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ENGLISH SUMMARY 
Organizations constantly face the pressure to adapt to evolving environments. 
However, the ability of management to both foresee the need for change and to 
timely implement it has been subject to much debate (Hannan and Freeman, 1984; 
Nelson and Winter, 1992; Romanelli and Tushman, 1994). Can organizations 
undergo substantial change and survive, or does organizational evolution happen 
only at the population level? This is one of the most fundamental questions in 
organizational research. Regardless of their success record, organizations in fact 
regularly embark on major transformations. Thus, a relevant question is: what 
happens when organizations undergo such transformations? Specifically, given that 
the human capital embedded in employees can form the basis of an organization’s 
competitive advantage (Barney, 1991; Coff, 1997; Hitt et al., 2001), what are the 
consequences of these transformational efforts on employees? In this thesis, I 
explore the effect of major organizational change on employee mobility and stress. 
In particular, I focus on the outcome of two strategies used by organizations for the 
purpose of change: mergers and acquisitions (M&As) and external CEO/top-
management team (TMT) replacement.  
M&As provide the means for organizational transformation through expansion and 
resource acquisition by means of market entry (Bower, 2001; Harzing, 2002; 
Shimizu et al., 2004), technology acquisition and innovation, diversification and 
spread of risk, and expansion of capacity or consolidation to increase efficiency 
(Chatterjee, 1992; Christensen et al., 2011; Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999; Graebner 
et al., 2017; Bower, 2001; Haleblian et al., 2009). While the performance outcomes 
of M&As have been subject to much research, individual-level behavioral outcomes 
have received substantially less attention. For example, several scholars have linked 
the poor performance records of M&As to negative employee reactions to such 
M&As (Cartwright and Schoenberg, 2006; Davy et al., 1988; Levinson, 1970; 
Marks and Mirvis, 2001; Schuler and Jackson, 2001); however, the research on the 
link between M&As and employee outcomes remains sparse and strongly focused 
on management. One key individual behavior with potentially negative 
organizational outcomes is employee turnover. Employee turnover undermines 
organizational performance by eroding the social and human capital base of the 
organization and affecting organizational performance, survival and competitive 
advantage (Aime et al., 2010; Hancock et al., 2013; Hatch and Dyer, 2004; Heavey 
et al., 2013; Kacmar et al., 2006; Park and Shaw, 2013; Shaw et al., 2005; Wezel et 
al., 2006). Sudden increases in employee turnover can be particularly disruptive for 
performance (Heavey et al., 2013), quickly eroding the organization’s human capital 
–the knowledge, skills, abilities and other characteristics that are relevant for 
economic output (Ployhart et al., 2014). 
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The point of departure of the first article of this thesis is thus as follows: Do M&As 
increase employee turnover; if so, who leaves? I find that employee turnover 
unambiguously increases as a result of M&As. However, a more granular analysis 
shows a “last-in-first-out” scenario and does not back up the notion that top 
employees depart en masse following M&As. Consequently, one must question the 
degree to which accounts of human capital drain following M&As are representative 
of a wide set of organizations. Accounts of top employees departing following 
M&As may be compounded by the fact that top-performing employees are relatively 
more visible in the labor market in general, and they are thus highly mobile 
(Groysberg et al., 2008). Nevertheless, I find that the mobility of top-performing 
employees is not particularly increased by M&As. The findings also reinforce recent 
evidence that M&A deals can be put off by potential employee mobility (Younge et 
al., 2014) as organizations consider human capital retention key to value creation in 
deals (Pablo, 1994). The findings also indicate that employee turnover is largely 
involuntary as organizations integrate operationally in the quest for synergy 
realization, as those who leave have relatively low human capital.  
While the most common path for employee mobility is between established 
organizations, employee transition to entrepreneurship is becoming increasingly 
common. Similar to turnover, entrepreneurial entry has been associated with 
significant performance damage for the source organization (Campbell et al., 2012; 
Wezel et al., 2006). The second article of this thesis therefore aims to study the 
impact of M&As on entrepreneurial entry. Following the sociological approach of 
Sørensen and Sharkey (2014), I argue that changes in the opportunity structure 
within the organization change the relative attractiveness of entrepreneurship for 
employees as a means by which to advance their career. In other words, employees 
enter entrepreneurship because they perceive it to be the best way to advance 
(Sørensen and Sharkey, 2014). In the same vein, I argue that employees with higher 
levels of organization-specific capabilities and who are closest to the opportunity 
ceiling are more likely to transition to entrepreneurship as a reaction to shocks to the 
span of control. Overall, I find concrete evidence that M&As indeed increase the 
transition to entrepreneurship for employees of M&A targets. This finding supports 
and extends the previous studies on entrepreneurial entry in high-tech industries that 
have considered M&As to be a relevant factor (Brittain and Freeman, 1986; 
Buenstorf, 2007; Klepper, 2009; Klepper and Thomson, 2010). The finding also 
shows that this transition is particularly marked for employees in management 
positions who are arguably closest to the ceiling in the internal opportunity structure 
(Sørensen and Sharkey, 2014). The sudden increase in the span of control due to an 
M&A means that managers’ advancement opportunities are curtailed, which 
translates into higher entrepreneurial entry rates. The impact of M&As on 
entrepreneurial transition is short-lived, and those who stay are no longer more 
likely to transition to entrepreneurship. 
7 
However, not all M&As are equal. The effects of M&As on employee mobility vary 
greatly depending on the deal characteristics, particularly the level of industry 
relatedness between target and acquirer in M&As. The M&A literature (Larsson and 
Finkelstein, 1999; Paruchuri et al., 2006; Puranam et al., 2009; Zollo and Singh, 
2004) indicates that the closer the degree of relatedness, the higher the levels of 
integration needed to fully unlock the value of the deal. Higher levels of resource 
redundancy and a greater span of control for management would suggest that the 
higher the integration is, the stronger the effect on mobility. I find that employee 
turnover indeed increases with the level of industry relatedness: the greater the 
overlap, the stronger the effect on employee turnover. The effect of industry 
relatedness is the same for entrepreneurial entry barring one major difference: 
closely related M&As have no effect. This difference reveals an identified 
countervailing force at play that generates a boundary condition or even a U-shaped 
relationship between industry relatedness in M&As and entrepreneurial entry. 
Potential candidates in this context include noncompete contractual clauses or 
economic incentives (e.g., vested stock) to discourage employees’ transition to 
entrepreneurship. Lastly, pursuing a gradual M&A approach is an effective means of 
avoiding employee turnover. Equity alliances that gradually increase the 
involvement of the acquirer in the M&A target in effect reduce the impact of M&As 
on employee turnover, possibly by reducing adverse partner selection (Reuer and 
Ragozzino, 2008) and providing enough time for employees to adapt their 
perception of fit with the new organizational image (Holtom et al., 2005). 
The third article of this thesis, co-authored with Michael S. Dahl, explores a second 
strategy used to achieve organizational change: namely, external top-management 
team (TMT) replacement. Executive replacement is often considered an inflection 
point in an organization’s lifecycle, providing the opportunity to reorient strategies, 
processes and structures (Tushman and Rosenkopf, 1996). Newcomers often come 
with a mandate for change and are given substantial managerial discretion to carry 
out such change (Barron et al., 2011; Karaevli, 2007; Quigley and Hambrick, 2012; 
Shen and Cannella, Jr., 2002). Because top managers’ decision-making is shaped by 
their ability to search for information, identify issues, specify alternatives and 
choose the most appropriate courses of action (Hambrick and Fukutomi, 1991), 
altering the composition of the TMT potentially leads to changes in decision-making 
and strategy, consequently affecting the entire organization. External successors 
arguably have both stronger ability and motivation to push for change than internal 
successors (Barron et al., 2011; Karaevli, 2007; Quigley and Hambrick, 2012; 
Miller, 1993; Shen and Cannella, Jr., 2002; Virany et al., 1992; Wiersema, 1992; 
Weisbach, 1995).  
While the direct performance outcome of TMT replacement has been a fruitful area 
of research (i.e., Barron et al., 2011; Haveman, 1993; Tushman and Rosenkopf, 
1996; Williams et al., 2017), with a general focus on the CEO figure (i.e., Beatty & 
Zajac, 1987; Georgakakis and Ruigrok, 2017; Karaevli and Zajac, 2013; Karaevli, 
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2007; Khurana and Nohria, 2000; Leker and Salomo, 2000; Shen and Cannella, Jr, 
2002), its potential impact on employees’ psychological wellbeing and turnover 
have been considerably less studied. Employees’ mental wellbeing is clearly a 
relevant topic in itself; additionally, it is relevant for organizations given the 
potential negative impact of impoverished mental health on employee productivity 
(Adler et al., 2006; Brenninkmeijer et al., 2008; Harter et al., 2002; Stewart et al., 
2003; Wang et al., 2004). Motivated by this literature, we investigate how external 
CEO/TMT replacement influence employees’ mental health and turnover. 
We consistently find that external TMT-member replacement increases employee 
turnover and stress and that external TMT-member replacement in unstable contexts 
increases employee turnover, irrespective of the organizational performance in the 
period leading up to the replacement. These findings are in line with the upper-
echelon view of the firm, by which the whole TMT shapes the organization and its 
strategy and does not support views that either positive or negative organizational 
performance is a prerequirement for change (Boeker, 1997; Karaevli and Zajac, 
2013; Zhang and Rajagopalan, 2010). However, performance is relevant with regard 
to external CEO replacement. In a context of positive performance, external CEO 
replacement does not have a significant impact on employee turnover or stress, 
irrespective of CEO replacement in the previous years. When performance is 
negative, externally replacing the CEO actually reduces employee turnover if there 
was no replacement the year before. Taken together, this is evidence that CEO 
succession is least disruptive for employees when the organization is performing 
strongly; CEO succession is even positive in periods of poor performance without 
recent replacement. 
Another major finding is that joint replacement events involving internal CEO 
replacement increase employee turnover whereas joint replacement events involving 
external CEO replacement decrease turnover. We believe that two mechanisms 
could be at play here: first, it could be a timing issue as employees wait to have 
more information on the new external CEO’s and the remodeled TMT’s potential 
impact on the organization, and as the new executives in turn learn more about the 
organization before embarking on major changes. This would be consistent with 
cases such as Louis V. Gerstner, Jr.’s tenure as CEO of IBM (Karaevli, 2007). 
Second, it is possible that “internal contender” succession –whereby the CEO is 
forced to step down as a result of power struggles and is replaced internally– can be 
more disruptive for employees than external CEO replacements when coupled with 
TMT restructuring. With their more in-depth knowledge of the organization, internal 
contenders would be in a position to initiate change swiftly after their appointments, 
bringing in new TMT-members to overcome opposition to change. This is in line 
with Shen and Cannella, Jr. (2002), who point out that internal contender succession 
will have the most immediate impact on organizational performance as contenders 
initially have a better understanding of the required changes and how to harness 
internal support than external candidates. This second possible mechanism raises 
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some questions regarding the extent to which executive “outsiderness” is a 
meaningful trait in cognitive terms, as initially theorized. If external CEOs bring in 
fresh perspectives and cognitive schemas that have a substantial impact on the 
organization, then why does the joint external replacement of the CEO and other 
TMT-members not have an impact on employee turnover and stress whereas internal 
replacement does have an impact? The argument of internal political resistance to 
new external CEOs does not hold water either, because members of the TMT are 
also replaced in this scenario, paving the way for the new CEO to establish his or 
her agenda. Altogether, on the one hand, the evidence supports the notion of internal 
contender succession as the most disruptive type for employees; on the other hand, 
and it calls for a re-examination of the factors of outsiderness that may determine the 
impact of external successors on employee turnover and stress. 
Overall, this thesis sheds further light on the consequences of organizational change 
on employees. It contributes to the literature on employee mobility (Campbell et al., 
2012; Sørensen and Sharkey, 2014; Wezel et al., 2006) and the outcomes of M&As 
(King et al., 2004; Krug and Hegarty, 1997; Marks and Mirvis, 2001; Paruchuri et 
al., 2006; Younge et al., 2014), by showing if and when M&A deals lead to 
employee turnover and entrepreneurial entry. Furthermore, it contributes to the 
growing literature on the mental health consequences of organizational change 
(Dahl, 2011; Ferrie et al., 1998). In doing so, it moves us a step further in our 
understanding of what happens when organizations embark on transformational 
processes.  
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DANSK RESUME 
Organisationer står konstant overfor at skulle tilpasse sig ændrende miljøer. 
Alligevel er ledelsesniveauets evne til bade at forudse behovet for forandring og 
tilpasse sig i tide et emne, der har været debatteret ofte. (Hannan and Freeman, 
1984; Nelson and Winter, 1992; Romanelli and Tushman, 1994). Kan organisationer 
gennemgå betydelig ændring og overleve, eller kan organisationsudvikling kun 
foregå på individniveau? Det er en af de mest fundamentale spørgsmål i 
organisationsforskning. Upåagtet af deres tidligere erfaringer, så er faktummet ikke 
desto mindre, at organisationer ofte gennemgår større transformationer. Et relevant 
spørgsmål er derfor: “hvad sker der, når de gør dette?”. Specifikt, givet at en 
organisations menneskelige kapital kan være basis for dens konkurrencemæssige 
fordel (Barney, 1991; Coff, 1997; Hitt et al., 2001), hvad er konsekvensen for denne 
forandringsmæssige indsats på medarbejderne? I denne afhandling vil jeg udforske 
effekten af større organisatoriske transformationer på medarbejdermobilitet og stess. 
Helt specifikt vil fokusset være på resultatet af to strategier, som bruges til 
forandring: Fusioner og opkøb (kendt som M&As) og ekstern CXO-udskiftning 
(TMT-replacement)  
M&As giver en mulighed for transformation af organisationer igennem ekspansion 
og tilegnelse af resurser til at entrere markedet (Bower, 2001; Harzing, 2002; 
Shimizu et al., 2004), tilegnelse af teknologi og innovation, diversifikation og 
spredning af risiko, samt kapacitets udvidelse eller konsolidering for at øge 
effektivitet. (Chatterjee, 1992; Christensen et al., 2011; Larsson and Finkelstein, 
1999; Graebner et al., 2017; Bower, 2001; Haleblian et al., 2009). Selvom effekten 
af M&As på bundlinjen har været emnet for megen forskning, så har effekten på 
individniveau været begrænset. For eksempel, så har flere forskere fundet 
sammenhæng mellem dårlige resultater for M&As og negative medarbejder 
reaktioner (Cartwright and Schoenberg, 2006; Davy et al., 1988; Levinson, 1970; 
Marks and Mirvis, 2001; Schuler and Jackson, 2001), men forskningen på denne 
sammenhæng mellem M&As og medarbejdere har været sparsomlig og oftest 
fokuseret på ledelsen. Et nøgleparameter for individuel opførsel, som kan have 
negative organisatoriske konsekvenser, er medarbejderudskiftning. 
Medarbejderudskiftning kan være med til at underminere en organisations evne til at 
præstere, ved at erodere den sociale og menneskelige kapital, som er fundamentet 
for organisationen og på den måde påvirke organisations evne til at præstere, 
overleve og dens konkurrencemæssige fordel (Aime et al., 2010; Hancock et al., 
2013; Hatch and Dyer, 2004; Heavey et al., 2013; Kacmar et al., 2006; Park and 
Shaw, 2013; Shaw et al., 2005; Wezel et al., 2006). Pludselige stigninger i 
medarbejderudskiftning kan være specielt ødelæggende for en virksomheds 
præstation (Heavey et al., 2013), og hurtigt erodere en organisations menneskelige 
kapital – viden, evner, færdigheder og andre træk, som er afgørende for økonomiske 
resultater (Ployhart et al., 2014). 
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Udgangspunktet for denne afhandlings første artikel er derfor: Øger M&As 
medarbejderudskiftning, og i givet fald, hvem forlader organisationen? Det, som jeg 
finder ud af, er, at medarbejderudskiftningen utvetydigt stiger i forbindelse med en 
M&A, men en mere finmasket analyse viser, at der er tale om en ”last-in-first-out” 
situation, hvilket ikke kan underbygge idéen om, at topmedarbejdere forlader 
organisationen i massevis i kølvandet på en M&A. Man bliver derfor nødt til at 
spørge sig selv, i hvilket omfang menneskelig kapital drænes fra en organisation 
efterfølgende en M&A er repræsentativt for et bredt udvalg af organisationer. 
Fortællinger om nøglemedarbejdere, der forlader organisationen efter en M&A, 
bliver muligvis forstærket af, at disse medarbejdere ofte er mere synlige på 
arbejdsmarkedet generelt og derfor har en højere mobilitet (Groysberg et al., 2008). 
Ikke desto mindre, så peger mine undersøgelser på, at nøglemedarbejders mobilitet 
ikke stiger betydeligt efter en M&A. Dette resultat forstærker også nylig evidens på, 
at M&A aftaler kan blive udskudt grundet potentiel medarbejder mobilitet (Younge 
et al., 2014), da organisationer betragter menneskelig kapital fastholdelse som 
nøglen til en aftales værdiskabelse (Pablo, 1994). Det peger også på, at 
medarbejderudskiftet primært er ufrivillig, da organisationer integreres operationelt I 
jagten på synergier, da dem, som forlader organisationen har relativt lav 
menneskelig kapital.  
Selvom den mest normale vej for medarbejdermobiltet er mellem to etablerede 
organisationer, så er overgangen til iværksætteri stadig stigende. Ligesom 
medarbejderfrafald, så er iværksætteri også blevet associeret med signifikant 
påvirkning på organisationen, hvorfra medarbejderen udspringer. (Campbell et al., 
2012; Wezel et al., 2006). Den anden artikel i denne afhandling har derfor til formål 
at belyse betydningen af M&A på iværksætteri. Baseret på Sørensen og Sharkey’s 
(2014) sociologiske tilgang, så argumenterer jeg for, at ændringer i 
mulighedsstrukturen inde i organisationen kan gøre det relativt mere attraktivt for 
medarbejdere at forfølge iværksætteri, som en måde hvorpå de kan fremme deres 
karriere. Med andre ord, medarbejdere bliver iværksætteri fordi de ser det som den 
bedste måde at fremme deres karriere på (Sørensen and Sharkey, 2014). I samme 
ombæring argumenterer jeg for, at medarbejdere med et højere niveau af 
organisationsspecifikke kompetencer og tættere på toppen af 
avancementsmulighederne, er mere tilbøjelige til at overgå til iværksætteri, som en 
reaktion på iværksætteri, som en reaktion på organisatoriske ændringer af ansvar og 
muligheder. I det store hele finder jeg konkrete beviser på, at M&A’er øger 
overgangen til iværksætteri for medarbejdere i organisationer, som er mål for 
M&A’s. Disse fund under- og udbygger tidligere studier omkring iværksætteri i 
high-tech industrier med fokus M&A’s (Brittain and Freeman, 1986; Buenstorf, 
2007; Klepper, 2009; Klepper and Thomson, 2010). Det viser også, at denne 
overgang er specielt relevant for medarbejdere i ledelsesstillinger, som formentlig er 
tættere på loftet ift avancement internt i organisationen (Sørensen and Sharkey, 
2014). Den pludselig stigning i the span of control pga. M&As betyder, at lederes 
mulighed for avancement bliver begrænset, hvilket kan overføres til en stigning i 
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nystartede iværksætteri. Betydning af M&As på iværksætteri er kortlivet, og de, som 
bliver, har ikke en øget sandsynlighed for at overgå til iværksætteri. 
Dog er alle M&As ikke skabt lige. Effekten fra en M&A på medarbejdermobilitet 
variere betydeligt afhængigt af aftalens sammensætning – specielt niveauet af 
industri ensartethed mellem målet og opkøberen i M&A. Litteraturen inden for 
M&As (Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999; Paruchuri et al., 2006; Puranam et al., 2009; 
Zollo and Singh, 2004) indikere, at jo mere ensartet de to er, desto mere integration 
er påkrævet for at kunne fuldt ud realisere aftalens værdi. Et højere niveau af resurse 
redundans og øget ?ledelsesmæssigt omfang?, jo mere integration er nødvendig og 
desto højere er effekten på medarbejdermobiliteten. Mine resultater peger på, at 
medarbejdermobiliteten stiger i takt med brancheensartheden: jo større overlap, 
desto større er effekten på medarbejdermobiliteten. Brancheensartetheden har 
samme effekt på iværksætteri, dog med én primær forskel – M&As med meget ens 
aktører har ingen effekt. Dette peger på en identificeret udligningseffekt, som skaber 
en grænse eller måske endda et U-formet forhold mellem brancheensartethed og 
entreprenante tendenser. Potentielle kandidater har ofte konkurrenceklausuler eller 
økonomiske incitamenter (fx medarbejderaktier) med det formål at afholde 
medarbejderens lyst til at blive selvstændig. Til sidst skal det nævnes, at forfølgelse 
af en gradvis M&A tilgang virker til at være en effektiv måde at undgå 
medarbejdere forlader organisationen. Equity alliances, som gradvist øger 
opkøberens engagement i målet for M&A, reducere opkøbets betydning på 
medarbejderfrafald – formentlig grundet reduceret ugunstig partner selektion (Reuer 
and Ragozzino, 2008) og samtidig giver medarbejdere tilstrækkeligt med tid til at 
tilpasse deres syn på deres rolle i den nye organisation (Holtom et al., 2005). 
Denne afhandlings tredje artikel, som er medforfattet af Michael S. Dahl, udforsker 
en anden strategi for at opnå organisatorisk forandring: nemlig ekstern udskiftning 
af CXO-teamet. Udskiftning i topledelsen bliver ofte betragtet som et 
brydningspunkt i en organisations livscyklus, som giver mulighed for at reorientere 
strategier, processer og strukturer (Tushman and Rosenkopf, 1996). Nytilkomne får 
ofte et betydeligt ledelsesmæssigt mandate til at foretage ændringer i organisationen 
(Barron et al., 2011; Karaevli, 2007; Quigley and Hambrick, 2012; Shen and 
Cannella, Jr., 2002). Siden topleders beslutningsgrundlag bliver skabt på baggrund 
af deres evne til at søge efter information, identificere udfordringer, specificere 
alternativer og vælge den mest relevante løsning (Hambrick and Fukutomi, 1991), 
ændres sammensætningen af topledelsen, så kan dette føre til potentielle ændringer i 
beslutningsprocessen, samt strategi, hvilket kan have en negativ påvirkning på hele 
organisationen. Eksterne efterfølgere har velsagtens både en større mulighed og 
motivation for at presse forandringer igennem ift. interne efterfølgere (Barron et al., 
2011; Karaevli, 2007; Quigley and Hambrick, 2012; Miller, 1993; Shen and 
Cannella, Jr., 2002; Virany et al., 1992; Wiersema, 1992; Weisbach, 1995).  
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Hvor den direkte præstationseffekt af CXO-udskiftning har været fokus for megen 
forskning (i.e., Barron et al., 2011; Haveman, 1993; Tushman and Rosenkopf, 1996; 
Williams et al., 2017), med et generelt fokus på CEO’en (i.e., Beatty & Zajac, 1987; 
Georgakakis and Ruigrok, 2017; Karaevli and Zajac, 2013; Karaevli, 2007; Khurana 
and Nohria, 2000; Leker and Salomo, 2000; Shen and Cannella, Jr, 2002), så er den 
potentielle påvirkning af medarbejderes psykiske velbefindende og udskiftning ikke 
dokumenteret i samme grad. Medarbejderes mentale velbefindende er et ganske 
relevant emne i sig selv, og specielt organisationer, given den potentielle negative 
betydning, som dårligt arbejdsmiljø og velbefindende kan have på produktiviteten 
(Adler et al., 2006; Brenninkmeijer et al., 2008; Harter et al., 2002; Stewart et al., 
2003; Wang et al., 2004). Motiveret af denne literatur, undersøger vi hvordan 
CEO/CXO-udskiftning påvirker medarbejderes mentale velbefindende og 
udskiftning. 
Vores resultater peger konsistent på, at eksterne CXO-udskiftninger øger 
medarbejderes stressniveau og udskiftning, og at CXO-udskiftning i usikre tider, 
upåagtet af organisationens præstationer i perioden op til udskiftning, øger 
medarbejderudskiftning. Dette falder godt I tråd med Upper Echelon-teoris syn på 
CXO-teamet, som værende formende for en organisation og dens strategi; og lader 
ikke til at støtte den tilgang, at enten positive eller negative organisatoriske 
præstationer, som værende katalysator til forandring. (Boeker, 1997; Karaevli and 
Zajac, 2013; Zhang and Rajagopalan, 2010). Præstationer har dog betydning, når der 
er tale om en ekstern CEO-udskiftning. I en kontekst med positive resultater, har 
ekstern CEO-udskiftning ikke en betydende indflydelse på medarbejderudskiftning 
og stess – upåagtet af CEO-udskiftninger i foregående år. Når præstationer har været 
dårlige, så kan en ekstern udskiftning af CEO’en faktisk reducere 
medarbejderudskiftning, hvis der ikke har været nogen udskiftning i året før. 
Sammenholder man dette, så er der evidens for, at en CEO-udskiftning har mindst 
påvirkning på medarbejderne, når organisationen klarer sig godt og endda positiv i 
perioder med dårlige præstationer uden nylige udskiftninger. 
Et andet betydeligt fund er, at samlet udskiftninger, hvor flere medlemmer af CXO-
teamet inkl. CEO udskiftes, hvor CEO-efterfølgeren er intern, øger 
medarbejderudskiftning, hvor hvis CEO-efterfølgeren have været ekstern, så havde 
det formindsket medarbejderudskiftning. Vi mener, at der kan være to mekanismer 
på spil her. For det første kan det være et spørgsmål om timing, hvor medarbejderne 
afventer mere information om den nye eksterne CEO og den nye CXO-
sammensætnings påvirkning på organisationen, samtidig med at et nyt CXO-team 
forsøger at lære mere om organisationen før man påbegynder større forandringer. 
Dette ville være på linje med cases så som Louis V. Gerstner, Jr.’s turnus som CEO 
for IBM (Karaevli, 2007). For det andet, så er det muligt at en intern efterfølger – 
hvor CEO bliver tvunget til at fratræde sin stilling som et resultat af interne 
magtkampe og derefter udskiftet internt – kan have en mere kraftig påvirkning på 
medarbejdere end en ekstern kandidat, hvis det bliver koblet med andre CXO-
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udskiftninger. Med deres mere dybdegående kendskab til organisationen, så 
forventes interne kandidater at være i en position, hvor de hurtigt kunne initiere 
forandring efter deres tiltrædelse og udpege nye CXO-medlemmer for at 
overkomme modstand mod forandring. Dette er på linje med Shen and Cannella, Jr. 
(2002), som påpeger, at en intern efterfølger vil have den mest umiddelbart 
påvirkning på organisationens præstationer, da disse vil have en bedre forståelse for 
de forandringer, som er påkrævet, samt at stable intern støtte på benene, end 
eksterne kandidater. Denne anden mulige mekanisme rejser ligeledes en række 
spørgsmål omkring I hvilket omfang, at CXO’ers “outsiderness” er en 
betydningsfuld egenskab i en kognitiv kontekst, som det oprindeligt blev troet. Hvis 
eksterne CEO’er bringer nye perspektiver og måder at tænke på, som har en 
betydelig påvirkning på organisationen, hvorfor har en dobbelt ekstern udskiftning – 
af CEO og andre CXO-medlemmer – ikke en påvirkning på medarbejderudskiftning 
og stress, men interne udskiftninger har? Argumentet om intern politisk modstand 
mod en ny ekstern CEO holder heller ikke vand, fordi medlemmer af CXO-teamet 
også udskiftes I dette scenarie, hvilket baner vejen for, at CEO’ens egen agenda. Alt 
I alt underbygger resultaterne, en intern efterfølger som værende mest påvirkende på 
medarbejderne på den ene hånd, og på den anden hånd peger på behovet for en ny 
undersøgelse af, hvilke ”outsider”-faktorer, som er betydende for eksterne 
efterfølgers påvirkning på medarbejderudskiftning og stress.  
Overordnet set, så har denne afhandling kastet yderligere lys på konsekvenserne for 
medarbejderne ved organisatorisk forandring. Den bidrager til litteraturen indenfor 
medarbejdermobilitet (Campbell et al., 2012; Sørensen and Sharkey, 2014; Wezel et 
al., 2006) og resultaterne af M&As (King et al., 2004; Krug and Hegarty, 1997; 
Marks and Mirvis, 2001; Paruchuri et al., 2006; Younge et al., 2014), ved at vise, at 
hvis og når M&A-aftaler fører til medarbejderudskiftning og iværksætteri. Hertil 
bidrager den også til et voksende forskningsområde indenfor konsekvenserne ved 
organisatorisk forandring på medarbejders mentale velbefindende (Dahl, 2011; 
Ferrie et al., 1998). Dermed er den med til at bringe os et skridt tættere på en 
forståelse af, hvad der sker, når en organisation bevæger sig ud på en transformativ 
rejse. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction  
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
Few ideas find as much support among organizational scholars as the need for 
organizations to adapt to changes in the environment to survive and grow. To that 
end, managers constantly formulate and implement new strategies and 
organizations. Considerably more contested, however, is the ability of organizations 
to successfully change and undergo transformational processes. On the one hand, the 
management literature often considers organizations to be fairly malleable, a view 
that is in line with what Hannan and Freeman (1984) refer to as ‘rational adaptation 
theory’. Through this lens, managers envision a specific end-state and commit 
resources for transforming organizations accordingly. The ability of organizations to 
reconfigure resources to address environmental changes, so-called dynamic 
capabilities, is in fact at the core of strategic management theory (Teece et al., 
1997). Punctuated equilibrium theories of organizational transformation, whereby 
organizations undergo fundamental transformations in a short time span following 
long periods of stability, have also received considerable support in the management 
research (Romanelli and Tushman, 1994). Although these theories recognize the 
risks of engaging in transformational processes, they nevertheless sustain that 
organizations can and indeed do undergo fundamental change. On the other hand, 
organizational ecologists argue that inertial forces prevent organizations from 
substantially and timely changing courses of action (Hannan and Freeman, 1984). 
Evolution is seen in this context as occurring at the population level (i.e., through 
the creation of new organizations and organizational forms) rather than at the 
organizational level (Hannan and Freeman, 1977). In Nelson and Winter’s words, 
“highly flexible adaptation to change is not likely to characterize the behavior of 
individual organizations” (1992: 134). Although some types of organizational 
changes occur with frequency, and sometimes even radical changes, evolutionary 
selection processes favor rigid organizational structures. Both internal and external 
pressures generate structural inertia, from internal politics and sunk costs to legal 
and institutional norms. While managers may generate new strategies and 
organizations, structural inertia largely prevents them from timely and successfully 
carrying out major change processes.  
The idea that organizations can successfully adapt to changing environments hinges 
on the premise of congruency between design and outcome: is management able to 
both foresee the need for change and to timely implement the means by which to 
achieve a specific end state? Changes to an organization’s core rarely occur 
overnight. Organizational ecologists have identified four process that delay and 
often prevent changes to an organization’s core (Hannan et al., 2003: 463): “(1) 
structural processes, including the consequences of intricacy and viscosity 
(sluggishness of response); (2) institutional processes, involving identities and the 
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"moral" character of structural arrangements; (3) political processes, involving 
interests and interest-group politics; and (4) learning processes, involving feedback 
over time.”  
During the time period in which new rules and structures are taking shape and the 
existing ones are being challenged and dismantled, the likelihood of conflict 
increases as contending parties strive to mold the organization to their own interests. 
This transition process makes organizations unstable and lowers reliability and 
performance, increasing organizational death rates (Hannan and Freeman, 1984). In 
addition, the reorganization process limits the organization’s capability to take 
advantage of opportunities (Hannan et al., 2003). The longer this transition period, 
the higher the organizational mortality rates will be. The worst possible scenario for 
an organization is to take so long to arrive at a new end-state that the new structure 
is no longer fit for the environment. Thus, even when decision-makers are able to 
see the necessary changes required, the time required to complete the 
transformational effort will be determined by the intricacy of an organization’s 
design and its “viscosity”, i.e., the typical time it takes for a unit to respond to 
changes and bring local architecture into conformity (Hannan et al., 2003). 
Embarking on major change processes can thus be problematic and even deadly for 
organizations. 
Despite the ongoing debate over the ability of organizations to successfully design 
and implement major change processes, it is undoubted that organizations often do 
attempt to change. The perceived need for change often overcomes the potential 
negative consequences of organizational change. In that regard, a number of relevant 
questions arise when transitioning from the issue of “can organizations change?” to 
“what happens to organizations when they try to do so?” It is precisely in this 
domain where the studies presented in this thesis take place. As organizational 
changes crafted in the upper echelons of the organization are announced and 
implemented, how do the rest of the organizational members react to the shock? 
The point of departure here is that, regardless of the need or ability of organizations 
to change, major change processes have the potential to be highly disruptive for 
employees, as emphasized by organizational ecologists. Changing deeply engrained 
values and norms is likely to have adverse effects on employees (Baron et al., 2001). 
The alteration of organizational routines may be met with emotional reactions, 
particularly if employees feel that they are not able to cope with the new tasks and 
practices. Attempts to alter core organizational features are negatively perceived by 
employees because they introduce uncertainty, causing anxiety and stress in 
employees (Bordia et al., 2004) and thus increasing their intention to leave 
(Schweiger and Denisi, 1991). Such perceptions are heightened by the reported 
increase in breaches of implicit psychological contracts and agreements between 
employers and employees (Morrison and Robinson, 1997; Rousseau, 1989). This 
often translates into lower organizational commitment as well as increased anti-
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social behavior, absenteeism and employee turnover. Based on the observation that 
organizational change often leads to negative employee reactions and outcomes, a 
number of authors have questioned the relative success of M&As and other 
restructuring efforts (Cartwright and Schoenberg, 2006; Marks and Mirvis, 2001; 
Schuler and Jackson, 2001). 
This issue is of strategic importance for organizations because employee reactions to 
change can have a substantial impact on organizational performance. On the one 
hand, resource-based views of the firm (Barney, 1991) argue that an organization’s 
competitive advantage is based on its rare, inimitable and valuable resources, and 
often such resources take the form of human capital (Coff, 1997). Losing highly 
valuable employees as a consequence of organization change can further contribute 
performance disruptions, further undermining an organization’s competitive position 
–especially if employees go on to found their own ventures (Wezel et al., 2006). 
This is particularly marked when the employees leaving the organization have high 
levels of human and social capital (Nyberg, 2010) and if a high number of them 
leave in a short period of time (Heavey et al., 2013). On the other hand, a number of 
studies have also shown that employees’ mental wellbeing can have severe 
implications for their performance (Adler et al., 2006; Kessler et al., 1999; Stewart 
et al., 2003; Wang et al., 2004). Therefore, employee turnover and stress as a result 
of organizational disruptions has the potential to further undermine performance. 
Although the idea that organizational change can take its toll on employees has been 
studied before (see for example Dahl, 2011), there is still much to be explored: Do 
all types of organizational change have the same impact on employees? Which 
employees are most affected by change? This thesis focuses on the impact of two 
main types of organizational disruptions. The first and most prominent is Mergers 
and Acquisitions (M&As), which is the subject of the studies in presented in Chapter 
2 and Chapter 3. M&As are a common strategy for organizational expansion and 
resource acquisition worldwide. However, from the employee perspective, being an 
employee of an M&A target can be highly challenging as one is suddenly faced with 
new routines, processes, and organizational identities. A potential outcome of an 
M&A is thus employee mobility –either to a competitor or to entrepreneurship. 
Organizations are aware of this phenomenon; in fact, a number of deals may be put 
off by the potential loss of talent (Younge et al., 2014). In this context, the studies 
presented here explore both the impact of different types of M&As on employees 
and which groups of employees are most affected by them. Employee turnover in 
particular is studied in Chapter 2, whereas entrepreneurial entry is explored in 
Chapter 3. The second group of organizational disruptions investigated is external 
top executive replacement. Executive replacement is often considered an inflection 
point in an organization’s lifecycle, and it provides the opportunity to reorient 
strategies, processes and structures (Tushman and Rosenkopf, 1996). In particular, 
Chapter 4 presents a study of the impact of external (outsider) Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) and Top Management Team (TMT) replacement on employees. 
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Similar to M&As, strategic change and organizational reorientation following 
external executive replacement can disrupt the organization and have a substantial 
negative impact on employees. Thus, the main research question driving this thesis 
is as follows: 
What is the impact of M&As and external CEO/TMT replacements on 
employees? 
While the performance outcomes of both M&As and external executive succession 
have been subject to much research, individual-level behavioral outcomes have 
received substantially less attention. By most accounts, the overall performance 
gains from M&As fall well below expectations in up to 90% of M&As (Christensen 
et al., 2011; Marks and Mirvis, 2001). Several scholars have linked such 
performance to negative employee reactions to M&As (Cartwright and Schoenberg, 
2006; Davy et al., 1988; Levinson, 1970; Schuler and Jackson, 2001; Marks and 
Mirvis, 2001); however, the research on the link between M&As and employee 
outcomes remains sparse and strongly focused on management. There is no 
systematic analysis of the impact of M&As on employees based on objective 
evidence of their behavior while accounting for organizational and industry 
heterogeneity. What we know about employee reactions to M&As and external 
executive replacement is largely anecdotal or based on studies with limited research 
designs. This gap is due in no small measure to the general unavailability of 
databases that simultaneously track major organizational events and objective 
employee outcomes. 
Since individuals represent the microfoundations of organizations, their behavior is 
fundamental to organizations’ performance and survival. Therefore, this thesis 
focuses on employee behaviors that are considered to have detrimental 
consequences for organizational performance. In particular, I focus on employee 
mobility and negative stress outcomes of organizational disruptions. The potential 
costs of employee turnover and its impact on the organization’s resource base are 
well established in the literature (Shaw et al., 2013). The human capital that is 
embedded in employees can form the basis of an organization’s competitive 
advantage (Barney, 1991; Coff, 1997; Hitt et al., 2001), particularly organization-
specific knowledge, skills, and abilities (Hatch and Dyer, 2004). The more unique 
the set of valuable knowledge, skills, abilities, and other characteristics (KSAOs), 
and the more unique the system of interactions between them (Nyberg et al., 2014), 
the more likely it is that human capital will be rare, valuable and inimitable. 
Employee turnover undermines organizational performance by eroding the human 
capital base of the organization. The potential loss of social and human capital for 
organizations affects short-term financial and operational performance as well as 
organizations’ competitive advantage (Aime et al., 2010). Moreover, sharp increases 
in turnover are more disruptive than turnover that is spread over a long time period 
(Heavey et al., 2013). The mobility of employees into entrepreneurship is likewise 
associated with significant performance damage for the source organization 
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(Campbell et al., 2012; Wezel et al., 2006). Thus, the first study of this thesis 
(Chapter 2) specifically seeks to answer the following question: 
a) What is the effect of M&As on employee turnover? 
However, not all M&As are equal. M&As are strategies to expand an organization’s 
resource basis, and, as such, it can differ along several dimensions, depending on the 
relationship between newly acquired and previously existing resources. For 
example, M&As are used for market entry (Bower, 2001; Harzing, 2002), for 
technology acquisition and innovation, or to expand capacity and increase 
organizational efficiency –often referred to as synergies (Chatterjee, 1992; 
Christensen et al., 2011; Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999). Ultimately, the 
characteristics of the organizations and the rationale behind the M&A will affect the 
degree of required integration (Bauer et al., 2014; Chatterjee, 1992; Napier, 1989) 
and thus the degree to which M&As may represent a disruption to the targets’ 
employees. Although a high degree of integration is often seen as necessary for 
resource redeployment and exploitation (King et al., 2004), the expected level of 
synergies will be determined by the rationale behind a deal. For example, related 
M&As, where target and acquirer operate in the same industry, provide high 
opportunities for operational synergies, and high levels of integration are expected 
post-M&A (Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999; Paruchuri et al., 2006; Puranam et al., 
2009; Zollo and Singh, 2004). Cross-border M&As, on the other hand, may provide 
great opportunities for complementarities but relatively weaker operational 
synergies. Generally, it is critical to understand how different types of M&A may 
have different impacts on employee turnover, and thus, in Chapter 2, I further 
explore the following question: 
b) Do all types of M&A have the same effect on employee turnover?  
A number of scholars have studied the impact of employee turnover on 
organizational performance in a variety of contexts, from health care (nurses and 
physicians) to call-centers and restaurant chains. The great majority of studies in this 
area have found a negative relationship between turnover and organizational 
performance, survival and competitive advantage (Aime et al., 2010; Hancock et al., 
2013; Hatch and Dyer, 2004; Heavey et al., 2013; Kacmar et al., 2006; Park and 
Shaw, 2013; Shaw et al., 2005; Wezel et al., 2006). Similarly, the eventual success 
of M&As has often been tied to employees’ reactions to the deals (Cartwright and 
Schoenberg, 2006; Marks and Mirvis, 2001; Schuler and Jackson, 2001). However, 
not all employee turnover is the same, as not all individuals are equally valuable for 
organizations. Several factors may affect the overall impact of employee turnover on 
an organization. Employees’ levels of human capital –the aggregation of knowledge, 
skill, abilities and other characteristics (Ployhart et al., 2014)- are key to 
organizational performance (Dalton et al., 1982; Nyberg and Ployhart, 2013; Shaw 
et al., 2005). Thus, the turnover of high performing employees may be 
disproportionally damaging for organizational performance (Nyberg, 2010). The 
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effect of the loss of human capital due to employee turnover is particularly 
damaging in industries where investment in human capital is substantial (Shaw et 
al., 2005), as well as in knowledge- and skill-intensive industries (Hancock et al., 
2013). Therefore, understanding the question of who leaves following an M&A is 
crucial to understanding the overall effect on an organization; thus, the last guiding 
question of Chapter 2 is as follows: 
c) How is the effect of M&As on employee turnover distributed across 
different groups of employees? 
Among the different types of employee mobility, one that has drawn much scholarly 
attention is entrepreneurship. On the one hand, there is a belief that entrepreneurship 
is a major engine for economic and employment growth (Audretsch and Keilbach, 
2004). On the other hand, there is an increasing recognition of established 
organizations as the context within which entrepreneurship is born and nurtured 
(Brittain and Freeman 1986; Sørensen and Sharkey, 2014). Nevertheless, despite the 
growing interest in entrepreneurship and the understanding that entrepreneurship is 
not born in a vacuum, the linkage between organizational context and 
entrepreneurial entry remains underexplored (for an exception, see Sørensen and 
Sharkey, 2014). How do organizational disruptions, as significant events in the life 
of an organization, affect individuals’ choice of leaving the organization to enter 
entrepreneurship? Can M&As be an engine for entrepreneurial entry by employees 
of established organizations? These are highly relevant questions because this 
specific type of employee mobility can have a particularly negative impact on the 
performance of the source organization and its competitive advantage (Campbell et 
al. 2012, Wezel et al. 2006). Thus, entrepreneurship is not only greatly relevant for 
industrial and regional economic growth, but it also has significant implications for 
the performance of the source organization. In this context, the study presented in 
Chapter 3 argues that M&As increase the relative attractiveness of entrepreneurship 
for employees of M&A targets, acting as catalysts for entrepreneurial events 
(Krueger et al. 2000). The study therefore explores the following research question: 
d) What is the effect of M&As on entrepreneurial entry? 
Again, since M&As can be substantially heterogeneous, we should explore if 
different M&A types have different effects on entrepreneurship. Campbell et al. 
(2012) find that the negative effect of employee mobility into entrepreneurship 
increases with employee wages so that the departure of better-paid employees is 
most damaging for the source organization. Furthermore, as employees are 
positioned differently throughout the opportunity structure, they are likely to 
respond differently to changes in the span of control and advancement opportunities. 
Thus, in Chapter 3, I explore the following question: 
e) What is the differential effect of M&A types of entrepreneurial 
entry? 
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M&As are prevalent and perhaps extreme cases of organizational disruptions. Other 
major organizational events that are often considered transformative are CEO and 
TMT member replacements (Tushman and Rosenkopf, 1996). The consequences of 
replacing the CEO as well as other top executives have been extensively studied by 
management scholars. Based primarily on upper echelons theory (Hambrick and 
Mason, 1984), the axiom in the top management replacement literature is that the 
organization is a reflection of its leaders, and therefore changes at the top are 
matched by changes throughout the organization. In general, scholars define three 
types of replacement events: successor, contender, and outsider (Barron et al., 2011; 
Shen and Cannella, Jr., 2002). There are still questions with regard to the precise 
causes and consequences of each type of replacement. Nevertheless, the literature 
generally agrees that outsider executives are hired when the need for change is the 
greatest. The external replacement of the CEO and other TMT members is intended 
to transform the organization, bringing about substantive change and divergence 
from previous courses of action. Managers who have not been socialized into the 
organization are expected to provide diverse perspectives and insights, bringing 
along new information and cognitive frameworks that help organizations adapt and 
evolve. New external TMT members shape the ability of management to identify 
issues, search for information, specify alternatives and select appropriate courses of 
action (Hambrick and Fukutomi, 1991; Wiersema, 1992). These fresh insights and 
capabilities are bundled to new external members’ initial lack of organizational 
socialization and solid grasp of internal politics, which can have potentially 
disruptive consequences for organizations. New managers often have little incentive 
to keep the status quo at an organization, and they are therefore more likely to 
promote change than their predecessor (Miller, 1993; Tushman and Rosenkopf, 
1996). This is particularly marked in cases in which both the CEO and other 
members of the TMT are simultaneously replaced (Tushman and Rosenkopf, 1996). 
The redistribution of power, the redesign of control systems, the revision of 
practices, and new information systems are likely to be introduced following TMT 
replacement (Miller, 1993). Outsider executives are more likely to both have a 
greater mandate for change and to be granted considerable discretion to carry out 
change. Of all types of succession, outsider succession is the most likely to represent 
an organizational disruption, with potential impact on employees throughout the 
ranks. 
Similar to M&As, external executive succession can be highly disruptive for 
employees. With the growing body of literature analyzing the relationship between 
employee wellbeing and organizational performance (e.g., Adler et al., 2006; Harter 
et al., 2002; Kessler et al., 1999; Stewart et al., 2003; Wang et al., 2004), it is 
apparent that employee wellbeing has become paramount in the organizational 
research. The research shows that impoverished psychological health- and working 
environments increase workplace conflicts, unrest, stress, depression and 
absenteeism, decreasing productivity, increasing employee turnover and translating 
into substantial performance and financial losses (Kacmar et al., 2006; Krueger and 
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Mas, 2003; Mas, 2008; Park and Shaw, 2013; Shaw et al., 2005). The previous 
studies have also found that organizational changes have a significant impact on 
employees’ physiological and psychological well-being (Dahl, 2011; Ferrie et al., 
1998; Kivimäki et al., 2000). Since impoverished mental wellbeing can represent a 
tremendous drain of organizational resources (Stewart et al., 2003; Wang et al., 
2004), it is crucial for organizations to understand how organizational disruptions 
psychologically affect employees. Chapter 4 precisely studies this link between 
organizational-level disruptions and employee wellbeing. In the study, co-authored 
by Michael S. Dahl, we investigate the following question: 
f) What is the effect of external CEO/TMT member replacement on 
employee stress and turnover? 
The chapters of this thesis cover complementary aspects of organizational 
disruptions and their individual-level outcomes. As mentioned above, the focus of 
the studies presented in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 is on the outcomes of M&As. The 
perspective taken is that of the M&A target, with an emphasis on the disruptive 
effects of different types of M&A on employee mobility. The last study in Chapter 
4, co-authored by Michael S. Dahl, considers the outcomes of disruptions that are 
products of key personnel changes at the top of organizations. In particular, the last 
study addresses the effect of the external replacement of CEO and TMT members on 
employee stress and turnover. Ultimately, the relevance of this research hinges on 
the premise that employee reactions to organizational disruptions are both important 
in and of themselves, and it is critical to the success of organizational change 
processes. However, before we turn to the studies, I first review the relevant 
literature on the key concepts, treatments and outcomes of such studies. 
1.1.1.  ORGANIZATION DISRUPTIONS 
Organizational change and organizational disruptions are not the same phenomenon 
(Gjerløv-Juel, 2012). Organizations frequently change; however, such changes 
generally pertain to peripheral organizational structures, processes and activities. For 
organizational change to be considered disruptive, it must alter the organization’s 
core processes and routines (Gjerløv-Juel, 2012). From the organizational ecology 
perspective (Hannan and Freeman, 1984), an organization’s core is comprised of 
four general features: the organizational mission, the form of authority, the basic 
technologies, and the marketing strategy. Organizations embark much less 
frequently on the type of fundamental organizational changes that modify their cores 
than in changes to their peripheral structures and activities (Gjerløv-Juel, 2012).  
Of a potential number of organizational disruptions, this thesis focuses on two 
particularly salient types: M&As and external CEO/TMT member replacement. 
These types of organizational change have the potential to alter several of an 
organization’s core features simultaneously. Some scholars have argued, that M&As 
can in fact be so disruptive for employees that negative employee reactions are often 
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behind the failure of M&As. Recently, M&As have been scrutinized for their high 
failure rate, and although M&A performance metrics themselves have been put into 
question (Zollo and Meier, 2008), scholars claim that between 50% and 90% of 
deals fail to create the expected value (Christensen et al., 2011; Mark and Mirvis, 
2001; Schoenberg, 2006). Similarly, replacements of top executives, in particular by 
individuals who are new to the organization, has been defined as a pivotal moment 
in organizational life (Tushman and Rosenkopf, 1996). New external executives 
come with a mandate for change and no attachment to the status quo, and as they 
attempt to leave their mark on the organization and shape it according to their 
vision, they are a source of disruption.  
In this section, I review what we know about such organizational changes and how 
they can be disruptive for organizations. In doing so, I draw on specific literature 
streams regarding executive succession and M&As as well as more general literature 
streams including studies that adopt the resource-based view of the firm and human 
capital. 
M&As 
Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are one of the most widespread expansion 
strategies, enabling organizations to expand at a greater pace and change over a 
shorter period of time than occurs through organic growth (Kim et al., 2011). 
Whether their goal is to acquire new technologies or intellectual property (Ahuja and 
Katila, 2001; Cassiman et al., 2006), to expand geographically (e.g., Barkema and 
Vermeulen, 1998; Wang et al., 2009) or to consolidate production and distribution 
(Christensen et al., 2011), M&As are a very well established mechanism for 
transformation through boundary expansion (Aldrich and Ruef, 2006). Just since the 
turn of the century, over half a million M&A deals have been announced worldwide, 
worth in excess of $54 trillion (Thomson Financial, 2014). In parallel to their 
growing popularity, the perceived lack of success of M&As has caught the attention 
of scholars throughout the economics-, finance- and management fields, with some 
arguing that as many as half (Schoenberg 2006), three-quarters (Marks and Mirvis, 
2001), and even 70-90% (Christensen et al., 2011) of M&As actually fail to achieve 
their intended goals. Despite calls for the redefinition of “M&A performance” (Zollo 
and Meier, 2008), the factors behind such a high proportion of unsuccessful deals 
have been subject to much debate, which has led to an increased call to focus on the 
human aspects of M&As (Cartwright and Schoenberg, 2006; Davy et al., 1988; 
Levinson, 1970; Schuler and Jackson, 2001; Buono and Bowditch, 2003; Stahl and 
Voigt, 2004, 2008). These studies are grounded on the observation that, without 
employee support, the expected goals of M&As are seldom achieved (Chatterjee et 
al., 1992). 
The great majority of M&A deals involve the integration of the target into the 
acquiring organization; however, the degree of integration differs across deal types 
(Bauer et al., 2014; Chatterjee, 1992; Napier, 1989). Level of integration can be 
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defined as “the degree of postacquisition change in an organization’s technical, 
administrative, and cultural configuration” (Pablo, 1994: 806). In general, acquiring 
organizations will seek to plug the target into their existing line of business, 
processes and routines (Christensen et al., 2011); however, the targets of related 
M&As are more likely to become fully integrated into the acquirer, as such deals are 
mainly motivated by potential operational synergies (Chatterjee, 1992). In fact, 
Zollo and Singh (2004) argue that the benefits of related acquisitions are only 
expected to materialize in cases of extensive operational integration. Unrelated 
acquisitions are relatively more likely to grant greater degrees of autonomy to 
targets. There are exceptions to this approach whereby businesses keep their 
autonomy (see Zaheer et al., 2013). 
Full integration (or absorption) and full autonomy are presumably two extremes in 
what could be seen as an integration continuum. For example, Schweizer (2005) 
argues for hybrid integration strategies in technology acquisitions whereby different 
parts of the organization are integrated to different degrees. Others have argued that 
considering integration and autonomy to be opposites is actually a fallacy and that it 
is possible for targets to be fully integrated and retain their autonomy (Zaher et al., 
2013). 
The preservation of key strategic resources and skills that form the foundation of 
value creation is essential for achieving value in M&As (Pablo, 1994). The target-
specific bases for those resources and skills must not be eroded in the acquisition 
process, which highlights the tension between fully absorbing target organizations 
and keeping them at arm’s length. The integration process has thus been one of the 
main areas of the M&A research. Integration refers to “changes in the functional 
activity arrangements, organizational structures and systems, and cultures of 
combining organizations to facilitate their consolidation into a functioning whole” 
(Pablo, 1994: 806). The research on integration is mainly focused on either the 
sources of synergies from coordination, on the one hand, or on the impact of 
consolidation on the organization, on the other. The camp that thinks in terms of 
synergies focuses on establishing the variables that determine the potential increase 
in performance of the combined organization to establish patterns of deals that 
create value (Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999; Zollo and Singh, 2004). The camp that 
is concerned with the consequences of M&As with regard to the organization 
instead focuses on the implementation challenges, from operational disruptions 
(Paruchuri et al., 2006), to R&D and innovation (Cassiman et al., 2006; Puranam 
and Srikanth, 2007), to cultural compatibility (Chatterjee et al., 1992; Stahl and 
Voigt, 2004, 2008) and to HR policies and issues (Napier, 1989). 
The common ground for both camps is that M&As represent major change events 
for target organizations and their employees: M&As can profoundly change 
organizational structures, systems, processes and culture (Buono and Bowditch, 
2003). M&A targets generally undergo transformational changes to processes, 
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routines, and strategies, which can be greatly disruptive for employees and for 
organizational performance. Although a high degree of integration is often seen as 
being required for improved resource redeployment and exploitation (King et al., 
2004), integration is a highly uncertain process (Bauer et al., 2014). The 
transformation of organizational processes and routines is highly a stochastic 
phenomenon whereby employee resistance at different organizational levels has the 
potential to deviate the change outcome in unexpected directions (Hannan et al., 
2003). The disruptive effect of M&As on routines and the increased uncertainty for 
target employees is likely to negatively affect employees, resulting in reduced 
commitment and identification with the organization and even the reevaluation of 
their organizational fit. As I argue throughout this thesis, this effect results in higher 
employee mobility, both to other established organizations (Chapter 2) and into 
entrepreneurship (Chapter 3), particularly for employees with high levels of human 
capital. 
Clearly, not all M&As are equal, which is relevant (Bower, 2001). There are a 
number of dimensions along which M&As can be characterized. For example, 
M&As are often distinguished by the technological-, industry- and product market 
similarities of the target and the acquirer. When there is a significant overlap in 
terms of industry or product market between the organizations, it is generally 
described as related or horizontal acquisitions. When the target operates in entirely 
different industries than those of the acquirer, the deal is generally referred to as an 
unrelated or conglomerate M&A. Another relevant distinction in M&As concerns 
the national origin of the target and the acquirer: M&As can be either domestic or 
cross-border. Although a majority of deals are still domestic, the presence of cross-
border M&As has increased substantially over the last two decades. 
Different types of M&As have been associated with different rationale, antecedents, 
processes and outcomes. For example, the motives behind related M&As are 
generally considered to be operational synergies, leading to higher levels of 
postmerger integration and resource redundancy (Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999; 
Zollo and Singh, 2004). Unrelated M&As, however, are associated with 
diversification, technology acquisition or a vertical integration of the value chain, 
and they are characterized by less overlap of skills, knowledge and capabilities 
between the target and the acquirer. In general, we expect that the greater the degree 
of operational and competence overlap between target and acquirer, the greater the 
degree of post-M&A integration will be to unlock to value of the M&A. Resource 
redundancy between the two organizations is expected following more extensive 
organizational integration (Zollo and Singh, 2004), and thus higher levels of 
integration potentially translate into the shutting down of sites, redundancies and 
layoffs (Christensen et al., 2011). In this context, employees are likely to perceive a 
greater risk of being laid off, and they will therefore seek employment opportunities 
elsewhere. In fact, this increased risk of employee turnover has been found to 
impede M&A deals (Younge et al., 2014). The extensive integration process in 
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related M&As is likely to affect not only employee commitment but also the 
distribution of opportunities within the organizations. These changes, as I argue in 
Chapter 3, can truncate career development paths and increase the relative 
attractiveness of entrepreneurship as a career choice. 
Cross-border acquisitions are motivated by geographical expansion into new 
markets, which on the one hand adds an additional level of acculturation, and on the 
other presents minimal overlap of activities between target and acquirer, and, 
therefore, limited sociocultural integration is required (Stahl and Voigt, 2008). 
Cultural difference can have an important effect on the success of M&As (Chatterjee 
et al., 1992). Differences in national culture can provide unique complementarities 
in M&As. For example, Morosini et al. (1998) argue that acquisitions in culturally 
distant countries are a unique source of routines and repertoires that are difficult to 
replicate, providing a potential comparative advantage to acquirers. However, the 
effect of culture in the context of M&As is a rather complex phenomenon. National 
and organizational cultures are separate constructs that are associated with different 
implications for coordination and integration (Stahl and Voigt, 2008). Barkema et al. 
(1996) argue that cross-border M&As are characterized by an additional layer of 
acculturation, which represents a substantial barrier to the postmerger integration 
process. Nevertheless, Weber et al. (1996) found the effect to be the opposite: while 
organizational culture differences in domestic M&As had a negative impact on 
integration and cooperation, national culture differences in cross-border M&As had 
the opposite effect. Stahl and Voigt (2008) argue that increased attention to cultural 
differences between acquiring and target organizations lead to less negative 
integration outcomes than organizational culture differences. The evidence on the 
effect of organizations’ national origin on employees thus appears to be rather 
mixed. In this thesis, I argue that both domestic and cross-border deals will lead to 
increased employee turnover. Domestic M&As are associated with higher 
integration efforts relative to cross-border deals, leading to higher resource 
redundancy and decreased career opportunities for employees. Cross-border M&As 
increase the complexity of communication and management by adding an additional 
layer of acculturation for employees to deal with, leading to increased conflict. Krug 
and Hegarty (1997) find precisely the latter for top managers, showing an increase in 
employee turnover for organizations that are acquired by foreign organizations vis-
à-vis domestic organizations. 
External CEO/TMT replacement 
From the perspective of upper echelons theory, Hambrick and Mason (1984) 
propose that organizations resemble their top management. Managers’ strategic 
decision-making is shaped by their values, as well as knowledge and assumptions 
about future events, alternatives and the consequences of such alternatives. These 
cognitive bases are shaped by multiple factors, among them the executives’ tenure 
within the organization. Therefore, sudden changes to the TMT alter the cognitive 
bases of executives’ decision-making, and they are often considered to represent an 
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inflection point in organizations’ trajectories (Quigley and Hambrick, 2012; 
Tushman and Rosenkopf, 1996). 
The organizational origin of incoming executives –whether they come from outside 
the organization or are promoted from within the ranks- has been singled out as the 
most significant characteristic of the succession event (e.g., Boeker, 1997; Hambrick 
and Mason, 1984; Shen and Cannella, Jr., 2002). Hambrick and Mason (1984) argue 
that external managers have less commitment to the status quo as well as an interest 
in weakening opposition and building a loyal camp. More generally, the role of 
successors’ origins on postsuccession performance has been attributed to the ability 
and motivation of external and internal successors to push for changes in strategy 
and organization (Barron et al., 2011; Karaevli, 2007; Miller, 1993; Quigley & 
Hambrick, 2012; Shen and Cannella, Jr., 2002; Virany et al., 1992; Weisbach, 1995; 
Wiersema, 1992). CEOs’ origins (outsider versus insider) affect their ability to 
initiate and implement strategic changes (Zhang and Rajagopalan, 2010). External 
succession is generally associated with a mandate for change, granting successors 
the managerial discretion (Hambrick and Filkenstein, 1987) needed to initiate and 
implement such change. Thus, external succession is generally followed by a stage 
of organization reorientation and fundamental organizational change, particularly 
when certain preconditions for change are present (Karaevli and Zajac, 2013). 
External managers are more likely to implement changes to structure, processes and 
people than executives who rose through the organizational ranks (Hambrick and 
Mason, 1984; Miller, 1993).  
Barron et al. (2011) and Shen and Cannella, Jr. (2002) propose that the insider-
outsider dichotomy does not necessarily reflect a decision of continuity versus 
change. While they argue that external succession is most certainly associated with a 
mandate for change, the appointment of an insider does not necessarily reflect 
continuity. Based on the power circulation theory of control, they point out that 
internal successors can in fact be either followers or contenders: followers succeed a 
retiring executive whereas contenders follow the dismissal of an executive. 
Outgoing CEO tenure is a key factor in postsuccession performance as it affects the 
organizational inertia and disruption caused by the succession event: frequent 
succession events are a potential disruption for business continuity and performance.  
The performance consequences of outsiderness remain contentious, with five 
decades of empirical studies providing mixed findings (Karaevli, 2007). Outsiders 
typically have the motivation to implement strategic change: however, the extent to 
which they will be able to implement such changes will depend on their ability to do 
so. Challenges presented by senior executives have been found to be an important 
impediment to new external CEOs’ abilities to implement strategic change 
(Karaevli, 2007). The mandate for change and the motivation of external CEOs to 
see it through do not necessarily translate into the ability to make such changes. 
Karaevli and Zajac (2013) argue that corporate stability (ordinary succession, a 
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long-tenured predecessor CEO, and good organizational performance) is required 
for external CEOs to be able to set and implement changes. External CEOs’ 
likelihood of generating strategic changes is therefore a joint function of ability and 
motivation. From this perspective, the question should not be “Does CEO 
outsiderness generate strategic change?” but rather “Under what conditions will 
CEO outsiderness generate strategic change?” (Karaevli and Zajac, 2013:1270).  
As shown in Chapter 4 of this thesis, the impact of external CEO replacement on 
employees depends both on recent organizational performance and on recent CEO 
replacement events. Recent organizational performance is one important aspect that 
affects the ability of new executives to implement fundamental organizational 
change, as it is a clear indicator of the suitability of current strategies. Thus, poor 
performance signals that current strategies are ill-suited for the environment and that 
changes may be required (Boekner, 1997). However, poor presuccession 
performance makes it easier for outsider CEOs to overcome resistance to change 
(Boeker, 1997, Zhang and Rajagopalan, 2010). In apparent contradiction, however, a 
period of poor performance has also been found lead to increased monitoring by the 
board and shareholders and to decreased discretionary power for the CEO 
(Finkelstein et al., 2009). Therefore, Karaevli and Zajac (2013) argue that although 
new external CEOs come with a mandate for change, in the case of poorly 
performing organizations, this mandate comes with increased monitoring and more 
limited financial resources. In organizations with strong recent performance, CEOs 
have more latitude for strategy setting, more abundant slack resources and a board 
that is more likely to tolerate risks and uncertain changes. Nevertheless, Quigley and 
Hambrick (2012) find that new CEOs will always feel the pressure and urge to push 
for change, even in a context of orderly succession and relatively good 
organizational performance. Therefore, studies of executive replacement should in 
any case consider presuccession performance to be a relevant variable behind 
succession outcomes.  
Karaevli (2007) argues for the need to bring the context back into succession events: 
previous organizational performance, external environmental conditions, and 
simultaneous changes in strategy and other TMT members. Given the potential role 
of the external environment, particularly the level of turbulence or stability and 
munificence, it is essential that studies on the impact of outsider succession control 
for industry-specific factors. Turbulence refers to “instability, or difficult to predict 
changes in the environment” (Karaevli, 2007:698). Munificence refers to the degree 
to which the environment enables organizational growth (Karaevli, 2007). It is thus 
essential to consider environmental factors in studies of the outcomes of executive 
succession to advance our knowledge of the subject. In the study presented in 
Chapter 4, we capture effects that might affect all organizations in the economy in a 
given year through year fixed effects, the effect of operating in a particular industry 
through industry fixed effects, and the geographical effects of location through 
location fixed effects. While all these variables capture important fixed effects that 
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are essential external contextual elements, organization-specific factors can 
substantially affect the impact of CEO/TMT replacement on employees. We thus 
include organization fixed effects in all models to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity across organizations as well as additional controls for organizational 
characteristics (such as size and age) and past performance (sales and profits). We 
also control for the simultaneous replacement of other top executives, both internally 
and externally. However, we recognize that organizational stability and performance 
might create specific scenarios whereby reactions to executive succession are 
markedly different. Therefore, we created separate treatments for external TMT 
replacement and external CEO replacement in the contexts of stability and 
instability. Stability is defined as no previous TMT succession in the previous time 
period. In this context, we study external CEO and TMT succession events in stable 
and unstable contexts. To deepen the analysis of previous performance, we then 
construct 4 samples with 1-1 matching. The first sample is composed of 
organizations that experienced a decline in sales from the previous year and either 
external TMT replacement (treated) or no replacement (control). The second sample 
(488 organizations) is composed of organizations with declining sales in the 
previous year that either experienced external CEO replacement (treated) or no 
replacement (control). The last two samples are analogous but in a context of sales 
increase. Interestingly, the results in Chapter 4 show that when recent performance 
is negative, external CEO replacement can actually have a positive effect on 
employees. Additionally, when previous performance is positive, externally 
replacing the CEO does not have a negative effect on employees. 
Barron et al. (2011), argue that while the management research on managerial 
succession has rightly focused on the whole TMT, and not only the CEO, strategic 
change is usually implicit and generally not measured. However, they show that 
strategic change only happens when CEO turnover is couple with other TMT 
members’ departure, backing upper-echelon perspectives that the whole TMT 
shapes strategy, and not only the CEO. Moreover, they also find that strategic 
change happens only with contender succession and not with follower succession, 
which is in line with Quigley and Hambrick (2012). Lastly, Barron et al. (2011) also 
find that outsider succession is related only to strategic change when other TMT 
members also depart. When other TMT members do not exit the organization, or 
when the former CEO remains in the ranks, they observe no significant strategic 
change. Their findings back the notion that contender succession and a mandate for 
change are directly linked while that is the case only for outsider succession when 
the CEO exits the organization entirely. Similarly, Quigley and Hambrick (2012) 
argue that departing CEOs actually often remain at the organization as board chairs. 
This limits new CEOs’ discretion and ability to depart from previous strategies and 
successfully implement change. Therefore, even when CEOs have a mandate for 
change, the continuity of the former CEO as board chair restricts new CEOs’ leeway 
to initiate substantive change. Therefore, in our analysis, we focus only on CEOs 
and TMT members who depart the organization entirely. It is therefore relevant for 
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executive succession studies to indicate when former executives remain in the 
organization beyond their stint as top executive members. In the article presented in 
Chapter 4, we therefore only considered replacement events in which the executive 
leave the organization entirely. Moreover, we deepen our analysis by considering 
the effects of simultaneous multiple TMT replacement events on employees. 
1.1.2. INDIVIDUAL OUTCOMES OF ORGANIZATIONAL 
DISRUPTIONS 
Employee turnover 
The impact of employee turnover (also termed “attrition”) on organizational 
performance has been an area of much research since the late 1970s. The early work 
by Price (1977), Dalton and Todor (1979), Staw (1980) and Abelson and Baysinger 
(1984) marked the rise of the consequences of turnover in the management research 
agenda. The early work showed that although turnover can be costly and harmful, it 
should only be prevented as long as keeping employees is less costly than letting 
them go. By the mid-1980s, interest in turnover had declined in the management 
field. Since the turn of the millennium, however, the research on the consequence of 
employee turnover for organizations has once more come to the fore (e.g., Hancock 
et al., 2013, Hatch and Dyer, 2004; Kacmar et al., 2006; Park and Shaw, 2013; 
Shaw et al., 2005; Waldman el al., 2004). The turnover-performance relationship 
has been researched from a variety of angles, which I broadly define in terms of two 
camps: the cost-based camp and the resource-based camp. 
The cost-based camp represents one of the main streams of research studying the 
impact of turnover on performance. This is predominant in studies of turnover in the 
healthcare industry, for example, Buchbinder et al. (1999), Jones (2005) and 
Waldman et al. (2004). Buchbinder et al. (1999) calculate the direct costs of primary 
care physician turnover in US institutions, including recruitment, training and 
average productivity losses. In that case, productivity losses due to, for instance, 
orientation costs, increased time with patients, and higher use of lab tests and 
radiological procedures, were by far the main cost at over twice the average 
physician’s annual wage. Jones (2005) focuses on the costs of nurse turnover. Jones 
(2015) estimates the costs of nurse turnover to amount to between 1.2 and 1.3 times 
the average nurse’s annual wage, the largest item being the costs of temporary 
replacement and overtime by the remaining staff. Waldman et al. (2004) estimates 
the costs of turnover of both nurses and physicians. They conclude that nurse 
turnover costs 0.86 times the average annual nurse’s salary whereas the figure for 
physician turnover is in line with Buchbinder et al. (1999). Also in line with 
Buchbinder et al. (1999), estimated productivity losses are the largest single cost of 
turnover. This body of literature suggests that substantial investment in employee 
retention pays off for organizations since the productivity losses and the costs of 
hiring and training new personnel are considerable. The cost-based approach 
generally assumes a monotonic impact of turnover on financial performance while 
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acknowledging the existence of intangible turnover effects that the research has, to 
date, been unable to capture.  
The second major camp is firmly rooted in the resource-based view of the firm 
(Barney, 1991). Human (Pfeffer, 1994; Coff, 1997; Shaw et al., 2013) and social 
capital (Dess and Shaw, 2001; Shaw et al., 2005) embedded in employees and their 
networks are considered from this perspective to be critical aspects of organizational 
performance, and employee turnover can potentially erode organizational 
performance. On the one hand, Dess and Shaw (2001) and Shaw et al. (2005) argue 
that social capital losses are the main factor behind the impact of turnover on 
organizations. Social capital (the value embedded in relationships) constitutes a 
unique resource for organizations because it increases communication, trust and the 
ability to exchange resources. They argue that social capital losses predict 
performance beyond what can be generally attributed to overall turnover and in-role 
performance losses due to turnover. Social capital losses from turnover have the 
potential to undermine the social fabric of the organization, leading to a significant 
and potentially long-lasting impact on performance. By testing their predictions on 
an upscale restaurant chain, they indeed find that when turnover is low, social 
capital losses due to turnover are high, and that is reflected in substantial 
performance losses. Thus, turnover not only increases costs and inefficiencies in 
organizations, but it is also costly in terms of lost relationships among people, 
particularly when those turning over hold critical bridging positions in networks. 
On the other hand, the main theoretical lens through which organizational-level 
outcomes of turnover have been studied is human capital theory. The human capital 
perspective is that the accumulation of human capital (knowledge, skills and abilities 
–“KSAs”) leads to higher levels of performance. Proponents of human capital theory 
broadly distinguish between general and organization-specific types of human 
capital (Becker, 1962, 1994). The human capital perspective is inevitably linked to 
resource-based views of the firm, by which performance differences across 
organizations depend on their endowment of valuable, unique and inimitable 
resources (Barney, 1991). Employee turnover is costly in terms of both general and 
organization-specific human capital as the hiring and training of employees drain 
resources from productive uses. When an employee leaves, the return on investment 
on that employee disappears, with a resulting impact on productivity. In general, it is 
argued the organization-specific human capital is more difficult to replace and takes 
the most time to build; it is therefore a key factor in the impact of turnover on 
organizational performance. Time is required for new recruits to accumulate the 
level of organization-specific human capital of departing employees.  
Shaw et al. (2013) adopt a resource-based perspective to analyze the turnover-
performance relationship. Particularly when investment in human capital is high, 
human capital losses are damaging for organizational performance. This is 
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particularly marked in organizations for which turnover rates are low, and it is less 
marked in organizations that experience high turnover rates. 
Kacmar et al. (2006) take a knowledge-based view of the firm (Grant, 1996) as their 
framework to study turnover as a predictor of unit-level performance on a sample of 
262 fast food restaurants of a well-known franchise. Knowledge can be embedded in 
team routines, i.e., patterns of behavior that require minimal verbal communication 
among coworkers, for which the more tacit aspects take time to learn. Turnover 
creates inefficiencies by disrupting the established routines and the consequent loss 
of tacit knowledge in the workforce. They propose that efficiency fully mediates the 
turnover-performance relationship such that turnover leads to an immediate effect on 
efficiency, and sustained inefficiencies lead to poor performance in a second step 
(i.e., sales, profits). The food service industry is particularly characterized by 
extreme turnover rates, often in excess of 100% annually. They find evidence that 
efficiency indeed mediates the turnover-performance relationship and that both 
“crew” and management turnover had a significant impact on both sales and profits.  
Hancock et al. (2013) perform a meta-analysis of the relationship between turnover 
and organizational performance. Their results confirm the negative impact of 
turnover on performance and that the social and human capital losses from turnover 
generally outweigh the potential beneficial consequences. Moreover, they find that 
performance is more strongly affected by losses of organization-specific human 
capital than of general human capital. They find that the negative relationship 
between turnover and performance is stronger for managerial employees and in 
more knowledge- and skill-intensive industries, where social and human capital 
losses can have the greatest impact. Moreover, in line with Batt and Colvin (2011), 
they find that the effects of voluntary and involuntary turnover on organizational 
performance are largely the same. Lastly, their paper provides evidence that the 
impact of turnover on the financial performance of organizations is mediated by 
quality and safety outcomes. Thus, they conclude that involuntary turnover may not 
be entirely functional, as is sometimes believed, most likely affecting financial 
performance through quality and safety outcomes. 
One important finding by Hancock et al. (2013) is that they were “forced to treat 
issues of labor costs and human capital at a rather coarse level (e.g., industry, job 
levels) because the primary studies do not typically provide enough information 
about more specific indicators such as salary, and knowledge, skills, abilities, and 
other characteristics (KSAOs), or tenure” (597). In other words, studies rarely 
provide measures of employees’ human capital in their analysis of turnover. 
Hatch and Dyer (2004) study how human capital contributes to learning and how 
learning can become a source of sustainable competitive advantage. They find that 
investment in organization-specific human capital indeed has a positive impact on 
learning and organizational performance. They also find that organizations with high 
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turnover performed comparatively worse than competitors, revealing the 
inimitability of human capital as a source of competitive advantage.  
The outstanding evidence supports the view that turnover is in general very costly 
for organizations. In their meta-analysis, Park and Shaw (2013) conclude that there 
is a negative and significant effect of employee turnover on organizational 
performance. The evidence most strongly supports human and social capital views 
of the effects of the turnover-performance relationship.  
Aime et al. (2010) show that although routines stable over time, the competitive 
advantage derived from such routines is eroded by key employee mobility. The 
competitive implication of employee mobility can be substantial both in cases of 
individual mobility (Aime et al., 2010) and of collective mobility (Wezel et al., 
2006). Wezel et al. (2006) study the effect of individual and group turnover on the 
survival of the focal organization. They find that collective mobility (turnover) to a 
new venture (startup) has the strongest effect on focal organization survival. The 
recruitment of talent from competitors has become a strategy for overcoming 
resource constraints and for obtaining competitive advantage derived from employee 
human capital (Rao and Drazin, 2002). The recruitment of key organizational 
members is a key mechanism for the transfer and appropriation of routines and 
resources from rival organizations.  
In the context of M&As, the turnover of target top managers has been found to have 
a negative influence on M&A performance, particularly when the seniority of the 
replaced managers is high (Cannella and Hambrick, 1993). Keeping the best 
employees following M&As is generally considered essential for value creation and 
a major challenge for the acquiring organizations’ management (Pablo, 1994). It has 
in fact been shown that the anticipation of employee mobility significantly affects 
the likelihood of acquisitions (Younge et al., 2014). 
Mental health and performance 
Depression is estimated to be the psychiatric disorder with the largest economic 
impact (Conti and Burton, 1994). Major depression is a common and seriously 
impairing mental disorder, and it has been argued that by 2020, it will be the second 
leading cause of disability (Kessler, 2012). Depression affects employee 
performance both through absenteeism –days of work missed— and presenteeism –
time present at work but not working, or at least not working to full capacity (Johns, 
2010).  
Several attempts have been made to quantify exactly how costly depression is for 
organizations. Using data from 2 US national surveys, Kessler et al. (1999) find that 
major depression leads to between 1.5 and 3.2 more work-disability days per 30-day 
period. Adler et al. (2006) study the effect of performance and worker productivity 
in primary care patients. Their results show that depression causes significantly 
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greater deficits in the management of mental-interpersonal-, time- and output tasks. 
The impact of depression on work performance is persistent even after symptoms 
have improved. 
Wang et al. (2004) study the effect of depression on performance for airline 
reservation agents and telephone customer service representatives. To minimize 
recall bias in that study, the participants registered their work performance at 5 
random points in time during the day when they are paged by a computerized 
autodialer. After following the participants for a week, they found that major 
depression was indeed the only condition that significantly relates to the measured 
outcomes: task focus and productivity. They estimate that the economic effects of 
depression were equivalent to 2.3 days of absence due to sickness per depressed 
worker, a figure that is substantially greater than indicated by the previous findings. 
Stewart et al. (2003) estimate the impact of depression on labor costs on a cohort of 
the American Productivity Audit conducted between August 2001 and July 2002. 
They estimate that the health-related excess loss in productive time was nearly four 
times for those with depression than for those without depression (5.6 hours/week 
versus 1.5 hours/week). The great majority of these costs (81%) are due to reduced 
performance while at work, which is largely invisible to employers.  
All these studies have a narrow focus and tend to underestimate the magnitude of the 
total costs of depression as they do not account for the additional costs incurred by 
organizations to adjust workloads across units due to the increased work-day loss as 
well as the potential sales and revenue losses. Nevertheless, it is clear from these 
studies that depression indeed has a significant impact on worker productivity and, 
thus, a financial impact on organizations. Even moderate changes in the number of 
employees with depression can have a substantial effect on performance. 
The literature therefore indicates that organizational performance can be 
substantially affected by employee behavior. Employee turnover translates into 
lower organizational performance (Hancock et al., 2013; Hatch and Dyer, 2004; 
Kacmar et al., 2006; Park and Shaw, 2013; Shaw et al., 2005; Waldman et al., 
2004). The turnover of high performers, in particular, can disproportionally affect 
performance (Nyberg et al., 2014). For example, in the context of organizational 
disruptions, the behavior of employees may depend on how they cope with 
organizational changes (Fugate et al., 2002; Judge et al., 1999; Rafferty and Griffin, 
2006; Riolli and Savicki, 2006; Terry and Callan, 1997; Terry and Jimmieson, 
2003). Organizational disruptions represent sudden organizational changes that can 
disturb processes and routines (Barnett and Carroll, 1995; Baron et al., 2001). In 
M&As, the potential conflict between two organizational cultures represents a major 
challenge for employees. Indeed, employee reactions to M&As are considered to be 
the basis for high M&A failure rates –negatively affecting between half 
(Schoenberg, 2006) and three-quarters (Marks and Mirvis, 2001) of M&A deals. 
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Entrepreneurship 
While most employee mobility occurs between established organizations, employees 
often choose to instead enter entrepreneurship. As Sørensen and Sharkey (2014) 
note, the transition from established organizations to entrepreneurship is remarkably 
common, and the vast majority of entrepreneurs come from established 
organizations (Burton et al., 2002). Entrepreneurship is often considered one of the 
main engines of innovation and growth for local and national economies (Audretsch 
and Keilbach, 2004), and, consequently, it has raised substantial attention from 
scholars. The definition of entrepreneurship remains contentious, which is not an 
issue that this thesis will seek to resolve. Instead, I align with the view of Brittain 
and Freeman (1986) and Sørensen and Sharkey (2014), among others, that the 
defining factor for an entrepreneur is the act of starting a business. In this thesis, I 
therefore refer to entrepreneurial entry and new venture formation interchangeably, 
as the act of starting an organization with no connection to (i.e., equity of) another 
existing organization.  
An important concept in the entrepreneurial entry literature is that of spinoffs, intra-
industry spinoffs, or spinouts: these terms are often used to designate specifically 
new ventures in industries or markets in which the source/parent organization 
operates. This is the case for the studies presented in this section. The terms spinoff 
or spinout are also often used as synonyms for new venture formation from 
organizational units’ divestiture (i.e., “corporate” spinoffs) or new ventures 
controlled by a source organization (e.g., Sørensen and Fassiotto, 2011), which is 
not the case here. The prominence of spinoffs in the entrepreneurship studies stems 
from the performance premium attributed to these ventures (Klepper and Thomson, 
2010), their role in the evolution of certain industries (e.g., semiconductors, lasers), 
and the high number of spinoffs among industry leaders (e.g., Chevrolet, Intel, 
AMD).  
In addition to the general economic interest in entrepreneurship, the recent research 
has shown that this type of employee mobility can have major implications for 
source organizations’ competitive advantage. Two studies (Campbell et al., 2012; 
Wezel et al., 2006) have particularly addressed the impact of key employees’ move 
into entrepreneurship on the performance of the source organization. Wezel et al. 
(2006) studied the impact of the different mobility events of key employees 
(partners), and they conclude that the survival of the source organization is most 
negatively affected by the departure of such employees to start-ups. Such impact is 
particularly marked when several senior key employees depart together to a new 
organization given their ability to leverage their social capital but especially due to 
their capability to replicate successful routines. While noncompete clauses can limit 
the ability of departing employees to drain the source organization’s customer base, 
their replication of higher-order routines cannot be restrained, and these are more 
easily reproduced in startups than in established competitors. Spinoffs (intra-
industry independent new ventures) are speedier than other startups at mobilizing 
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resources, inheriting knowledge (Klepper and Sleeper, 2005), and cloning and 
modifying ideas acquired at their previous organization (Bhide, 1994). Wezel et al. 
(2006) show that intra-industry entrepreneurship is the type of mobility with the 
strongest competitive implications for source organizations.  
Similarly, Campbell et al. (2012) study the competitive consequences of employee 
mobility into entrepreneurship for source organization performance. Based on the 
notion of complementary assets, they argue that employees’ ability to recreate or 
transfer such assets will determine employees’ decision to stay, to leave for a 
competitor or to form a new venture. Using longitudinal data from the legal service 
industry, they find that employees departing to create their own venture in the same 
industry hurt the source organization’s performance the most. Additionally, they 
find that employees who earn the highest income are generally less likely to leave; 
however, they are more likely to create a new venture when they do leave. 
Furthermore, the adverse effect of employee entrepreneurship on the source 
organization increases with the income of the departing employee. 
These two studies are highly relevant because they connect microlevel (individual) 
mobility decisions with macrolevel (organizational) outcomes. Given the 
competitive implications of entrepreneurship for organizations, regions and 
countries, it is important to also understand the organizational context within which 
entrepreneurship is conceived. In other words, there is a need to advance our 
knowledge of the microlevel consequences of macrolevel disruptive events because 
individual behavior such as employee mobility has substantial implications for 
organizations. What motivates employees to leave their jobs in established 
organizations to start up their own ventures? Is there a specific organizational 
context that triggers entrepreneurship? Which employees are most likely to move 
into entrepreneurship in such context? Can organizational disruptions trigger waves 
of entrepreneurs? These questions drive the research agenda of Chapter 3, “M&As 
and Entrepreneurship”, in which I specifically investigate whether M&As act as 
triggers to entrepreneurial entry (Krueger et al., 2000), how employees make the 
transition to entrepreneurship, and how this process differs across M&A types. 
The first evidence of the link between organizational disruptions and 
entrepreneurship can likely be traced back to Brittain and Freeman (1986). Their 
study of entrepreneurship in the semiconductor industry highlights the link between 
internal organizational factors and the rate of entrepreneurship. Of the number of 
factors that they propose affect entrepreneurship, they explore the outcome of two 
variables that they term “political events”. The two identified political events are 
external CEO replacement and being the target of an unrelated M&A, both of which 
are expected to have a positive effect on the rate of entrepreneurship. Their findings 
indeed support the idea that disruptive events that have the potential to “make life 
difficult, or bode ill for their futures” (Brittain and Freeman 1986: 11) increase the 
probability of employees entering entrepreneurship. Brittain and Freeman (1986) 
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provide one of the few studies that present entrepreneurship as an organizational 
product by directly linking major organizational events to the rate of 
entrepreneurship. Nevertheless, their paper has a number of limitations, notably the 
lack of a control group of individuals, their focus on Silicon Valley, and their lack of 
theorizing on why employees spin out, which I attempt to overcome in the study 
presented in Chapter 3. 
In terms of the empirical link between organizational disruptions and entrepreneurial 
entry, another relevant study is Buenstorf’s (2007) account of the evolution of the 
German laser industry. Entrepreneurial entry in the form of spinoffs from 
established organizations was a key feature of the German laser industry’s evolution 
beginning in the 1960s. The link between organizational events and 
entrepreneurship is described in terms of strategic disagreements, which is in line 
with Klepper and Sleeper (2005). Buenstorf (2007) describes M&As mainly as an 
example of events that might motivate employees to spin out, although the account 
does not delve into the potential mechanisms behind the decision to form a new 
venture. Although the scope of the study is the evolution of the German laser 
industry, it offers empirical backing to the notion that some organizational events 
trigger entrepreneurial entry into the market by the employees of the parent 
organization. 
In their study of spinoff formation in the US laser industry, Klepper and Sleeper 
(2005) also find that organizations undergoing unrelated acquisitions (i.e., by 
organizations from outside the laser industry) are more likely to generate spin outs. 
They argue that changes in leadership as a result of acquisition decreases the 
probability of organizations recognizing opportunities, which increases the 
probability of employees spinning out to exploit opportunities unrecognized by the 
parent organization. However, this is not the case for related acquisitions, in which 
no such correlation with spinout generation is present. More generally, their model 
of spinoff formation implies that employees may spin out when incumbent 
organizations and employees have diverging evaluations of opportunities or 
incentives to pursue them. For example, an organization may not develop a certain 
product because it cannibalizes its existing market, whereas new entrants do not 
have such opportunity cost.  
Instead, Klepper and Thomson (2010) propose a model of spinoff formation as a 
result of strategic disagreements. Based on a series of case studies in the automotive, 
laser and semiconductor industries, they propose a model in which disagreements 
over the future strategy of the organization triggers the decision to spin out. In their 
model, like-minded organizational members receive different information regarding 
the best future strategic direction and generally communicate until their visions 
converge. However, when disagreements on the value of ideas arise, there is an 
opportunity for employees to spin off and pursue the opportunity through the 
creation of a new venture.  
INDIVIDUAL CONSEQUENCES OF ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE 
46
 
Sørensen and Fassiotto (2011) and Sørensen and Sharkey (2014) contribute to the 
discussion of employee entrepreneurship from a more sociological perspective. 
Sørensen and Fassiotto (2011) recognize that the same factors behind individuals’ 
decision to enter self-employment may differ from those factors that lead to the 
identification and exploitation of innovative opportunities. “Organizations beget 
organizations”, they note, and “in the vast majority of cases, the decision to launch a 
new venture (or indeed, the decision not to) is made while a person is employed by 
an existing organization” (Sørensen and Fassiotto, 2011: 1322).  
Sørensen and Sharkey (2014) are among those who frame entrepreneurship as a 
labor market status that depends on the organizational context. They argue that 
entrepreneurship is a decision shaped by certain organizational characteristics, 
notably the distribution of opportunity within the organization. The main 
contribution of their paper is to highlight the role of established organizations’ 
characteristics in employee mobility decisions, as organizations are the context 
within which entrepreneurship is conceived. Entrepreneurship is understood as a 
conscious mobility decision made by individuals for the purpose of advancing in 
their careers, which mainly takes place in the context of an established organization. 
Entrepreneurship happens when individuals face a relative lack of opportunities for 
growth at their workplace. This perspective is situational in that the determining 
factor for entrepreneurship is the structure of choices at a specific point in time. In 
other words, to understand what motivates entry into entrepreneurship, we should 
understand what makes entrepreneurship attractive relative to other opportunities. 
Overall, understanding how organizational disruptions might be a source of 
entrepreneurial entry is essential because employees’ transition to entrepreneurship 
can have substantial competitive implications for established organizations. Within 
this setting, Chapter 3 explores the impact of M&As on entrepreneurial entry. 
1.2. METHODS  
All the articles presented in this thesis are large-scale quantitative studies. All the 
studies are based on register data linking individuals and organizations. The main 
database used in all three articles is the Danish IDA: Integreret Database for 
Arbejdsmarkedsforskning (Integrated Database for Labor Market Research). The 
IDA is matched to two other databases: the Zephyr M&A Database (Chapter 2 and 
Chapter 3), and the Danish database on medical prescriptions (Chapter 4). Below, I 
describe the main characteristics of the databases and the variables used in the 
studies. I also describe the methods used to analyze the data and the main strengths 
and weaknesses of the approach. 
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1.2.1. THE DATABASES 
The IDA is a large panel database that contains information on virtually all 
individuals in the Danish labor market and all employers that have registered in 
Denmark since 1980. The data are collected on a yearly basis by Statistics Denmark 
from state agencies primarily for research purposes, and they are structured in 
several datasets at the organization- and employee-levels. Some of the most 
prominent articles in the organizational research that have utilized this register 
database include Dahl (2011), Nanda and Sørensen (2010), and Sørensen and 
Sorenson (2007). The IDA is known for the richness of its variables and its 
comprehensiveness, which makes it particularly suited for objectively tracking 
individual mobility. Organizational-level variables include location, industry, profits 
and assets, among others. Individual variables include, for example, income, job 
tenure, and rank within the organization (based on ISCO-08), as well as 
demographic variables such age, sex, educational level, marital status and number of 
children. 
Zephyr is a global M&A, IPO and private equity database that has previously been 
used in a number of articles such as Arora and Nandkumar (2011) and Useche 
(2014). The database, which is arguably the most comprehensive M&A database to 
date, is maintained by the Bureau van Dijk’s on a constant basis. The data are based 
on analyst and journalist reports of deals, press releases and filings. It contains data 
on the majority of M&A deals in Denmark since 2000, and it identifies several 
interesting characteristics of the deals and deal actors. In the studies presented in 
Chapter 1 and Chapter 3, the raw data from the Zephyr database are consolidated 
into a number of variables that identify the targets, the industry relatedness of the 
target and acquiring organizations, the amount of target equity owned by the 
acquirer before the M&A, and the national origin of the acquirer. The Zephyr 
database also provides a wide array of organization- and deal financial data as well 
as the intermediaries and actors involved in the deals. Much of the data are 
ultimately not used in the studies presented in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 for two 
reasons. The first reason is that they are only available for a subset of deals. The 
more variables we include in the analysis, the smaller the subset of M&A deals is 
included. Thus, in the interest of obtaining more generalizable outcomes of M&A 
deals, some of these variables were left out of the analysis. The second reason is that 
the merging of the IDA and Zephyr databases is managed by Statistics Denmark, 
which must ensure that the organizations remain anonymous. Thus, all of the 
detailed variables had to be converted into categorical or binary variables before the 
merge, and some variables had to be excluded from the merge. The resulting dataset 
is a unique deal-organization-employee linked panel. The ability of the data to 
match individuals to organizations and deals provides a unique opportunity to study 
individuals’ mobility as a result of different deal types. 
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The other database used in this thesis is the Danish Medical Database. This 
database, which is also maintained by Statistics Denmark, contains data on all 
prescription medications in Denmark. The prescriptions are linked to the social 
security number, which enables the merge with the IDA. The prescriptions of 
interest in this case relate to those most commonly associated with stress-related 
symptoms such as insomnia, depression and anxiety, as discussed below. Some of 
the most prominent studies that have used this dataset include Dahl (2011) and 
Pierce et al. (2013). The combination of the IDA and the Danish Medical Database 
provides a unique resource to overcome some of the key limitations of measuring 
the mental health outcomes of organizational phenomena. Widely used techniques 
such as surveys and interviews can suffer from severe limitations in the study of 
such sensitive matter since individuals may avoid revealing information regarding 
their mental health condition. Moreover, publicly available, objective data on the 
mental health of individuals is scarcely available. This dataset allows for objective 
measurement if there is a change in the probability of being prescribed stress-related 
medication due to a specific event –such as those studied in Chapter 4. 
Outcomes 
The main outcomes studied throughout this thesis are different types of employee 
mobility. Employee turnover is defined as an employee departing a certain 
organization from one year to the next, regardless of where the employee goes after 
departing. This outcome variable is the focus of Chapter 2, which then refines the 
analysis around the turnover of different groups of employees according to 
indicators of their human capital and ranks within the organization. Turnover is also 
one of the two outcome variables of interest in Chapter 4. Turnover is 
operationalized as a binary variable that takes the value 1 (at t=0) when an employee 
changes their employer from one year (t=0) to the next (t=1) and the value 0 
otherwise. That is, turnover is defined as the employee leaving the organization 
within the following 12 months. 
The second type of employee mobility of interest in this thesis is entrepreneurship. 
Entrepreneurship is operationalized as an employee leaving an organization to start a 
new venture that has no equity relationship with the source organization. The term 
“source organization” refers to the organization that is left by a transitioning 
employee. Here, it is important to note the two main characteristics defining the 
entrepreneurial event: the entrepreneur must be a founder of the new venture, and 
the source organization must have no participation in the new venture. 
The last outcome studied is employee stress. The data on stress come from the 
Danish Medical Database, which is maintained by Statistics Denmark. The 
prescriptions of medicines typically used to treat stress-related symptoms (insomnia, 
anxiety, and depression) were traced before and after the treatment. These drugs are 
selected according to their codes provided by the Anatomic Therapeutic Chemical 
(ATC) classification system that was produced by the World Health Organization 
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Collaborating Center for Drug Statistics Methodology. In particular, we identify 
drugs related to shorter-term insomnia (benzodiazepine-related medication -ATC: 
N05CF) and longer-term insomnia (benzodiazepine derivatives -ATC: N05BA), on 
one hand, and anxiety and depression (selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors- ATC: 
N06AB) on the other. The variable Stress is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if 
the individual was prescribed with stress-related medication that year, and zero 
otherwise. 
Treatments 
The main treatment in the studies presented in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 is “working 
for an M&A target”. Individuals are considered “treated” if they work in an 
organization when it is an M&A target. Individuals who join the organization after 
an M&A are therefore not considered treated because they did not work for the 
organization at the time of the event. Similarly, individuals who left before the 
M&A were also not considered treated. The main treatment is then refined 
according to the type of M&A. The types considered in these studies are: Domestic 
versus cross-border M&As, related versus unrelated M&As, and outright versus 
gradual M&As.  
Domestic M&As are those in which both the M&A target and acquirer are based in 
Denmark. Cross-border M&As refer to deals in which the acquiring organization is 
not based in Denmark. The degree of industry overlap, based on NACE codes, is 
taken as the measure of relatedness between the target and the acquirer. Closely 
related M&As are those where the 4-digit NACE code of the primary (‘core’) 
industry of target and acquiring organizations are the same. Related deals are those 
in which any of the industries in which the target operates overlaps with any of the 
industries of the acquirer, based on 2-digit NACE codes as the precision of 
secondary industries is often reduced in the dataset. Broadly related deals are those 
for which only secondary industries of the target and secondary industries of the 
acquirer overlap. Unrelated M&As are deals for which the industry of the target and 
acquiring organizations do not overlap at all, considering the 2-digit NACE 
classification. Outright M&As refer to the acquisition of a majority stake of the 
target organization with no previous equity ownership by the acquiring organization. 
Gradual M&As refer to deals in which the acquiring organization previously had 
some form of equity participation before acquiring a majority stake. 
The full list of industries in which organizations operate, as well as the precise 
nationality of the acquirers and their equity participation in the target, are restricted 
by Statistics Denmark in the matching process with the M&A dataset to prevent the 
perfect identification of organizations. 
The main treatment in the Chapter 4 study is the external replacement of CEO/TMT 
members. Employees are considered treated if they work for an organization when it 
undergoes external CEO/TMT member replacement. TMT is operationalized as the 
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five top-paid managers in the organization. This is in line with previous studies of 
top management teams, although there is considerable variation in the criteria used. 
Barron et al. (2011), for example, identify the TMT as the highest paid 3 executives 
after the CEO. Boeker (1997), on the other hand, considers the TMT to comprise all 
individuals who report directly to the CEO. External replacement is defined as 
joining the CEO/TMT rank directly from outside the organization. This is also in 
line with the previous research (e.g., Shen and Cannella, Jr., 2002), although other 
researchers have also adopted less restrictive definitions of outsiderness (e.g., 
Quigley and Hambrick, 2012).  
1.2.2. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
The main identification technique used to analyze the dataset throughout this thesis 
is the difference-in-differences (DD) regression. The DD is used to simulate an 
experimental research design with panel data. It is an identification strategy that is 
particularly suited to studying events that are exogenous (i.e., out of the control) of 
individuals as it compares the situation before and after the event (i.e., treatment). 
The difference-in-differences coefficient captures the difference in the change in 
probability that the outcome variable will take a specific value for the treated and 
control groups. That is, it captures the change in probability that is due to the 
treatment. Logit models are used given the binary nature of the outcome variables 
(i.e., leave/stay, stress/no stress). Generically, the regression model can be written 
such that 
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛾𝑇𝑗 + 𝜇𝑑 + 𝛿(𝑇𝑗 . 𝑑) +  𝑋′𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝑖𝑗𝑡 
where i denotes the individual, j the organization, t the time period, T the treatment 
(dummy), d a dummy for observations posttreatment, X a vector of the control 
variables, and ε the error term. The main coefficient of interest here is δ, the DD 
estimate, which represents the change in outcome for an individual due to the 
treatment. If B is treated and A is in the control group, the DD estimate is as 
follows: 
?̂? = (?̅?𝐵,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝐵,𝑡) − (?̅?𝐴,𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝐴,𝑡) 
This is the difference in means for the treated before and after treatment minus the 
differences in means before and after treatment for the control group. The method is 
discussed in the specific chapters; however, here I highlight some of its strengths 
and weaknesses. One of the strengths of the difference-in-differences method used 
through this thesis is that the treatment and control groups are allowed to differ as 
long as the potential outcomes are independent of treatment assignment, a property 
that is known as conditional ignorability. In short, given a set of (observable) 
variables, the treatment assignment (e.g., working for an organization that is the 
target of an M&A) is independent of the potential outcomes (e.g., employee 
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mobility). There are several ways to account for the probability of treatment and 
increase the confidence on the conditional ignorability assumption. The ones used in 
this thesis are the inclusion of a number of lagged and nonlagged control variables 
as well as sample matching based on a propensity score. Both methods rely on the 
assumption that observed variables capture the treatment assignment and that 
unobserved variables only affect the outcome through the treatment.  
Methodological concerns that fall under the term “endogeneity” generally permeate 
the social science research. For example, in the case of the study presented in 
Chapter 4, a potential concern could be that of omitted variable bias: that a third, 
unobserved, variable is causing both the treatment (external TMT member 
recruitment) and the consequences (employee stress and turnover). The most evident 
variable in this case is the performance of the organization prior to the recruitment 
of new TMT members. In other words, employees may be under stress or leave the 
organization due to poor organizational performance, which also causes the external 
replacement of top executives (Boeker, 1997; Shen and Cannella, 2002). To capture 
the direct effect of previous performance on the outcome (that is, not through the 
treatment), the Chapter 4 study controls for various measures of previous 
organizational performance. A similar approach is also followed for the studies on 
M&As presented in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, where organizations are also either 
matched on covariates or on propensity scores. Generally, organization fixed effects 
are included in all analyses to control for unobserved, time-invariant organizational 
factors, partly addressing the omitted variable bias concern. 
As mentioned above, one of the strengths of this research is that it is based on 
objective quantitative data. Using register data enables the study of employee stress, 
turnover and entrepreneurship based on objective measures, thus avoiding the 
common limitations of, for example, surveys –from selection to recall issues. 
However, this strength is not without limitations. The most notable among those is 
the inability to show the precise mechanisms that drive behavior. Whereas we can 
measure the impact of a given treatment (such as M&As) on a behavioral outcome 
(such as entrepreneurship), we cannot specifically show the mechanism through 
which treatment leads to outcome. In that respect, the studies presented here can 
only present plausible explanations that are likely to describe the phenomenon under 
study. 
1.3. CONCLUSION 
In the three studies that compose this thesis, I investigate the impact of M&As and 
external CEO/TMT replacement on employee stress, turnover and entrepreneurship. 
Overall, the findings of the studies presented in the different chapters support the 
notion that these organizational events indeed lead to individual-level outcomes that 
are disruptive for employees and organizations. The results reinforce the notion that 
organizational changes can be disruptive for employees and significantly affect their 
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mental health and careers. First, I find that employee turnover unambiguously 
increases as a result of M&As. However, a more granular analysis shows a “last-in-
first-out” scenario and does not back up the notion that top employees depart en 
masse following M&As. Consequently, one must question to what degree accounts 
of human capital drain following M&As are representative of a wide set of 
organizations. The narratives of top employees departing following M&As might be 
compounded by the fact that top-performing employees are relatively more visible 
in the labor market in general, and they are therefore highly mobile (Groysberg et 
al., 2008). Nevertheless, I find that the mobility of top-performing employees is not 
particularly increased by M&As. The findings also reinforce recent evidence that 
M&A deals can be put off by potential employee mobility (Younge et al., 2014) as 
organizations consider human capital retention key to value creation in deals (Pablo, 
1994). The findings also indicate that employee turnover is mainly involuntary as 
organizations integrate operationally in the quest for synergy realization and as those 
who leave have relatively low human capital. 
Second, I find that M&As indeed increase the transition to entrepreneurship for the 
employees of target organizations. This finding supports and extends the previous 
studies on entrepreneurial entry in high-tech industries, which have considered 
M&As to be a relevant factor (Brittain and Freeman, 1986; Buenstorf, 2007; 
Klepper, 2009; Klepper and Thomson, 2010). It also shows that this transition is 
particularly marked for employees in managerial positions, who are arguably closest 
to the ceiling in the internal opportunity structure (Sørensen and Sharkey, 2014). For 
managers, M&As increase the attractiveness of entrepreneurship as a career choice, 
triggering the transition to entrepreneurship. This finding is all the more interesting 
given that, in Chapter 2, I find that, in contrast with the previous findings, M&As do 
not increase managerial turnover in general (Krug and Hegarty, 1997; Walsh, 1988; 
Walsh and Ellwood, 1991). Taken together, the results from the studies in Chapter 2 
and Chapter 3 indicate that managers are not more prone to moving in general as a 
result of M&As but that they are more likely to choose entrepreneurship if they do 
move. The sudden increase in the span of control due to an M&A means that 
managers’ advancement opportunities are curtailed, translating into higher 
entrepreneurial entry rates. Nevertheless, one key finding of this thesis is that the 
impact of M&As on entrepreneurial transition is short-lived. The increase in entry 
following M&As disappears over time; thus, entrepreneurial transition becomes 
insignificant in the longer run. On average, once managers leave the organization to 
found their own ventures, the remaining managers are no longer more likely to 
transition to entrepreneurship. The implications of this finding are mostly practical: 
managers whose career trajectories are truncated by an M&A will seek to transition 
to entrepreneurship quickly, and the organization will not continue to bleed out 
managers in the medium term. This is important as the loss of managerial talent has 
often been reported as a consequence of M&As (Cannella and Hambrick, 1993; 
Walsh and Ellwood, 1991; Younge et al. 2014) and as a potential cause behind their 
lack of success (Cartwright and Schoenberg, 2006; Marks and Mirvis, 2001). 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
53 
Third, I find that not all M&As are equal, which is relevant for employee mobility. 
The effect of M&As on mobility varies greatly depending on the deal 
characteristics, particularly the level of industry relatedness between target and 
acquirer in M&As. The M&A literature indicate that the closer the degree of 
relatedness, the higher the levels of integration needed to fully unlock the value of 
the deal (Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999; Paruchuri et al., 2006; Puranam et al., 
2009; Zollo and Singh, 2004). Higher levels of resource redundancy and a greater 
span of control for management would suggest that the higher the integration, the 
stronger the effect on mobility. I find that employee turnover indeed increases with 
the level of industry relatedness between target and acquirer: the greater the overlap, 
the stronger the effect on employee turnover will be. The effect of industry 
relatedness is the same for entrepreneurial entry, baring one major difference: 
closely related M&As have no effect on entrepreneurial entry. This suggests an 
identified countervailing force at play that generates a boundary condition or even a 
U-shaped relationship between industry relatedness in M&As and entrepreneurial 
entry. Potential explanations for this effect include noncompete contractual clauses 
(Wezel et al., 2006) or economic incentives (e.g., vested stock) to discourage 
employees’ transitions to entrepreneurship. It is also possible that closely related 
deals are impeded when the risk of entrepreneurial transition is high, thus precluding 
the effect of closely related deals on entrepreneurship, which is in line with findings 
by Younge et al. (2014) on overall employee mobility. Lastly, pursuing a gradual 
M&A approach is an effective means of avoiding employee turnover. Equity 
alliances that gradually increase the involvement of the acquirer in the M&A target 
in effect reduce the impact of M&As on employee turnover, possibly by reducing 
adverse partner selection (Reuer and Ragozzino, 2008) and providing enough time 
for employees to adapt their perception of fit with the new organizational image 
(Holtom et al., 2005). 
In general, less difference can be attributed overall to the country of origin of the 
acquirer, as both cross-border and domestic M&As similarly increase employee 
mobility. This finding is in line with the growing evidence that the heightened 
attention to culture in cross-border deals prevents conflict and enhances cooperation 
(Stahl and Voigt, 2008; Vaara et al., 2012; Weber et al., 1996). The main difference 
between domestic and cross-border M&As resides in who is most affected, with 
domestic M&As having a stronger effect on technical workers and professionals and 
cross-border M&As having a stronger effect on blue-collar employees. The findings 
do not particularly shed light on a differential impact of organizational or national 
cultural differences (Stahl and Voigt, 2008; Weber et al., 1996). They do indicate, 
however, that an outcome of cross-border deals can be the substantial redeployment 
of blue-collar jobs to other locations.  
The third article of this thesis, coauthored with Michael S. Dahl, explores a second 
strategy used to achieve organizational change: namely, external TMT replacement. 
We consistently find that external TMT-member replacement increases employee 
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stress and turnover and that external TMT-member replacement in unstable contexts 
increases employee turnover irrespective of the organizational performance in the 
period leading up to the replacement. These findings are in line with the upper-
echelon view of the firm, by which the whole TMT shapes the organization and its 
strategy and does not support views that either positive or negative organizational 
performance is a prerequirement for change (Boeker 1997, Zhang & Rajagopalan 
2010, Karaevli & Zajac 2013). Performance is relevant, however, in regard to 
external CEO replacement. In a context of positive organizational performance, 
external CEO replacement does not have a significant impact on employee turnover 
or stress, irrespective of CEO replacement in the previous years. When the previous 
performance is negative, external replacement and a context of stability interact thus 
externally replacing the CEO actually reduces employee turnover in a stable context, 
–i.e., when there was no executive replacement the year before. Taken together, this 
is evidence that CEO succession is least disruptive for employees when the 
organization is performing strongly, and it is even positive in periods of poor 
performance when there has been no recent executive replacement. 
Another major finding is that joint replacement events involving internal CEO 
replacement increase employee turnover whereas joint replacement events involving 
external CEO replacement decrease turnover. We believe that two mechanisms 
could be at play in this case: first, it may be a timing issue as employees wait to have 
more information on the new external CEO’s and the remodeled TMT’s potential 
impact on the organization, and as the new executives in turn learn more about the 
organization before embarking on major changes. This would be consistent with 
cases such as Louis V. Gerstner,, Jr.’s tenure as CEO of IBM (Karaevli 2007). 
Second, it is possible that internal “contender succession” –whereby the CEO is 
forced to step down as a result of power struggles and is replaced internally– can be 
more disruptive for employees that external CEO replacements when coupled with 
TMT restructuring. With their more in-depth knowledge of the organization, internal 
“contenders” would be in a position to initiate change swiftly after their 
appointments, bringing in new TMT-members to overcome opposition to change. 
This is in line with Shen and Cannella, Jr. (2002), who show that internal contender 
succession will have the most immediate impact on organizational performance as 
contenders begin with a better understanding of the required changes and how to 
harness internal support than external candidates. This second possible mechanism 
raises some questions regarding the extent to which executives’ “outsiderness” is a 
meaningful trait in cognitive terms as initially theorized. If external CEOs bring in 
fresh perspectives and cognitive schemas that have a substantial impact on the 
organization, then why does the joint external replacement of the CEO and other 
TMT-members not have an impact on employee stress and turnover while internal 
replacement does have an impact? Further, the argument of internal political 
resistance to new external CEOs does not seem plausible because members of the 
TMT are also replaced in this scenario, paving the way for the new CEO to establish 
his or her own agenda. Overall, on one hand, the evidence supports the notion of 
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“contender” succession as the most disruptive type for employees and, on the other, 
calls for a re-examination of the factors of outsiderness that may determine the 
impact of external successors on employee turnover and stress. 
This paper informs two contemporary discussions. First, it contributes to the debate 
on the impact of organizational changes on employee turnover and mental wellbeing 
(Dahl 2011, Ferrie et al. 1998). Second, it expands the discussion on the outcomes 
of CEO/TMT-member recruitment (i.e., Georgakakis et al. 2017, Karaevli & Zajac 
2013, Karaevli 2007, Shen & Cannella Jr 2002, Williams et al. 2017, Barron et al. 
2011, Quigley & Hambrick 2012) by considering its impact on individual employees 
throughout the organization. We show that external CEO/TMT-member recruitment 
has significant implications for employee turnover and, to a lesser extent, employee 
stress. Given the well-established link between employee turnover and 
organizational performance (Kacmar et al. 2006, Shaw et al. 2005, Park and Shaw 
2013), the effect of external recruitment on turnover is indeed an important finding. 
Organizations’ decision to hire new CEO/TMT-members should account for 
increased levels of employee turnover as a consequence of external recruitment, and 
the potential associated costs shall be considered in the executive hiring decision. 
The panel datasets used throughout this thesis enable us to overcome common 
methodological limitations by enabling the consistent and objective tracking of 
individual mobility patterns and the prescription of medicines related to stress for 
the entire Danish population. Access to linked data on medicine prescriptions on this 
scale provides an exceptional opportunity for analyzing the mental health outcomes 
of organizational disruptions. However, the strength of the data comes with some 
limitations. First, there are limits in terms of the population it studies as the Danish 
labor market is considered to be particularly flexible. There are relatively low 
barriers to switching employers since, for example, holidays and pension schemes 
are transferable from one employer to another. It is possible that employees in other 
labor markets with higher costs of switching employers will be less prone to 
changing, instead leading them to cope with organizational disruptions in other 
ways. Nevertheless, the overall mobility rates of Danish employees have been 
shown to be comparable to those of employees in the US (Dahl and Sorenson, 
2010). This means that employees are at the very least no more restricted in their 
movement than in other major developed economies. However, the small size of the 
labor market limits the number alternative potential employers in a given industry 
and in a given geographical area. This is partly offset by the high geographical 
mobility of individuals in Denmark; however, it is nonetheless exacerbated by the 
fact that M&As reduce the number of employers in the industry. All things 
considered, it is possible that the findings would not be much different in the context 
of other developed economies as long as the average effect across a wide set of 
industries is considered. 
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Another limitation of the empirical setting is that, while we demonstrate the 
phenomenon, we are unable to disentangle the exact mechanisms behind it. This 
applies to all the studies of this thesis. We propose a series of plausible mechanisms 
behind the effects of M&As and external CEO/TMT replacements; however, we are 
not able to dismiss all alternative mechanisms. It is also a limitation of this thesis 
that we cannot observe potential coping mechanisms other than stress and mobility. 
It is possible that individuals used other means for coping with change besides 
turnover such as engagement in negative organizational citizenship behaviors, 
absenteeism, a lack of organizational commitment, or abuse of alcohol or other 
substances. It is also possible that a number of employees abuse of other substances 
such as alcohol to cope with stress, anxiety and depression, which we cannot 
observe in the dataset. We are able to measure only a reduced, albeit significant, 
number of outcomes of organizational change on wellbeing, which is likely to 
underestimate the true impact of these organizational events on employees. 
Overall, this thesis sheds further light on the consequences of organizational change 
on employees. It contributes to the literature on employee mobility (Campbell et al., 
2012; Sørensen and Sharkey, 2014; Wezel et al., 2006) and the outcomes of M&As 
(King et al., 2004; Krug and Hegarty, 1997; Marks and Mirvis, 2001; Paruchuri et 
al., 2006; Younge et al., 2014) by showing if and when M&A deals lead to 
employee turnover and entrepreneurial entry. Furthermore, it contributes to the 
growing literature on the mental health consequences of organizational change 
(Dahl, 2011; Ferrie et al., 1998). In doing so, it moves us a step closer in the 
understanding of what happens when organizations embark on transformational 
processes. Do M&As fail because of the human capital depletion as a result of the 
deal? On average, this is likely not the case. Do M&As trigger entrepreneurial 
entry? The answer to that question is yes, particularly by managers but not in all 
types of deals. Does external CEO-TMT replacement increase employee stress and 
turnover? Generally, yes –and so does “internal contender” CEO replacement. 
However, this thesis only begins to address the individual-level outcome of major 
organizational events, leaving just as many unanswered questions along the way. 
Nevertheless, I hope it contributes, albeit modestly, to our overall knowledge of the 
consequences of organizational change on employees. 
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Chapter 2. M&As and employee turnover: 
who’s leaving? 
Abstract: With the worldwide growth of mergers and 
acquisitions (M&As), a number of studies in recent years have 
called their relative success into question. One reason for the 
poor performance of a number of deals may be negative 
employee reactions, such as employee turnover. Despite the 
widespread perception that M&As often lead to employee 
turnover, there is surprisingly weak empirical support 
provided in the literature. In particular, we know notably little 
regarding the characteristics of those who are departing. In 
this study, I address this gap by using a unique dataset 
resulting from the merger of Bureau Van Dijk’s Zephyr M&As 
database and Danish register data. Additionally, I explore the 
heterogeneous effect of different types of M&As across 
employee groups. I find that M&As generally increase the 
probability of employee turnover, particularly for employees 
with relatively low human capital. Nevertheless, the effect 
varies significantly for different types of M&A. 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) have become a major growth strategy for 
organizations across the globe: Since the turn of the century, over half a million 
M&A deals worth over $54 trillion have been announced worldwide (Thomson 
Financial, 2018). Whether it is to acquire new technologies or intellectual property 
(e.g. Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Cassiman et al., 2006), to expand geographically (e.g. 
Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998; Chen, 2008; Harzing, 2002; Wang, 2009) or to 
consolidate production and distribution (Christensen et al., 2011), M&As are a well-
established growth strategy. Despite their popularity, however, the success record of 
these deals has been called into question. The seemly high failure rate –as high as to 
70-90% according to Christensen et al. (2011)- has naturally sparked an intense 
academic debate, but there are still no conclusive answers as to what factors predict 
M&As’ success (King et al., 2004).  
A number of authors have argued that negative employee reactions to deals are 
behind the high proportion of M&A failures (e.g. Cartwright and Schoenberg, 2006; 
Davy et al., 1988; Levinson, 1970; Marks and Mirvis, 2001; Schuler and Jackson, 
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2001). A potential reaction with direct impact on organization performance is 
employee turnover (Hancock et al., 2013; Hatch and Dyer, 2004; Kacmar et al., 
2006; Park and Shaw, 2013). Employee turnover affects organizational performance 
through operational disruptions and the erosion of the organization’s human (Shaw 
et al., 2013) and social capital resources (Dess and Shaw, 2001; Shaw et al., 2005), 
especially when those leaving are high performers (Nyberg, 2010), and when it 
happens in a short period of time (Heavey et al., 2013). Human capital resources in 
particular are locally scarce and difficult for competitors to imitate, due in part to 
their specificity and the tacit nature of knowledge and in part to the complexity of 
human capital combinations (Ployhart and Moliterno, 2011; Ployhart et al., 2014). 
As both individual and collective turnover erodes the organization’s competitive 
advantage and survival (Aime et al., 2010; Wezel et al., 2006), human capital 
retention in the organization may be a major factor in a deal’s outcome. Pablo 
(1994) argues that the preservation of key strategic resources and skills that form the 
foundation of value creation is essential for achieving value in M&As. In fact, the 
mobility potential of employees in target organizations reduces M&A likelihood 
(Younge et al., 2014), indicating that potential employee movements indeed matter 
in M&A deals. 
But can the erosion of human capital through employee turnover following M&As 
be behind their failure to achieve the expected results? Despite anecdotal evidence 
and the widespread notion that M&As lead to employee turnover, particularly 
among top performers, surprisingly little research has explored it empirically. 
Research has focused almost single-handedly on (top) management (Cannella and 
Hambrick, 1993; Fried et al., 1996; Krug and Hegarty, 1997; Walsh, 1988; Walsh 
and Ellwood, 1991), using research designs that did not include control groups or 
that studied a single organization (Iverson and Pullman, 2000). Much less is known 
about the effect of M&As on the mobility of other employees, such as technical 
workers (Paruchuri et al., 2006), or the value of the departing employees for the 
organization. Studies of employee turnover rarely identify the quality of the 
employees who leave (Nyberg, 2010); most studies treat turnover and its effect on 
performance as a uniform phenomenon, despite low performer turnover possibly 
being sometimes functional or beneficial for the organization (Dalton et al., 1982). 
In this study, I address this gap by exploring both whether M&As have a widespread 
impact on employee turnover across the organization and who is most impacted. For 
this I use a combination of the Danish panel database known as the Integrated 
Database for Labor Market Research (IDA) with Bureau van Dijk’s Zephyr M&A 
database. I examine the effect of M&As on employee turnover through difference-
in-differences and fixed effects regressions on a sample of employees working in 
2,983 organizations from 2001 to 2010.  
Scholars have argued that M&As are not a single organizational phenomenon but 
rather a number of qualitatively different transactions (e.g. Bower, 2001; 
Christensen et al., 2011; Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999), which can thus have 
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different impacts on employees. Despite this recognition, research on how different 
types of M&As affect employee turnover is non-existent. To address this gap, I 
additionally explore how industry relatedness, country of origin, and acquirer’s 
previous stake in the target influence the effect of M&A on employee turnover in a 
follow-on analysis. I approach the effect of deal type on turnover with a largely 
inductive empirical approach (Helfat, 2007; Oxley et al., 2010). Rather than 
proposing a set of testable hypotheses, I provide a more informal theoretical 
discussion that gives context to the empirical analysis, followed by a discussion of 
what the evidence reveals (Helfat, 2007).  
This article is the first to look into the comprehensive effect of M&As on employee 
turnover throughout the organization, advancing our knowledge of who leaves 
following M&As. One limitation of this article in particular is that the theoretical 
explanations for why employees leave following M&As are not directly tested. 
Rather, I develop a set of plausible propositions regarding the link between M&As 
and employee turnover based on the extant literature. As such, I do not claim that 
these are the only possible explanations to the phenomenon that could have been 
proposed a priori. 
2.1. WHY EMPLOYEES LEAVE FOLLOWING AN M&A 
Organizational growth through mergers and acquisitions is pursued for a variety of 
reasons. M&As are used as a means of market entry (Bower, 2001; Harzing, 2002), 
for technology acquisition and innovation and to expand capacity and increase 
efficiency –often referred to as synergies (Chatterjee, 1992; Christensen et al., 2011; 
Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999). The rationale behind M&As is likely to influence 
both what organizational changes will ensue, and therefore also how employees will 
perceive the deals. A high degree of integration is often seen as necessary for 
resource redeployment and exploitation (King et al., 2004). Integration refers to 
“changes in the functional activity arrangements, organizational structures and 
systems, and cultures of combining organizations to facilitate their consolidation 
into a functioning whole” (Pablo, 1994, p. 806). In general, the larger the potential 
for synergy realization, the greater the level of organizational integration expected 
following M&As (Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999; Paruchuri et al., 2006; Puranam et 
al., 2009; Zollo and Singh, 2004). As the new organization strives to leverage the 
synergies from the merger, employee turnover is likely to increase through lay-offs 
as part of the organization’s restructuring (Chatterjee, 1992). 
Post-merger integration is a multifaceted and dynamic process, which involves on 
the one hand strategic integration of activities and resources to create value, and 
social and cultural issues on the other (Graebner et al., 2017). During the 
sociocultural post-M&A integration process, there are also a number of reasons why 
employees may leave an organization voluntarily. In this study, I propose three 
mechanisms behind that phenomenon: disruption of organizational routines and 
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change to core organizational features (Baron et al., 2001; Hannan and Freeman, 
1984; Hannan et al., 2003), breakage of psychological contracts (Morrison and 
Robinson, 1997; Rousseau, 1989), and shocks to the individual’s organizational 
identification (Holtom et al., 2005; Lee et al., 1996; Van Knippenberg et al., 2002). 
Just as M&As can “create value by disrupting routines and providing new 
organizational and technical components that can be combined in novel ways” 
(Graebner et al., 2017, p. 6), disrupting routines comes at a cost. Organizations tend 
to develop and perpetuate a set of norms and values that are increasingly difficult to 
change (Hannan et al., 2003). Organizational ecologists argue that individuals are 
inherently resistant to change, thus changing deeply engrained organizational values 
and norms is likely to have adverse effects on them (Baron et al., 2001; Hannan and 
Freeman, 1984). This resistance to change means that employees at different levels 
will not simply accept the change and will exert effort to shape its intended outcome 
(Hannan et al., 2003). Organizational change thus becomes a stochastic process with 
possible unintended outcomes (Hannan et al., 2003). Feedback leads to further 
changes to correct for such unintended results, causing more instability and 
uncertainty for employees. This uncertainty surrounding change can be a significant 
source of anxiety and stress that damages employee well-being (Bordia et al., 2004), 
thereby increasing their intention to leave the organization (Schweiger and Denisi, 
1991). Thus, the changes that follow M&As can disrupt organizational processes 
and routines and will frequently be met with resistance throughout the organization 
(Hannan et al., 2003), causing emotional reactions (Vakola and Nikolaou, 2005) and 
potentially increasing conflict and employee turnover.  
Organizational psychologists argue that major change processes increase the 
likelihood of breaching implicit psychological contracts and previous agreements 
between employers and employees (Morrison and Robinson, 1997; Rousseau, 1989), 
leading to lower organizational commitment, increased absenteeism and employee 
turnover. Employees gradually develop an implicit set of expectations regarding 
mutual obligations with the organization. These expectations are not necessarily 
written anywhere but are nonetheless part of the working culture and values of the 
workplace. In fact, Montes and Zweig (2009) show that what the management 
promises may matter much less for employees than the fit between their 
expectations and the actual outcomes. Psychological contracts are breached by an 
employer’s failure to fulfil the set of implicit expectations developed by employees, 
independent of whether these have actually been promised or not. Major change 
processes often breach these contracts as they are often crafted by the top 
management team with limited consideration for the agreements and expectations 
developed at the lower levels of the organization (Shield et al., 2002). Empirically, 
major alterations of psychological contracts and perceived breaches to employer’s 
obligations have been shown to ensue from M&As (Bellou, 2006). Such violations 
often translate into emotional reactions, engaging employees in uncivil behaviour 
that may further undermine the work environment and increase employee turnover.  
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M&As are significant events both for organizations and for their employees. As 
such, they can be pivotal moments for employees’ organizational identification (Van 
Knippenberg et al., 2002). Changes to organizational identity can trigger the re-
evaluation of identification, and employees may question whether they want to 
continue being part of the organization (Holtom et al., 2005). Lastly, Holtom et al. 
(2005) and Lee et al. (1996) propose that turnover is usually caused by shocks rather 
than by job dissatisfaction. While most research on turnover has focused on job 
dissatisfaction, they argue that turnover is usually caused by sudden events, such as 
an unsolicited job offer or being passed over for promotion. Job satisfaction before 
the shock may often be completely irrelevant to the decision to leave the 
organization. Shocks are sufficiently relevant events that make individuals question 
whether they should quit an organization, regardless of how satisfied they were 
previously. Shocks can elicit positive, neutral or negative emotion, and they do not 
necessarily originate from the organization -but they often do. Organizational 
M&As provide a widespread example of such a shock to employees (Holtom et al., 
2005). Cognitive appraisal plays a key role in employees’ reaction to a shock 
(Holtom et al., 2005); it determines whether the employee views change as negative 
or positive. A negative appraisal signifies that the employee perceives change as a 
threat; thus, organizational change becomes a source of stress (Fugate et al., 2002). 
Empirical studies on the consequences of M&As have also generally found a 
negative impact on employee wellbeing, particularly on job security and intention to 
leave (Bordia et al., 2004; Schweiger and Denisi, 1991). Focusing their analysis on 
middle-managers, Fried et al. (1996) found that feelings of loss of control, 
identification with employees who were laid off, feelings of unfairness, and the 
perception of detrimental career changes contributed to their psychological 
withdrawal, increasing their intention to leave the organization. These results further 
reinforce the expectation of M&As’ impact on employee turnover. 
However, the perspective that employee reactions to M&As are generally negative 
has also been challenged in recent times. In particular, Teerikangas (2012) found 
that in six of eight case studies of Finish multi-national acquisitions, reactions 
tended towards motivation rather than uncertainty. Employees’ behaviour as a 
response to M&As may depend to a large extent on their cognitive appraisal of the 
changes and how they cope with them. Coping refers to how individuals handle 
stressful situations that affect their well-being. Specifically, it is the effort exerted to 
manage the internal and external demands, fruit of the interaction with the 
environment that taxes or exceeds the individual resources (Folkman et al. 1986). 
Employees may cope with M&As in substantially different ways, and insofar as 
employees of target organizations perceive a M&A as an opportunity, it is possible 
that negative reactions to the deal will be limited. Nevertheless, most of the evidence 
on employee reactions to M&As indicates that these can be dramatic events in their 
employment careers (Cannella and Hambrick, 1993; Holtom et al., 2005; Krug and 
Hegarty, 1997; Walsh, 1988; Walsh and Ellwood, 1991). In times of M&As, by 
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most accounts, employees in the target organization will tend to distance themselves 
and use withdraw as a coping mechanism, leading to lower commitment and higher 
chances of turning over than before (Bellou, 2006; Schuler and Jackson, 2001). 
Thus, all in all, I expect that M&As increase the probability of employee turnover. 
2.2. WHO LEAVES AND WHY IT MATTERS 
Human capital differs from other resources since it requires motivation and 
satisfaction with current and future conditions (Coff, 1997; Coff and Kryscynski, 
2011). Perhaps the most pressing challenge for management is that these employees 
are mobile; they may well depart one day and never return. This particular 
characteristic has triggered considerable interest in the consequences of employee 
mobility on organizations, with the great majority of studies finding a negative 
relationship between employee turnover and organization performance, survival and 
competitive advantage (Aime et al., 2010; Hancock et al., 2013; Hatch and Dyer, 
2004; Heavey et al., 2013; Kacmar et al., 2006; Park and Shaw, 2013; Shaw et al., 
2005; Wezel et al., 2006). Sudden increases in employee turnover can be 
particularly disruptive for performance (Heavey et al., 2013), quickly eroding the 
organization’s human capital –the knowledge, skills, abilities and other 
characteristics that are relevant for economic output (Ployhart et al., 2014). 
Even though employee turnover can be very costly, not all turnover has the same 
consequences, as employees are not all equally valuable for the organization 
(Nyberg, 2010; Ployhart et al., 2014). The impact of employee turnover on the 
organization likely depends on the characteristics of those employees leaving. The 
quality of employees’ human capital –the aggregation of different employee 
dimensions, such as knowledge, skill, abilities and other characteristics (Nyberg and 
Ployhart, 2013)- is just as relevant as its quantity for organizational performance 
(Dalton et al., 1982; Nyberg and Ployhart, 2013; Shaw et al., 2005). Turnover by 
employees with high human capital are particularly concerning, since the 
preservation of key strategic resources and skills form the basis of value creation in 
M&As (Pablo, 1994). An increase in turnover of high human capital employees 
would indicate that indeed human reactions to M&As are affecting organizations’ 
human capital resources and therefore undermining the performance of the resulting 
organization.  
The literature on employee mobility observes that “star” performers –individuals 
who are considered to be disproportionally productive- are more visible on the 
labour market than their colleagues and are therefore highly mobile (Groysberg et 
al., 2008). Similarly, this also applies to key inventors –those with disproportionate 
patenting output- who have been found to leave more frequently following corporate 
acquisitions than lower-performance inventors (Ernst and Vitt, 2000). Organizations 
may therefore be more vulnerable to losing star performers and key inventors 
following M&As given the higher visibility on the market. 
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Conversely, if the rationale of an M&A is to increase efficiency by decreasing 
operational costs, it is possible that the profile of the departing employees be quite 
different. While preserving key human capital resources might still be a goal in 
those deals, the pursuit of operational synergies can result in widespread 
redundancies at most levels of the organization. The higher the level of integration 
required, the higher the resource redundancy will be (Zollo and Singh, 2004). In 
cases of extensive organizational integration, turnover may fall disproportionately 
on employees with relatively lower human capital.    
2.3. ONE M&A FITS ALL? 
M&As are in fact an umbrella term used to define the merger of two organizations 
or the acquisition of one organization by another, but deals can be considerably 
heterogeneous (Bower, 2001; Chen, 2008; Graebner et al., 2017; Larsson and 
Finkelstein, 1999; Napier, 1989). There are number of dimensions along which an 
M&A can be defined. For example, M&As are often distinguished by the 
technological, industry and product market similarities between target and acquirer. 
When there is a significant overlap in target and acquirer industry or product market, 
the deals are typically called related or horizontal M&As. When there is no overlap, 
M&As are referred to as unrelated or conglomerate M&As. Another dimension 
along which deals vary concerns the national origin of the target and acquirer: 
M&As can be either domestic (same country of origin) or cross-border (different 
country of origin). Deals can also differ for instance on how they are carried out: in 
particular, whether the acquirer takes on an equity stake in the target before 
assuming a controlling participation. 
As different types of M&As vary in motive, antecedents, processes and outcomes, 
there are a number of reasons to expect that their effect on employee turnover may 
differ. First, the majority of M&As require some level of integration of the target 
into the acquired, but the degree of integration fluctuates across M&A types. The 
rationale of an organization to engage in M&As determines the type of transaction it 
pursues, which in turn will determine the degree of post-M&A integration required 
to create value (Bauer et al., 2014; Chatterjee et al., 1992; Napier, 1989). In related 
M&As, for example, targets are more likely to become fully integrated into the 
acquirer, as these deals are often motivated by potential operational synergies 
(Chatterjee et al., 1992). Zollo and Singh (2004), in fact, argue that the benefits of 
related acquisitions are only expected to materialize in cases of extensive operational 
integration. The greater the potential for synergy realization, the greater the level of 
post-M&A integration expected (Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999; Paruchuri et al., 
2006; Puranam et al., 2009; Zollo and Singh, 2004). A high degree of integration 
leads to extensive resource redeployment and high resource redundancy (Larsson 
and Finkelstein, 1999), thus leading to organizational restructuring, labour 
rationalization and potential layoffs (Chatterjee, 1992; Christensen et al., 2011; 
O’Shaughnessy and Flanagan, 1998). Unrelated M&As, on the other hand, are 
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typically associated with diversification, technology acquisition or vertical 
integration of the value chain, with more limited overlap in skills, knowledge and 
capabilities between target and acquirer. The potential for operational synergies in 
that case is more limited, and thus is likely to involve limited post-M&A integration. 
Thus, it is reasonable to expect that related M&As will have a stronger effect on 
employee turnover than unrelated M&As. 
Second, the rationale behind cross-border M&As typically differs from domestic 
acquisitions. Cross-border M&As are mostly motivated by geographical expansion 
into new markets, which on the one hand adds a supplementary level of 
acculturation, and on the other presents minimal overlap of activities between target 
and acquirer, which translates into limited sociocultural integration of the target 
(Stahl and Voigt, 2008). Differences in national culture can provide unique 
complementarities in M&As (Morosini et al., 1998), as well as challenges. For 
example, Barkema et al. (1996) argue that cross-border M&As are characterized by 
an additional layer of acculturation, which represents a substantial barrier to the 
post-merger integrations process. Reus et al. (2016) highlight how cross-border 
M&As have the potential to increase conflict and power struggles. Krug and 
Hegarty (1997) also show an increase in employee turnover among top managers for 
targets that are acquired by foreign organizations vis-à-vis domestic organizations. 
Weber et al. (1996), however, found the effect to be the opposite: while 
organizational culture differences in domestic M&A had a negative impact on 
integration and cooperation, national culture differences in cross-border M&As had 
the opposite effect. In the same vein, Stahl and Voigt (2008) argue that increased 
attention to cultural difference between target and acquirer leads to less negative 
integration outcomes than less attention to organizational culture differences.  
All in all, the findings on the effect of acquirer foreignness on sociocultural 
integration provide an unclear prediction a priori of how domestic and cross-border 
M&As differ in terms of employee turnover. This has led Björkman et al. (2007) to 
conclude that “the ‘cultural distance’ hypothesis either does not apply to acquisitions 
or is too simplistic to explain the effects of cultural differences on post-acquisition 
integration outcomes” (p. 660). Another aspect of post-M&A integration is the 
process of operational or structural integration (Graebner et al., 2017; Larsson and 
Finkelstein, 1999). Cross-border M&As are relatively less likely to structurally 
integrate targets than domestic M&As because of the more limited operational 
synergies for geographically distant organizations. Consequently, I expect that 
involuntary turnover linked to operational synergies and cost reduction will be less 
prominent in cross-border M&As than in domestic M&As.  
Lastly, the impact of M&As on employee turnover may also depend on how the 
M&A process is carried out –the M&A mode. For example, a gradual M&A mode is 
characterized by an equity alliance to increase the involvement in the target prior to 
a potential full-scale M&A. This two/multiple-stage M&A mode reduces 
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information asymmetries between the management of acquirer and target and avoids 
adverse partner selection (Reuer and Ragozzino, 2008). Such information 
asymmetries are particularly relevant when the targets are private (Capron and Shen, 
2007) and in knowledge-intensive industries (Ranft and Lord, 2002). In this M&A 
mode, the acquirer first buys a minority stake or forms a joint venture with the 
target, gaining time and critical information about the target, enabling a better 
assessment of the target, potential fit and required post-M&A changes. 
Organizations do not always pursue a gradual acquisition, however. Most often, 
acquiring organizations buy outright a controlling share of the target with no prior 
equity involvement –an outright M&A. If M&As represent shocking events for 
employees, outright M&A modes probably have a stronger effect, leading to a more 
negative cognitive appraisal of the M&A and higher employee turnover. Gradual 
M&A modes provide a less sudden event and give employees more time to 
assimilate and cope with the new organizational reality.  
All in all, we can expect different M&As to have a heterogeneous effect on 
employee turnover. In general, the literature suggests that domestic, related and 
outright M&As will have the largest effect on turnover, vis-à-vis cross-border, 
unrelated and gradual M&As. 
2.4. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY AND DATA 
Studies on the effect that M&As have on employee turnover have been limited by 
the availability of comprehensive quantitative data linking M&A deals and 
employees mobility patterns. Empirical research has thus focused on employees for 
whom data is publicly accessible, such as the top management of organizations 
listed in stock markets (Cannella and Hambrick, 1993; Fried et al., 1996; Krug and 
Hegarty, 1997; Walsh, 1988; Walsh and Ellwood, 1991), or the management of a 
single organization (Iverson and Pullman, 2000) with research designs that do not 
include control groups. 
To overcome these limitations, I use a unique matched dataset product of the merger 
between Integrated Database for Labor Market Research (also known as IDA, its 
acronym in Danish) and the Bureau van Dijk’s Zephyr M&As database. IDA is a 
large panel database that contains information on virtually all individuals in the 
Danish labour market and all employers registered in Denmark since 1980. The data 
are collected on a yearly basis by Statistics Denmark from state agencies primarily 
for research purposes, and it is structured in several datasets at the organization- and 
employee-level. Some of the most prominent articles that have utilized this register 
database include Dahl (2011), Nanda and Sørensen (2010), and Sørensen and 
Sorenson (2007). Timmermans (2010) provides a comprehensive description of 
IDA. Zephyr is a global M&A database that has previously been used, for example 
in Arora and Nandkumar (2011) and Useche (2014). This database contains data on 
the majority of M&A deals in Denmark, including the industry and origin of 
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acquiring and target organizations. Although both databases are well-established, 
this paper is the first to make use of their combination.  
M&A deals, organizations and individuals are linked through unique corporate 
registration IDs. The linkage between the IDA and the extract from the Zephyr 
database is performed by Statistics Denmark to preserve the anonymity of 
organizations and individuals. This also means that the final number of available 
variables is limited by data protection requirements set to avoid perfect 
identification of anonymized individuals and organizations in the database. For 
example, while the final sample contains a dummy variable for foreign/domestic 
acquirers, the precise country of origin of the acquirer is not available.  
Table I: Descriptive Statistics - Organizations 
 
All Treated Control 
 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Profits (net, DKK million) 13,865 [213.928] 13,332 [149.380] 14,107 [237.496] 
Size (FTE) 75,083 [196.694] 83,753 [182.470] 71,156 [202.730] 
Sales (DKK million) 169,153 [659.730] 183,606 [544.685] 162,605 [705.727] 
Size (t-1, FTE) 76,293 [199.582] 86,594 [181.586] 71,597 [207.143] 
Size (t-2, FTE) 74,768 [195.226] 85,679 [187.053] 69,621 [198.807] 
Sales (t-1, DKK million) 162,652 [622.167] 176,477 [495.186] 156,371 [671.998] 
Sales (t-2, DKK million) 162,556 [712.608] 195,633 [891.821] 147,05 [610.427] 
Profits (t-1, net, DKK million) 12,495 [223.426] 11,326 [117.880] 13,026 [257.513] 
Profits (t-2, net, DKK million) 5,404 [69.971] 3,819 [64.062] 6,148 [72.584] 
High knowledge intensive 0,277 [0.448] 0,267 [0.442] 0,282 [0.450] 
Low knowledge intensive 0,377 [0.485] 0,373 [0.484] 0,379 [0.485] 
High Tech Manufacturing 0,025 [0.156] 0,023 [0.149] 0,026 [0.159] 
Mid-high Tech Manufacturing 0,114 [0.318] 0,124 [0.329] 0,110 [0.313] 
Mid-low Tech Manufacturing 0,071 [0.258] 0,073 [0.260] 0,071 [0.256] 
Low Tech Manufacturing 0,079 [0.269] 0,085 [0.279] 0,076 [0.265] 
Region 5,664 [3.594] 5,604 [3.552] 5,691 [3.691] 
Primary Industry 4,204 [2.028] 4,180 [2.064] 4,215 [2.012] 
Number of organizations 2,983 930 2,053 
 
The data covers the period 2001-2010, since data on M&As before that period are 
limited. From a large pool of untreated organizations, I found appropriate matches 
for 930 M&A targets. The final sample, following the matching described in this 
section, includes 2,983 organizations and 1,583,240 individual-year observations. 
The treated and control groups are generally comparable, with treated organizations 
being slightly larger (sales and FTEs) and treated organizations being slightly more 
profitable. Treated organizations have, on average, 83.8 FTEs, sales of 186.6 million 
Danish Kroner, and net profits of 13.3 million Danish Kroner. Control organizations 
have, on average, 71.1 FTEs, sales of 162.6 million Danish Kroner and net profits of 
14.1 million Danish Kroner. Of the treated organizations, 26.7% are knowledge-
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intensive service organizations and 37.3% are non-knowledge-intensive service 
organizations; in the control group, the figures are 28.2% and 37.9%, respectively. 
High-tech manufacturing represents only 2.3% and 2.6% of treated and control 
organizations, respectively, while low-tech manufacturing organizations compose 
8.5% and 7.6% of treated and control organizations, respectively. 
Likewise, the treated and control groups of employees are largely comparable (Table 
II). The average employee in the treated group is 39.1 years old, earns 310.2K 
Danish Kroner yearly, has worked in the organization for 4.3 years, in 30.6% of 
cases is female, and has a mean of 0.343 small children. The average employee in 
the control group is 38.7 years old, earns 302.2K Danish Kroner, has worked 4.6 
years in the organization, in 32.8% of cases is female, and has a mean of 0.343 small 
children. Control employees have a 3.24-month longer tenure than treated 
employees and earn approximate 8000 Danish Kroner (approx. 1250USD) less. The 
control group has a slightly higher composition of managers, professionals and 
service and sales employees, while the treated group has a slightly higher 
composition of technicians and blue-collar employees. 
Table II: Descriptive Statistics - Employees 
 All Treated Control 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Turnover 0.182 [0.385] 0.185 [0.388] 0.180 [0.384] 
Wage (DKK; 0,000) 30.491 [19.697] 31.021 [20.496] 30.221 [19.273] 
Job Tenure (years) 4.484 [5.661] 4.305 [5.512] 4.575 [5.733] 
Age (years) 38.863 [9.969] 39.131 [9.770] 38.727 [10.066] 
Education 1.760 [1.228] 1.759 [1.217] 1.761 [1.233] 
Marital Status 0.705 [0.632] 0.714 [0.631] 0.700 [0.632] 
Sex 0.321 [0.467] 0.306 [0.461] 0.328 [0.470] 
Number of kids age 0-6 0.343 [0.657] 0.343 [0.656] 0.343 [0.658] 
Number of kids age 7-12 0.290 [0.591] 0.292 [0.592] 0.288 [0.590] 
Number of kids age 13-18 0.210 [0.500] 0.212 [0.501] 0.209 [0.499] 
Unknown Rank 0.120 [0.325] 0.117 [0.322] 0.122 [0.327] 
Top Management Team 0.000 [0.013] 0.000 [0.013] 0.000 [0.013] 
Manager 0.045 [0.208] 0.043 [0.204] 0.046 [0.209] 
Professional 0.109 [0.311] 0.098 [0.297] 0.114 [0.318] 
Technician 0.189 [0.392] 0.202 [0.401] 0.183 [0.386] 
Clerk 0.098 [0.297] 0.098 [0.298] 0.098 [0.297] 
Service and Sales 0.063 [0.243] 0.055 [0.228] 0.067 [0.251] 
Blue Collar 0.300 [0.458] 0.316 [0.465] 0.291 [0.454] 
Employee-year observations 1,583,240 534,168 1,049,072 
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2.4.1. VARIABLES 
Dependent variable 
Employee Turnover: The dependent variable is a binary variable (Turnover) that 
takes the value 1 at time t0 when an employee changes employer from t0 to t1. The 
dependent variable is defined at the level of the individual employee. 
Treatments 
M&A: The main treatment in this article is defined as “working for an M&A target 
organization”. Employees are considered “treated” if they work in a 
merged/acquired organization when the M&A deal is announced. This variable is 
defined at the level of the organization, so that all individuals who are employed by 
an M&A target the year the deal is announced are considered treated. All those 
working for control organizations (which are not a target of an M&A) are part of the 
control group.  
In the additional analysis, I split the treatment according to the type of M&A. The 
main types considered in this paper are domestic vs. cross-border M&A, Related vs. 
Unrelated M&A, and Outright vs. Gradual M&A modes. These treatments are all 
binary, taking either the value one or zero. The precise nationality of the acquiring 
organization, the full list of industries in which organizations operate, and the 
detailed equity participation were ultimately restricted by Statistics Denmark in the 
matching process to prevent the perfect identification of organizations. 
Domestic M&As and cross-border M&As: domestic M&As are those where both the 
M&A targets and the acquiring organizations are based in Denmark. Cross-border 
M&A refer to deals where the acquiring organization is not based in Denmark. The 
precise nationality of the acquiring organizations was restricted by Statistics 
Denmark in the matching process with the M&A dataset to prevent the perfect 
identification of organizations. 
Related, closely related, broadly related and unrelated M&As: relatedness refers to 
degree of overlap in the industry of the acquiring and target organizations. In this 
study, I define a spectrum of relatedness based on 4-digit NACE codes for the 
primary and secondary industries of the target and acquiring organizations. Related 
M&As are defined as deals where the 4-digit NACE code of the primary industry of 
the target overlaps with the any of the industries of the acquiring organization. 
Closely related M&As are defined as deals where the primary industry of target and 
acquiring organizations overlap. Broadly related M&As are defined as deals where a 
secondary industry of the target overlaps with a secondary industry of the acquirer at 
2-digit NACE codes. Unrelated M&As are those where there is no overlap. 
Outright M&As and gradual M&As: outright M&As refers to the acquisition of a 
majority stake (>50%) of the target organization with no previous equity ownership 
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by the acquiring organization. Gradual M&As refer to deals in which the acquirer 
had a form of equity participation before acquiring a majority stake. This dichotomy 
is based on a more detailed equity participation variable from the Bureau van Dijk 
M&A dataset. 
Independent variables 
At the organizational level, to disentangle the specific effect of M&As on employee 
turnover, I control for a set of organizational variables that could arguably influence 
this effect. First, since individual mobility patterns can be conditioned by location, I 
include a categorical variable to control for the 23 different labour-market regions in 
Denmark. Second, mobility also varies substantially across different industries and 
sectors. I thus include both a 10-item categorical variable to capture industry-
specific factors. Alternatively, I also included a 27-item industry variable for 
robustness, without significantly altering the results. Additionally, all models 
include 6 sector dummies according to the knowledge intensiveness (services) and 
technological level (manufacturing) of the industry based on the Eurostat High-tech 
aggregation by NACE Rev.2. Third, I include two organizational performance 
variables: Profits (net, DKK, million) and sales (DKK, million) in the previous 2 
years. Lastly, I control for organizational size (FTEs), and organizations below 3 
FTE are pruned. 
At the individual level, I include a number of demographic and job-related variables. 
All models include a dummy for sex (1 if female, 0 if male), three variables for the 
number of children in different age ranges (0-6, 7-12, 13-18), marital status (not 
married, married, divorced, widow); age (years), an education categorical variable 
(Primary School, High School, Vocational Training, College, University). Job-
related variables include nominal annual income (Danish Kroner, ten thousand), job 
tenure (years in the organization), seven dummy variables for the employee’s rank 
in the organization (Top-Management-Team, Managers, Professionals, Technicians, 
Clerks, Service and Sales, and Blue-collar Employees) based on the ISCO-08 
classification from the International Labour Organization. 
Employee characteristics and human capital 
Arguably, the best single measure of individual human capital as established in the 
human capital literature is income (Nyberg et al., 2014). On average, employees 
with higher human capital receive higher wages than their peers in similar positions, 
and therefore income is often used as a proxy for an individual’s human capital 
(Nyberg et al., 2014). There is no single perfect measure of individual human 
capital, however, so I opt to present an analysis along several dimensions: 
organizational rank, wage, educational level, job tenure and age. For wage and job 
tenure, I construct an industry-wide variable splitting the distribution into quintiles, 
with the lowest quintile representing the bottom 20% of the distribution and the 
highest quintile representing the top 20%. Employee age is split into 4 categories: 
INDIVIDUAL CONSEQUENCES OF ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE 
82
 
18-30, 31-40, 40-50 and higher than 50 years of age. Organizational rank and 
educational level are defined above.  
2.4.2. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
In the ideal experiment, I would randomly assign employees to organizations which 
then become M&A targets. Such research design is clearly not feasible. Not all 
organizations have the same probability of becoming M&A targets either, so the 
treatment assignment is certainly not random. Therefore, we must rely on other 
alternative research designs that will allow for reliable inference. I make use of three 
strategies for identification of effects. First, I use propensity score matching to 
pseudo-randomize the treatment based on observable organization characteristics: 
size, sales, profits, industry and location. The region of common support for treated 
and untreated organizations in this case is approximately between 0 and .01. I then 
sort by propensity score and match the treated to the closest untreated organization. 
The propensity scores of the final sample are shown in Figure 1. This selection 
strategy enables the construction of treated and control groups with a similar 
probability of being treated, essentially pseudo-randomizing the treatment based on 
observables (assuming conditional ignorability). Second, I use a difference-in-
differences design, where changes over time are compared to the control (untreated) 
group of organizations and employees that have not experienced M&As. Lastly, I 
estimate the within-group effects in linear probability models with organization 
fixed effects, in effect controlling for unobservable differences between 
organizations. A conditional organization fixed effects logistic regression model is 
not feasible in Stata software due to numerical overload problems (see Dahl and 
Pierce, 2018), and I therefore use linear probability models here. These strategies 
account at least partly for the omitted variable bias, by including industry, location, 
year and organization fixed effects.  
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Figure 1: Propensity Scores After Matching 
 
Area of common support in propensity score distributions of treated and control organizations. The plot 
shows the propensity scores (x-axis) against relative frequency (y-axis) for each group. 
 
It is reasonable to assume that the departure of several employees of an organization 
might be correlated, and therefore I cluster standard errors at the level of the 
organization to correct for this intra-group correlation. Angrist and Pischke (2008) 
suggest that at least 42 clusters are required for reliable inference. The number of 
clusters is reported for each model, and in all cases meets this criterion. 
Figure 2 displays the evolution of turnover means for treated and control groups for 
each year from t-5 (i.e., 5 years before the event) to t+5 (i.e., 5 years after the event). 
The mean turnover of employees in the treated group is 18.5%, while the turnover of 
control employees is 18.0%. Treated and control groups follow similar parallel 
trends until t-2. In t-1, however, there is a divergence in trajectories, with the delta in 
mean turnover treated and control groups more than doubling. The M&A event 
unfolds between t-1 and t0, so this suggests that turnover might be happening before 
the deal is announced. Here, it is important to notice that the outcome variable 
Turnover takes the value 1 at t-1 when the employee changes organizations between 
t-1 and t0. At t0 the means are almost exactly at the same level and continue on a very 
similar trend thereon. Although this analysis is a simple means-comparison, it 
signals that there is something occurring with employee turnover around the time of 
an M&A. 
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Figure 2: Turnover Rates 
 
 
2.5. RESULTS 
2.5.1. MAIN ANALYSIS 
Table III shows the results of the logit model and the difference-in-differences logit 
model. Column (1) shows the correlation between M&As and turnover, including 
the full set of individual, organization performance, industry, sector, year and 
location variables. For conciseness, all tables display the summary results, but full 
regression tables are available on request for all models. The correlation between 
M&As and turnover is indeed positive, indicating that employees working in treated 
organizations are associated with a higher probability of turnover.  
Table III: Employee Turnover, Logit models 
 (1) (2) 
M&A 0.397**  
 [0.060]  
M&A, all years  0.187** 
  [0.040] 
M&A x Post t0  -0.187
** 
  [0.046] 
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Demographic variables  Yes Yes 
Rank  Yes Yes 
Organizational Performance  Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes 
Sector fixed effects  Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes 
Location fixed effects  Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.06 0.06 
Log-likelihood -569,017 -569,455 
Number of organizations 41,905 41,905 
Observations 1,316,551 1,316,551 
Standard errors are clustered at the level of the organization and reported in brackets.  
Significance levels: *(p<0.05), **(p<0.01). 
 
In Column (2) we move into the difference-in-differences analysis, where the 
variable of interest is M&A x Post, the interaction between the treatment (M&A, all 
years) and the Post treatment period. In Column (2), the post period is set to start at 
t0, which is the period when the M&A is reported to have already occurred. The 
results reveal that treated employees have in general a larger probability of turnover 
than the control group, but that this probability decreases in the post period. In other 
words, treated employees have higher turnover than the control group but only 
before the M&A event.   
Table IV: Employee Turnover -Organization Fixed Effects Models, Linear Probability 
 (1) (2) 
M&A 0.097**  
 [0.010]  
M&A, all years  -0.025** 
  [0.006] 
M&A x Post t0  0.023
** 
  [0.007] 
Organization fixed effects Yes Yes 
Demographic variables  Yes Yes 
Rank  Yes Yes 
Organizational Performance  Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
R2 0.02 0.02 
Log-likelihood -434,103 -436,040 
Number of organizations 41,907 41,907 
Observations 1,316,599 1,316,599 
Standard errors are clustered at the level of the organization and reported in brackets.  
Significance levels: *(p<0.05), **(p<0.01). 
 
INDIVIDUAL CONSEQUENCES OF ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE 
86
 
Table IV displays the linear probability models and introduces organization fixed 
effects to capture unobserved organizational heterogeneity. In this instance, the 
results reveal a notably different picture. Whereas the positive correlation between 
M&As and employee turnover shows robustness in Column (1), the model in 
Column (2) now stands in stark contrast. When we introduce organization fixed 
effects, the treatment shows a negative correlation with turnover, and the difference-
in-differences estimator shows a positive effect of M&A on turnover. In other 
words, the negative effect that we saw in Column (2) of Table III was largely based 
on differences between organizations, and when controlling for organizational 
heterogeneity, the effect of M&A on employee turnover is clearly positive. 
To test the robustness of these results, I additionally run a set of models right- and 
left-censoring the samples around M&As (results available on request). Changes to 
the treatment window have no effect on the direction or significance of the result. 
The magnitude of the effect is highest when considering the period between t-2 and 
t2. 
2.5.2. THE WHO 
Next, to analyse which groups of employees are most affected by M&As, I split the 
results according to a number of employee characteristics: organizational rank 
(Table V), wage quintile (Table VI), job tenure quintile (Table VII), educational 
level (Table VIII) and age (Table IX). All models are linear probability models with 
organization fixed effects, and include the full set of control variables and fixed 
effects.  
In Table V, the first thing we can see is that technicians are the only group that is 
significantly affected. This means that the effect of M&As on turnover is widely 
distributed and that categorizing employees by rank is not completely informative. 
Other constructions are necessary to understand the distribution of M&As effect on 
turnover. 
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Table V: Employee Turnover by Rank, Organization Fixed Effects Models, Linear Probability  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
M&A, all years 0.060 -0.007 -0.019 -0.032** -0.029* 0.015 -0.024* 
  [0.471] [0.013] [0.011] [0.008] [0.011] [0.017] [0.010] 
M&A x Post t0 0.178 0.011 0.024 0.016
* 0.003 -0.002 0.016 
 [0.205] [0.010] [0.014] [0.008] [0.010] [0.023] [0.011] 
Demographic 
variables  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Organizational 
Performance  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector fixed 
effects  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed 
effects  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location fixed 
effects  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.40 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.02 
Log-likelihood 25 -12,087 -33,433 -63,081 -32,042 -34,448 -122,363 
Number of 
organizations 
81 5,289 6,561 11,914 11,249 7,473 17,405 
Observations 196 60,537 144,952 251,770 125,333 80,199 400,806 
(1) TMT (2) Managers (3) Professionals (4) Technicians (5) Clerks (6) Service/Sales (7) Blue-Collar.  
Standard errors are clustered at the level of the organization and reported in brackets.  
Significance levels: *(p<0.05), **(p<0.01). 
 
Table VI: Employee Turnover by Wage Quintile, Organization Fixed Effects Models, Linear Probability  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
M&A, all years -0.052** -0.025** -0.021* -0.020* -0.002 
 [0.007] [0.008] [0.008] [0.009] [0.009] 
M&A x Post t0 0.079
** 0.024** 0.001 -0.009 -0.010 
 [0.008] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.008] 
Demographic variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Rank  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Organizational Performance  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Log-likelihood -111,743 -85,047 -68,810 -53,805 -44,089 
Number of organizations 21,606 17,108 15,294 14,652 13,271 
Observations 219,416 253,732 272,788 284,645 286,018 
(1) Lowest quintile - (5) Highest quintile. 
Standard errors are clustered at the level of the organization and reported in brackets.  
Significance levels: *(p<0.05), **(p<0.01). 
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In Table VI, I split the regression according to the wage quintile of the employee 
within the industry. Column (1) corresponds to the lowest wage quintile, and 
Column (5) represents the highest quintile. This categorization paints a very clear 
picture: the effect of M&As on employee turnover is only significant for those in the 
lower quintiles of the wage distribution, as the difference-in-differences estimator is 
only significant in the models in Column (1) and (2).  
In Table VII, regressions are split according to the job tenure quintiles, with column 
(1) representing the lowest quintile, and column (5) representing the highest quintile 
in the distribution. The model in column (1) shows a positive effect of M&As the 
lowest job-tenure quintile, whereas column (4) and (5) show that these groups of 
employees are actually less likely to move following M&As than before. 
Table VII: Employee Turnover by Tenure Quintile, Organization Fixed Effects Models, Linear Probability 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
M&A, all years -0.053** -0.023** -0.004 -0.015 0.007 
 [0.007] [0.009] [0.010] [0.010] [0.012] 
M&A x Post t0 0.084
** 0.012 -0.014 -0.030** -0.045** 
 [0.009] [0.009] [0.010] [0.008] [0.008] 
Organization fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Demographic variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Rank  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Organizational Performance  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 
Log-likelihood -192,235 -78,225 -55,408 -16,054 34,068 
Number of organizations 29,167 15,433 13,726 10,450 6,898 
Observations 369,274 209,135 232,042 256,225 249,923 
(1) Lowest quintile- (5) Highest quintile.  
Standard errors are clustered at the level of the organization and reported in brackets.  
Significance levels: *(p<0.05), **(p<0.01). 
 
Next, I split the regressions according to 5 educational levels: (1) Primary School, 
(2) High School, (3) Vocational Training, (4) College, and (5) University. It is 
notable here that employees who have completed formal education up to primary 
school or high school are not impacted by M&As, but rather those who have 
completed at least vocational training.   
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Table VIII: Employee Turnover by Educational Level, Organization Fixed Effects Models, Linear Probability 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
M&A, all years -0.018* -0.021 -0.022** -0.027** -0.036** 
 [0.009] [0.012] [0.007] [0.008] [0.011] 
M&A x Post t0 0.011 0.014 0.021
** 0.015 0.028* 
 [0.011] [0.014] [0.007] [0.008] [0.013] 
Organization fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Demographic variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Rank  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Organizational Performance  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Log-likelihood -107,007 -45,487 -156,249 -57,006 -33,025 
Number of organizations 19,255 11,454 25,464 11,524 6,776 
Observations 316,887 113,713 554,996 219,259 111,744 
(1) Primary School (2) Highschool (3) Vocational Training (4) College (5) University.  
Standard errors are clustered at the level of the organization and reported in brackets.  
Significance levels: *(p<0.05), **(p<0.01). 
 
Table IX: Employee Turnover by Age Group, Organization Fixed Effects Models, Linear Probability 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
M&A, all years -0.026** -0.023** -0.020** -0.015 
 [0.008] [0.007] [0.007] [0.009] 
M&A x Post t0 0.032
** 0.020** 0.014 -0.012 
 [0.012] [0.008] [0.008] [0.009] 
Organization fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Demographic variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Rank  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Organizational Performance  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 
Log-likelihood -130,107 -138,043 -82,164 -33,486 
Number of organization 25,060 22,272 17,307 9,780 
Observations 274,459 441,909 388,127 212,104 
(1) Age <30 (2) Age 31-40 (3) Age 41-50 (4) Age >50.  
Standard errors are clustered at the level of the organization and reported in brackets.  
Significance levels: *(p<0.05), **(p<0.01). 
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Table IX displays the results according to age groups. In this instance, once again, 
the tendency is clear: the effect of M&As on employee turnover is highly significant 
for those in the younger age groups (i.e., 40 years old or less). It is only marginally 
significant for those between 41 and 50 years old, and it is not significant for those 
over 50 years of age. 
All in all, what the results reveal is that the most affected groups of employees are 
relatively young, have joined the organization relatively recently, have completed at 
least vocational training and have relatively low wages. The distribution of effects 
according to organizational rank is less clear, with technicians being the only group 
for which M&As show a particularly significant effect overall. 
2.5.3. FOLLOW-ON ANALYSIS 
To deepen the analysis of the effect of M&As on employee turnover, I next study 
the heterogeneous effect of different types of M&As. Table X displays the results 
for domestic vs. cross-border M&As, and outright vs. gradual M&As. The first thing 
we notice is that the acquirer’s country of origin does not have a differential impact 
overall: the effect of both domestic and cross-border M&As on employee turnover is 
positive and significant. 
Table X: Employee Turnover, Organization Fixed Effects Models, Linear Probability 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Domestic M&A X Post t0 0.027
**    
 [0.010]    
Cross Border M&A X Post t0  0.029
**   
  [0.010]   
Outright M&A X Post t0   0.028
**  
   [0.007]  
Gradual M&A X Post t0    0.008 
    [0.027] 
Organization fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Demographic variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Rank  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Organizational Performance  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Log-likelihood -435,580 -435,562 -435,760 -435,277 
Number of organizations 41,907 41,907 41,907 41,907 
Observations 1,316,354 1,316,394 1,316,507 1,316,238 
Standard errors are clustered at the level of the organization and reported in brackets.  
Significance levels: *(p<0.05), **(p<0.01). 
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The next thing we notice on Table X is that outright M&As, where the acquirer does 
not have an equity stake in target before the majority acquisition, have again a 
positive and significant effect on employee turnover. M&As that follow a gradual 
acquisition strategy, on the other hand, show no significant effect at all on employee 
turnover.  
Next, we turn to the analysis of industry relatedness. M&A deals are classified here 
in terms of NACE Rev.2 industry codes. Related M&As are those where the primary 
industry of the target overlaps with any of the industries on the acquirer. Closely 
related M&As are those where the primary industry of the target is the same as the 
primary industry of the acquirer. Broadly related M&As are those where only a 
secondary industry of the acquirer matches the primary industry of the target (2-digit 
NACE codes). Unrelated M&As are those where there is no overlap between 
acquirer’s and target’s industry.   
Table XI: Employee Turnover, Organization Fixed Effects Models, Linear Probability 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Related M&A x Post t0 0.035
**    
 [0.010]    
Closely-related M&A x Post t0  0.039
**   
  [0.012]   
Broadly-related M&A x Post t0   0.022  
   [0.015]  
Unrelated M&A x Post t0    0.014 
    [0.011] 
Organization fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Demographic variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Rank  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Organizational Performance  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Log-likelihood -435,372 -435,166 -435,393 -435,573 
Number of organizations 41,907 41,907 41,907 41,907 
Observations 1,316,332 1,316,278 1,316,201 1,316,279 
Standard errors are clustered at the level of the organization and reported in brackets.  
Significance levels: *(p<0.05), **(p<0.01). 
 
The results in Table XI show that industry relatedness matters greatly for employee 
turnover. Related and particularly closely related M&As have a positive and 
significant effect on employee turnover. Broadly related and unrelated M&As, on 
INDIVIDUAL CONSEQUENCES OF ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE 
92
 
the other hand, have no significant effect on employee turnover. In a spectrum from 
full industry overlap to no industry overlap between target and acquirer, the impact 
of M&As on turnover increases with overlap. 
In the next step, I split the regression according to organizational rank (Table XII), 
wage quintile (Table XIII), educational level (Table XIV), and age (Table XV). All 
models are linear probability models with organization fixed effects and include the 
full set of control variables and fixed effects, with standard errors clustered at the 
level of the organization. 
Table XII: Estimated Probability of turnover by Rank, Organization Fixed Effects Models, Linear Probability  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Cross Border M&A 
X Post t0 
-0.564 0.018 0.016 0.025 0.012 -0.005 0.030** 
Domestic M&A X 
Post t0 
0.326* 0.020 0.052** 0.027* 0.011 0.065 0.007 
Outright M&A X 
Post t0 
0.174 0.013 0.022 0.021** 0.011 0.006 0.026** 
Gradual M&A X 
Post t0 
- 0.024 0.069 0.044 -0.016 -0.064 -0.014 
Related M&A x Post 
t0 
0.197 0.030 0.037 0.040* 0.013 0.047 0.031** 
Closely-related 
M&A x Post t0 
0.167 0.031 0.045 0.051* 0.017 0.061 0.036** 
Broadly-related 
M&A x Post t0 
- 0.024 -0.008 0.001 0.023 0.004 0.002 
Unrelated M&A x 
Post t0 
0.115 0.000 0.012 0.007 -0.001 -0.000 0.005 
Organization fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Demographic 
variables  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Organizational 
Performance  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed 
effects  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location fixed 
effects  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.40 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.02 
Log-likelihood 25 -12,084 -33,423 -62,979 -32,024 -34,438 -122,187 
Number of 
organizations 
81 5,289 6,561 11,914 11,248 7,473 17,405 
Observations 196 60,535 144,944 251,753 125,319 80,186 400,749 
(1) TMT (2) Managers (3) Professionals (4) Technicians (5) Clerks (6) Service/Sales (7) Blue-Collar. 
Standard errors are clustered at the level of the organization and reported in brackets.  
Significance levels: *(p<0.05), **(p<0.01). 
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The results in Table XII show that only domestic M&As have a significant effect on 
top management team (TMT) members turnover. Inference on this particular 
relationship is complicated by the limited number of organizations for which TMT 
membership was identified in the sample. Additionally, the condition of externality 
of an M&A event does not necessarily hold for top managers, since these employees 
quite possibly actively affect the likelihood of M&As happening in the first place. 
The model in column (2) shows no particularly significant effect of any type of 
M&A on the rest of management, while column (3) shows a positive and significant 
effect of domestic M&A on professionals. Technical employees and blue-collar 
employees are the collective most affected by M&As in general as we saw in the 
previous section. Turnover of technical workers is increased by domestic, outright, 
related and closely related M&As. Turnover of blue-collar employees is affected by 
cross-border, outright, related, and closely related M&As. 
Table XIII: Employee Turnover by Wage Quintile, Organization Fixed Effects Models, Linear Probability 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Cross Border M&A X Post t0 0.081
** 0.038** 0.010 0.005 -0.004 
Domestic M&A X Post t0 0.080
** 0.025* 0.009 -0.001 0.004 
Outright M&A X Post t0 0.086
** 0.028** 0.010 -0.001 -0.005 
Gradual M&A X Post t0 0.059
* 0.023 -0.012 -0.013 -0.012 
Related M&A x Post t0 0.087
** 0.034** 0.016 0.009 0.011 
Closely-related M&A x Post t0 0.083
** 0.039** 0.020 0.013 0.017 
Broadly-related M&A x Post t0 0.076
** 0.008 0.018 0.007 0.002 
Unrelated M&A x Post t0 0.076
** 0.022 -0.007 -0.016 -0.017 
Organization fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Demographic variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Rank  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Organizational Performance  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Log-likelihood -111,743 -85,047 -68,810 -53,805 -44,089 
Number of organizations 21,606 17,108 15,294 14,652 13,271 
Observations 219,416 253,732 272,788 284,645 286,018 
(1) Lowest quintile - (5) Highest quintile. 
Standard errors are clustered at the level of the organizations and reported in brackets. 
Significance levels: *(p<0.05), **(p<0.01). 
 
In Table XIII, we can see that the all types of M&A have a significant effect only on 
those employees in two lowest quintile of the income distribution in their industry. 
We can see this effect even for gradual M&As (p<0.05), for which we saw no 
overall impact on turnover. The trend is remarkably robust across all types of 
M&As, with no particular effect on the three highest quintiles of the income 
distribution. 
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Table XIV shows the results for the M&A types by educational level. In this 
instance, we note that gradual, broadly related and unrelated M&As do not have a 
significant effect on any particularly educational group. Cross-border M&As have a 
significant effect on employees who have completed up to primary school education 
and those who completed vocational training. Domestic M&As have an effect on 
those who have completed high school, college or university studies. Outright 
M&As have an effect on those with vocational training, college or university, 
whereas related M&As have a significant effect on all groups except university 
graduates (only at p<0.10). Closely related M&As have almost the same impact as 
related M&As, except for primary school graduates for which significance is only at 
the 5% level. 
Table XIV: Employee Turnover by Educational Level, Organization Fixed Effects Models, Linear Probability 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Cross Border M&A X Post t0 0.031
** 0.018 0.029** 0.017 0.024 
Domestic M&A X Post t0 0.005 0.040
** 0.019 0.028* 0.061** 
Outright M&A X Post t0 0.020
* 0.020 0.026** 0.018* 0.032* 
Gradual M&A X Post t0 -0.016 -0.001 -0.002 0.033 0.062 
Related M&A x Post t0 0.025
* 0.047** 0.030** 0.031* 0.047 
Closely-related M&A x Post t0 0.023 0.056
** 0.034** 0.035* 0.060 
Broadly-related M&A x Post t0 0.030 0.033 0.025 0.003 0.016 
Unrelated M&A x Post t0 0.008 -0.004 0.015 0.004 0.017 
Organization fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Demographic variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Rank  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Organizational Performance  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Log-likelihood -107,007 -45,487 -156,249 -57,006 -33,025 
Number of organizations 19,255 11,454 25,464 11,524 6,776 
Observations 316,887 113,713 554,996 219,259 111,744 
(1) Primary School (2) Highschool (3) Vocational Training (4) College (5) University.  
Standard errors are clustered at the level of the organization and reported in brackets.  
Significance levels: *(p<0.05), **(p<0.01)**. 
 
Table XV displays the results according to age group. In this table, there are two 
results to highlight: first, none of M&A types has a significant effect on those 50 
years old or older. Second, neither gradual, broadly related nor unrelated M&As 
have a significant effect on any particular age group. The other types of M&As have 
a significant effect on both groups 40 years old or younger, with all but domestic 
M&As also having a positive effect on the 41-50 age group.  
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Table XV: Employee Turnover by Age Group, Organization Fixed Effects Models, Linear Probability 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Cross Border M&A X Post t0 0.034
* 0.028** 0.022* 0.004 
Domestic M&A X Post t0 0.045
** 0.023* 0.017 -0.007 
Outright M&A X Post t0 0.040
** 0.026** 0.019** -0.005 
Gradual M&A X Post t0 -0.014 0.014 0.013 -0.008 
Related M&A x Post t0 0.049
** 0.036** 0.027** 0.006 
Closely-related M&A x Post t0 0.051
** 0.041** 0.030* 0.006 
Broadly-related M&A x Post t0 0.032 0.019 0.023 0.020 
Unrelated M&A x Post t0 0.029 0.008 0.004 -0.013 
Organization fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Demographic variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Rank  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Organizational Performance  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 
Log-likelihood -130,107 -138,043 -82,164 -33,486 
Number of organizations 25,060 22,272 17,307 9,780 
Observations 274,459 441,909 388,127 212,104 
(1) Age <30 (2) Age 31-40 (3) Age 41-50 (4) Age >50. 
Standard errors are clustered at the level of the organization and reported in brackets.  
Significance levels: *(p<0.05), **(p<0.01). 
 
In sum, in terms of country of origin of the acquirer, cross-border M&As increases 
turnover particularly for blue-collar workers, relatively young or middle-aged, with 
primary school or vocational studies, and in the lowest 40% of the income 
distribution. The profile of those affected by domestic M&As are 18-40 years old, 
technical workers of professional, with high school, college or university degrees, 
and in the lowest 40% of the income distribution in their industry.  
In terms of acquisition mode, it is clear from the results that outright M&As have a 
much more significant effect on turnover than gradual M&As. Overall, gradual 
M&As are shown to only have a significant effect (p<0.05) on those in the lowest 
quintile of the income distribution. Outright M&As, on the other hand, have a 
significant effect on young and middle-aged technicians and blue-collar employees, 
with high-school, college or university studies, and in the lowest 40% of the income 
distribution. 
The results for industry relatedness also reveal some marked tendencies. Overall, 
neither unrelated nor broadly related M&As have a significant effect on employee 
turnover. In fact, their impact on turnover is largely indistinguishable, and only 
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employees in the lowest quintile of the income distribution appear affected by these 
types of M&A. On the other end, related and closely related M&As have an effect 
on the turnover of employee similar groups: young or middle-aged technicians and 
blue-collar employees, with high school, vocational school or college studies, and in 
the lowest 40% of the income distribution in their respective industry. 
2.6. DISCUSSION 
Overall, the evidence presented in the article indicates that M&As indeed increase 
employee turnover. This is hardly surprising and in line with the previous studies, 
which have focused on top-management turnover following M&As (e.g. Cannella 
and Hambrick, 1993; Fried et al., 1996; Krug and Hegarty, 1997; Walsh, 1988; 
Walsh and Ellwood, 1991). Since employee turnover has been shown to decrease 
organizational performance (Aime et al., 2010; Hancock et al., 2013; Hatch and 
Dyer, 2004; Heavey et al., 2013; Kacmar et al., 2006; Park and Shaw, 2013; Shaw 
et al., 2005; Wezel et al., 2006), this is a potential source of value destruction in 
M&A deals. However, there are a number of caveats. First, contrary to previous 
findings, this article shows that managers in particular are not actually more likely to 
depart following M&As than before, at least for this large set of matched 
organizations and employees. This suggests that previous findings may have been 
driven by lack of control groups, control for organizational heterogeneity, or may 
not be representative of a wider set of organizations. The only indication that top-
management turnover increases found here is for domestic M&As, but inference on 
this point is limited by the small number of organizations with identified TMT 
members in the sample. 
Second, while overall employee turnover increases following M&As, a more 
granular analysis shows that the effect is focused on employees who would not be 
typically considered high-human capital individuals: relatively young, with short job 
tenure and low income, albeit with relatively high educational level. The evidence 
indicates that we are in a “last-in-first-out” scenario, rather than one in which top 
employees are leaving in droves. Clearly, employee turnover in general incurs direct 
and indirect costs for the organization. However, the notion that top employees 
typically walk out the door en masse following M&A simply finds no support here. 
Consequently, one must question again to what degree accounts of human capital 
drain following M&As are representative of a wide set of organizations. The 
perception that top employees leave following M&As might be compounded by the 
fact that top-performing employees are relatively more visible in the labour market 
in general, and therefore highly mobile (Groysberg et al., 2008). Nevertheless, I find 
that mobility of top-performing employees is not particularly increased by M&As. 
The findings also reinforce recent evidence that M&A deals can be put off by 
potential employee mobility (Younge et al., 2014), as organizations consider human 
capital retention key to value creation in deals (Pablo, 1994). It also points towards 
employee turnover being largely involuntary, as organizations integrate 
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operationally in the quest for synergy realization, since those leaving have relatively 
low human capital.  
Third, the effect of M&As varies greatly depending on the deal characteristics. The 
level of industry relatedness between target and acquirer in M&As is crucial for 
employee turnover. In general, the impact of deal on employee turnover increases 
with the level of industry relatedness; closely related and related M&As have the 
strongest effect on employee turnover, while broadly related and unrelated M&As 
had barely any significant effect on turnover. This reinforces the notion that related 
and unrelated deals are conceived for different reasons and have substantially 
different impacts on employees. This is in line with the explanation that the potential 
for operational synergies in related M&As are greater than in unrelated M&As, and 
thus a higher level of integration is required to achieve value in related M&As. 
(Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999; Paruchuri et al., 2006; Puranam et al., 2009; Zollo 
and Singh, 2004). It is also possible, however, that employees of related merging 
organizations anticipate the redundancy of their role in the new organization and 
search for alternative employers, leaving the target organization voluntarily. 
Less difference can be attributed overall to the country of origin of the acquirer, as 
both cross-border and domestic M&As similarly increase employee turnover. The 
main difference between domestic and cross-border M&As resides in who is most 
affected, with domestic M&As having a stronger effect on technical workers and 
professionals and cross-border M&A having a stronger effect on blue-collar 
employees. The findings do not particularly shed light on a differential impact of 
organizational or national cultural differences (Stahl and Voigt, 2008; Weber et al., 
1996). They do indicate, however, that an outcome of cross-border deals can be 
substantial re-deployment of blue-collar jobs to other locations.  
Lastly, this article also shows that following a gradual M&A approach is an 
effective way of avoiding employee turnover. Equity alliances that gradually 
increase the involvement of the acquirer in the M&A target in effect reduce the 
impact of M&As on employee turnover, possibly by reducing adverse partner 
selection (Reuer and Ragozzino, 2008) and providing enough time for employees to 
adapt their perception of fit with the new organizational image (Holtom et al., 2005). 
All in all, the evidence shows weak support for the notion that turnover of top 
employees is behind the failure of merging organizations to deliver on expected 
outcomes (e.g. Cartwright and Schoenberg, 2006; Napier, 1989; Schuler and 
Jackson, 2001). M&As increase employee turnover at the target organization, but 
not specifically of employees with high human capital. It is possible to see this as 
evidence that accounts of en masse turnover of top employees following M&As is 
the product of perception and selection bias, since these individuals are always 
relatively more mobile. However, one should also consider that, as this article looks 
into a large set of deals and organizations across a number of industries, it is 
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possible that many cases are not represented by the average treatment effects. 
Moreover, we should be cautious about extrapolating these results to other contexts. 
In this study, I cover a wide range of industries throughout the relatively small and 
wealthy Nordic country of Denmark, which has a flexible labour market and 
turnover rates comparable to those of the US. On the one hand, individuals in 
Denmark can carry their pension and holiday schemes from one employer to 
another, and non-compete clauses are typically not enforced. This means that top 
employees are at the very least not any more restricted in their movement than in 
other major developed economies. On the other hand, the small size of the labour 
market limits the number alternative potential employers in a given industry and in a 
given geographical area. This is partly offset by the high geographical mobility of 
individuals in Denmark, but nonetheless it is exacerbated by the fact that M&As 
reduce the number of employers in the industry. I believe that, all things considered, 
the findings would not be much different in the context of other developed 
economies, as long as the average effect across a wide set of industries is 
considered.  
A limitation of this article is that, despite its richness, the data do not allow us to 
discern why employees leave following M&As. Here I have proposed a series of 
plausible explanations on how M&As affect employee turnover, but alternative 
mechanisms are still possible and cannot all be dismissed. 
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Chapter 3. M&As and entrepreneurship 
Abstract: Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) can play a major 
role in the formation of new organizations because they 
represent a shock to the environment within which employees 
decide to start new ventures. By suddenly altering the 
opportunity structure of organizations, M&As change the 
relative attractiveness of entrepreneurship for individuals as a 
career choice. M&As’ impact on the advancement 
opportunities for employees, thus, increases the relative value 
of entering into entrepreneurship. Moreover, different types of 
M&As have different impacts on entrepreneurial entry through 
their change in the target’s opportunity structure. In this 
article, I use a unique panel dataset that combines data on 
entrepreneurs and M&As to explore such effects, and the 
results demonstrate that M&As are both significant and 
diverse catalysts of entrepreneurial entry. 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are often depicted in the popular press and 
economic disciplines as detrimental to competition. However, the literature on 
spinoff formation (intra-industry venture formation by individual employees) has 
suggested that M&As can instead be an important source of entrepreneurial entry in 
high-tech industries (Brittain and Freeman, 1986; Buenstorf, 2007; Klepper and 
Thomson, 2010). Nevertheless, why would employees leave an incumbent 
organization to found their own ventures following M&As in particular? According 
to the dominant logic in the literature, the answer to this question can be found in the 
disagreements concerning the strategic direction of an organization such as the shut-
down of R&D programs or the refusal to commercialize internally developed 
technologies and products (Garvin, 1983; Klepper and Thompson, 2010). 
The issue with those studies is that they retrospectively account for a reduced 
sample of (successful, intra-industry) entries by top employees and engineers in 
high-tech manufacturing. While there are good reasons to pay special attention to a 
reduced number of ventures and industries, the transition from established 
organizations to entrepreneurship at some point during individual’s professional 
careers is remarkably common (Sørensen and Sharkey, 2014). Research designs that 
sample on success stories do not tell us much about all those ventures that may have 
started and never reached stardom, leaving not much of a record. Narratives that 
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capture the popular imagination (think of Intel or AMD spinning out of Fairchild 
following strategic disagreements) fail to account for the fact that the vast majority 
of new ventures are founded by the employees of established incumbents (Burton et 
al., 2002) and that a large share of individuals eventually experience periods of 
entrepreneurship (Sørensen and Sharkey, 2014). In short, most entrepreneurs 
actually come from established organizations, and entrepreneurship is a much 
broader phenomenon than high-tech startups. 
Viewing entrepreneurship as a labor market status, I propose that changes to 
advancement opportunities as a result of M&As have a major role in the decision to 
enter entrepreneurship (Sørensen and Sharkey, 2014). The opportunity structure 
within an organization influences entrepreneurial entry by shaping individuals’ 
opportunities to advance in established organizations (Sørensen and Sharkey, 2014). 
The better the opportunities for growth within an established organization, the lower 
the relative attractiveness of entrepreneurial entry will be. From this perspective, it is 
the relative absence of opportunities inside the organization that drives individuals 
to transition to entrepreneurship. M&As change the distribution of available 
advancement opportunities in the target organization, thus acting as an exogenous 
shock to the opportunity structure, changing the relative attractiveness of 
entrepreneurship as a career choice and acting as triggers to entrepreneurial entry 
(Krueger et al., 2000). M&As often require a high degree of integration for the 
realization of synergies and increased efficiency (Christensen et al., 2011; Larsson 
and Finkelstein, 1999). This translates into higher competition for upward mobility 
as the number of adjacent positions increases through integration and the relative 
proportion of higher positions subsequently reduces with the consolidation of 
management. Given individuals’ fixed traits and tastes, when climbing the 
organizational ladder suddenly becomes more difficult and upward mobility is 
blocked, entrepreneurship may become the most attractive advancement opportunity 
(Sørensen and Sharkey, 2014).  
An essential element missing from the current discussion is the understanding of 
who actually transitions to entrepreneurship following M&As. The overall evidence 
in the spinoff literature is again based on a sample of high-profile cases in high-tech 
manufacturing, which does not provide information about the overall transition 
among a wide range of employees and across multiple industries. Following 
Sørensen and Sharkey’s (2014) sociological approach, I argue that employees with 
a) higher levels of organization-specific capabilities (as opposed to general 
capabilities valued by other organizations) and b) closest to the opportunity ceiling 
are more likely to transition to entrepreneurship as a reaction to shocks to the span 
of control (i.e., number of people competing for the same advancement opportunity). 
As such, this is the first article to explore who enters entrepreneurship as a result of 
M&As across multiple organizations and industries. To study this question, I 
combine the Danish panel database known as the Integrated Database for Labor 
Market Research (IDA) with the Zephyr M&A database from Bureau van Dijk. I 
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examine the effect of M&As on new venture formation by employees through 
difference-in-differences and fixed effects regressions on a sample that includes 
69.671 unique individual-year observations and 15.597 organization-year 
observations from 2001 to 2010. 
An important distinction in the M&A and intra-industry spinoff literature is among 
different types of M&As. In the spinoff literature (Garvin, 1983; Klepper, 2009; 
Klepper and Thompson, 2010), particular attention has been given to unrelated 
M&As (acquisition by nonindustry incumbents) and related M&As (acquisition by 
industry incumbents). The findings in this area are mixed, with related and unrelated 
M&As having different impacts across industries; however, no actual explanation is 
given for this “stylized fact”. I propose that observed differences are based on the 
degree of integration inherent in different types of M&A, which determines the 
change to internal advancement opportunities and consequently the employees’ 
propensity to move into entrepreneurship. This article extends these previous 
findings in the first cross-industry, large-scale panel study, which distinguishes 
among several types of M&A events. I begin to disentangle the outcomes of 
different types of M&A as they represent different types of ownership changes and 
their resultant organizational outcomes. Instead of considering relatedness as a 
dichotomous variable, I consider different levels of industry relatedness between 
target and acquirer. In addition, I differentiate among M&As in terms of the origin 
of the acquiring organization (domestic or foreign). 
The aspect of entrepreneurship investigated in this article is individuals’ transition 
from an established organization (i.e., paid employment) to founding an entirely new 
venture. Studying entrepreneurship as a labor market status is of interest because all 
entrepreneurial activity, from self-employment to high-growth ventures, in sum has 
a major weight in the economy (Sørensen and Fassiotto, 2011). This approach 
diverges from the intra-industry spinoff research, which focuses on entrepreneurship 
as a source of economic growth and industrial evolution (Klepper and Thompson, 
2010). This distinction is important as it is unlikely that the motivation for someone 
to become an independent contractor is the same as for someone seeking to found 
the next Facebook. This article therefore concerns the wider link between M&As 
and all types of entrepreneurial activity that involve the founding of a new venture 
unrelated to the parent organization. In that way, the current article complements 
intra-industry spinoff studies such as Klepper (2009) and Klepper and Thompson 
(2010). 
Despite its qualities, a limitation of the research design and data used in this article 
is that they do not allow us to tease out the exact mechanism by which individuals 
enter entrepreneurship following M&As. As such, I do not claim that the 
mechanisms proposed in this paper are a comprehensive account of all motives that 
may drive individuals into entrepreneurship. While the theoretical framework 
provides a plausible description of the mechanism by which an employee transitions 
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from employment in an M&A target to entrepreneurship, not all alternative 
explanations can be ruled out. 
3.1. ENTREPRENEURIAL ENTRY 
The definition of entrepreneurship is undoubtedly a contentious one. There are a 
variety of conceptualizations of entrepreneurship, which I do not aim to reconcile in 
this article. Here, I follow the notion of entrepreneurship as a labor market status, 
distinct from paid employment at an established organization (Sørensen and 
Sharkey, 2014). This wide understanding of entrepreneurship includes all forms of 
new venture formation by individuals, from self-employment to independent 
contractors to high-growth ventures. This is an important clarification because it 
encompasses all forms of new venture formation that are independent of the 
incumbent organization and because it excludes forms of entrepreneurship that do 
not result in the launch of new independent ventures. It is also an important 
clarification because, as Sørensen and Fassiotto (2011, pp. 1324) state, “it seems 
unlikely that there is a perfect overlap between the set of theoretical processes that 
account for changes in employment status and the set of processes that account for 
the likelihood that individuals will identify the next game-changing innovation.” 
The literature on spinoff formation generally considers that there are two main 
reasons why people leave paid employment for entrepreneurship: asymmetry of 
incentives to pursue an idea (Anton and Yao, 1995; Cassiman and Ueda, 2006; 
Hellmann, 2007) and strategic disagreements (Klepper and Thompson, 2010). The 
incentives stream argues broadly that individuals and organizations may have 
different valuations of opportunities or different incentives to pursue them, so that it 
might make perfect sense for an organization to pass up promising projects that can 
then be materialized by employees forming new ventures. Anton and Yao’s (1995) 
model focuses on the incentives to pursue an idea when an employee privately 
discovers a significant invention. In a market with minimal start-up capital 
requirements and weak property rights, the employee must then choose between 
disclosing the invention to the organization in the expectation for adequate 
compensation or leaving the incumbent and pursuing the invention independently. 
Cassiman and Ueda’s (2006) model proposes that there is an optimal project 
rejection level for an organization, where the organization has the comparative 
advantage in commercializing projects that fit with their core assets, and start-ups 
have the comparative advantage in commercializing projects that do not fit with the 
incumbent’s assets. The basic functioning of this model is that discoveries happen 
randomly in time in an R&D department; thereafter, the organization must decide 
whether to pursue a project. Hellmann’s (2007) model of entrepreneurship similarly 
hinges on the serendipity of new idea generation by employees as part of their 
regular jobs; Hellman argues that organizations may reject potentially profitable 
opportunities with limited overlap with their core business. Depending on the 
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distribution of IP rights, the external environment, and the organization’s support of 
innovation, employees may then decide to leave and start their own ventures.   
In general, this stream of literature largely focuses on the timely, exogenous arrival 
of opportunities that can be exploited by employees and their incentives to pursue 
such opportunities inside and outside the organization. Klepper and Thompson 
(2010) offer a different rationale for transitioning to entrepreneurship: specifically, 
strategic disagreements. They argue that it is an “empirical regularity” that new 
ventures are founded by top managers and engineers/scientists after disagreements 
on the strategies and technologies to be pursued by an organization. Disagreements 
arise from differences in the perception of the value of alternative ideas or strategies 
(Klepper and Thompson, 2010). A number of high-profile examples and mini-case 
studies back their theory from the automotive- to the semiconductor- to the laser 
industries. For example, Amelco and Signetics were formed in the early 1960s out 
of Fairchild’s limited interest in pursuing newly developed integrated circuits. Intel 
arguably resulted from tensions regarding control and compensation while AMD 
was formed after the new management brought on by Fairchild’s acquisition 
resulted in strategic change and the downgrade of employees who then spun off. 
Those championing ideas that do not prosper in an organization eventually grow 
frustrated and leave to start their own venture and pursue the rejected ideas or 
technologies on their own (Klepper and Thompson, 2010). Notably, a number of 
those disagreements seem to have been the result of M&As and changes in 
ownership, leading to clashes over changes in the strategic direction of the 
organization or management practices, including rewards systems. 
Both the economic models that focus on the “incentive problem” with the “inventor-
employee” at their core and the disagreements models in which new ventures are 
founded by disgruntled members of the parent’s organization management account 
for only a portion of entrepreneurial entry. While they study an important type of 
entrepreneurial activity, particularly in the high-tech industries, they fail to account 
for the far broader phenomenon of transition from paid employment to 
entrepreneurship. Indeed, as noted by Sørensen and Fassiotto (2011), a large part of 
working individuals will have a spell of entrepreneurship by the time they retire. All 
types of entrepreneurship have, in sum, a major weight in the economy. Periods of 
entrepreneurship are a common feature of many careers, and transition to 
entrepreneurship arguably has much in common with job transitions between 
established organizations (Sørensen and Fassiotto, 2011).  
Another way to study the transition from established organizations to 
entrepreneurship is to consider organizations as a source of opportunities. From this 
perspective, the opportunity structure determines differences in entrepreneurial entry 
rates across organizations. The relative absence of opportunities in the organization 
drives the transition to entrepreneurship; when opportunities for advancement within 
the organization are high, employees are less likely to look for outside opportunities 
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to advance. Like models that are focused on the “incentives problem”, this 
perspective focuses on the choices faced by an employee with an entrepreneurial 
idea. This is a situational view: relevant here is the structure of the choices that are 
made when an employee faces the decision between continuing in the organization 
and entering entrepreneurship. Thus, changes to the opportunity structure within the 
organization change the relative attractiveness of entrepreneurship for employees as 
a way to advance their career. In other words, employees enter entrepreneurship 
because they perceive it as the best way to advance (Sørensen and Sharkey, 2014). 
The basic assumption in the view of entrepreneurship as a mobility process is that it 
is quite similar to other employee turnover processes. In this framework, 
entrepreneurship is similar to the transition to another established organization, with 
one noticeable difference: to transition to dependent employment in another 
organization, the employee must be actively selected by that organization and 
therefore depends on the employer’s perception and actions. However, the decision 
to go solo generally comes from the employees themselves (Sørensen and Sharkey, 
2014). The framework rests on the understanding that self-employment is a viable 
career option for employees under some conditions (Krueger et al., 2000). The 
transition to entrepreneurship is based on the perceived credibility of alternative 
carrier choices, meaning that self-employment must be conceived as to some extent 
a viable choice. Nevertheless, this theory is largely agnostic about individuals’ 
proclivities and attitudes regarding risk or autonomy, focusing instead on the relative 
abundance of internal and external advancement opportunities rather than 
individuals’ traits. 
The opportunity structure is defined by Sørensen and Sharkey (2014, pp. 333) as “a 
hierarchical sequence of positions in the labor market that connected through 
vacancy chains.” A typical example is the internal job ladder in organizations, 
whereby advancement by those below often requires vacancies in higher positions. 
Opportunity structures can thus vary along two main dimensions: the highest 
attainable opportunity, or ceiling, and the span of control or number of adjacent 
positions that compete for advancement opportunities. The maximum attainment 
possible will be a reflection of the number of hierarchical levels in an organization. 
Settings with higher ceilings will present comparatively higher advancement 
opportunities than flat organizational structures. For a given attainment level, 
opportunity structures can still differ in one’s opportunities for advancement, as 
positions with a greater span of control mean greater competition for a vacancy at 
the next higher step. The span of control is determined by the number of employees 
with access to the next hierarchical level. A relatively greater span of control limits 
the prospects of advancing in the hierarchical structure. When employees are at the 
bottom of the organizational ladder, and internal opportunities for growth are 
therefore vast, the attractiveness of entrepreneurship is relatively low. However, 
when advancement opportunities are relatively scarce, entrepreneurship becomes 
relatively more enticing as a career choice. 
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3.2. M&AS AND ENTREPRENEURIAL ENTRY 
M&As are significant organizational events that often cause profound organizational 
changes that affect employees’ career trajectories (Carriquiry, 2018; Graebner et al., 
2017). Nevertheless, the impact of M&As on entrepreneurial entry has been 
considered tangentially in the entrepreneurship research, including Brittain and 
Freeman (1986), Buenstorf (2007), Klepper (2009), Klepper and Thompson (2010). 
The dominant logic, which comes from the intra-industry spinoff literature, is that 
M&As lead to strategic changes; as a consequence, disagreements over the direction 
of the organization flare up, which causes some employees to leave and pursue on 
their own path (Klepper and Thompson, 2010). Klepper and Thomson’s (2010) 
model on disagreements outlines the potential impact of M&As on entrepreneurial 
entry through two possible channels. First, M&As lead to potential changes to target 
organizational strategies, introducing uncertainty among management about the 
right strategy, which leads to increased disagreements. Second, the reorganization 
that often results from M&As can hinder the weight of certain managers’ opinion in 
the decision-making process. This second channel is all the more relevant when the 
acquirer comes from another industry. By reducing the decision-making weight of 
an incumbent manager on the overall strategy setting, potential for disagreements 
arise, increasing the likelihood that the incumbent manager will spin off. 
Klepper and Thomson (2010) describe a number of cases of strategic disagreement 
following M&As. For example, Jim McMullen and others left General Micro-
electronics (GMe) to found Electronic Arrays in 1967 following the latter 
acquisition by Philco-Ford the previous year. Intersil, AMD, LSI Logic, and VLSI 
were arguably all influenced by changes in leadership following M&As (Klepper 
and Thomson, 2010). The pattern of disgruntled employees spinning off and 
founding new ventures following M&As appears to be so pervasive that it is 
described by Klepper and Thomson (2010) as an empirical regularity. However, we 
should be cautious about building a more general explanation for entrepreneurial 
entry following M&As from these prominent cases. These cases refer to the 
transition of top executives and chief engineers in high-tech manufacturing 
industries to entrepreneurship, and they say little about the broader entrepreneurial 
entry by employees at all levels and across industries. In other words, strategic 
disagreements following M&As may explain some of the AMDs in the economy; 
however, they do not account for entrepreneurial transition more broadly.  
One important element of the consequences of M&As on employees regards 
changes to opportunities structures. As M&As strive to achieve synergies in the 
postmerger process, a number of organizational changes are often introduced that 
affect the relative proportion of opportunities to advance. As a number of positions 
higher up the hierarchy are consolidated, employees of M&A targets suddenly find 
themselves in a system with a greater span of control for a given attainment level. 
This outcome translates into fewer opportunities for advancement than before as the 
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number of competing candidates for the next step up the ladder increases. Change in 
their advancement opportunities will consequently affect the relative attractiveness 
of transitioning to entrepreneurship, increasing the rate of new venture formation by 
employees of M&A targets (Krueger et al., 2000; Sørensen and Sharkey, 2014). 
When the potential for synergies between acquirer and target is high, and thus 
resource redundancy is also high, the reduction of advancement opportunities will 
also be high, as the span of control increases with the number of employees 
competing for the next step up the career ladder. An increase in the span of control 
affects entrepreneurial entry by reducing the availability of advancement 
opportunities in established organizations (Sorensen and Sharkey, 2014). Thus, I 
expect the following: 
Proposition 1: M&As increase employees’ probability of entering 
entrepreneurship. 
3.3. M&A TYPE AND ENTREPRENEURIAL ENTRY 
M&As take a variety of forms. The term defines the merger of two organizations or 
the acquisition of one organization by another; however, in reality, deals can vary 
substantially (Bower, 2001; Chen, 2008; Graebner et al., 2017, Larsson and 
Finkelstein, 1999; Napier, 1989). For example, deals can differ both in their 
rationale and in the form in which they are carried out. An organization may acquire 
another organization to achieve economies of scale, to expand its scope, to diversify, 
to achieve financial synergies or to spread risk for the purpose of creating value 
(Bower, 2001; Graebner et al., 2017; Haleblian et al., 2009). The degree of 
relatedness between the target and acquirer will therefore be marked by the 
acquisition rationale. M&As by organizations with high technological, industry and 
product market similarities are typically referred to as related or horizontal M&As. 
Deals by organizations with dissimilar technologies or that operate in different 
industry- and product markets are generally referred to as unrelated or conglomerate 
M&As. Another salient dimension along which deals are typically characterized 
involves the country of origin of the acquirer. M&As between organizations with the 
same national origin are referred to as domestic whereas deals between 
organizations from different countries are termed cross-border M&As.  
As M&As vary along these dimensions, not all M&As are expected to have the 
same impact on entrepreneurial entry. When the rationale behind a deal is to 
increase efficiency, the degree of post-M&A integration necessary to achieve value 
will be substantial (Bauer et al., 2014; Chatterjee et al., 1992; Napier, 1989). 
Related M&As are often carried out to achieve operational synergies and economies 
of scale (Bower, 2001; Chatterjee, 1986), which frequently implies the reduction of 
operational costs through workforce reduction to minimize the duplication of tasks 
(O’Shaughnessy and Flanagan, 1998). These deals require great levels of integration 
to achieve operational synergies and therefore significant intervention to materialize 
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gains (Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999; Paruchuri et al., 2006; Puranam et al., 2009; 
Zollo and Singh, 2004), changing routines and practices in the process (Nahavandi 
and Malekzadeh, 1988) and affecting the internal opportunity structure. As 
organizations integrate operationally and strive to reduce overhead, advancement 
opportunities are hindered by the reduction in the relative number of positions 
higher up the hierarchical organizational ladder. In the post-M&A integration, the 
span of control increases as the number of competing candidates for the next step in 
the hierarchy increases. This translates in fewer internal advancement opportunities 
and makes a move into entrepreneurship relatively more attractive (Sørensen and 
Sharkey, 2014). Consequently, related acquisitions are expected to trigger higher 
levels of entrepreneurial entry by increasing the span of control. 
Proposition 2: Related M&As increase the probability of employees 
entering entrepreneurship. 
When the rationale for M&A deals is less focused on operational synergies, the need 
for integration and acquirer intervention in the target decreases (Larsson and 
Finkelstein, 1999; Paruchuri et al., 2006; Puranam et al., 2009). Unrelated M&As, 
for example, are generally motivated by technology/knowledge acquisition, 
diversification or vertical integration of the value chain. The limited overlap in terms 
of technologies, knowledge and markets translates into less resource redundancies 
than related M&As, offering little potential for operational synergies. Therefore, the 
targets of unrelated M&As are more likely to keep their autonomy and be subject to 
a more hands-off approach than targets of related M&A deals (Napier, 1989; Zollo 
and Singh, 2004). As a consequence, unrelated M&As may not have a substantial 
impact on the internal opportunity structure, as employees’ span of control is 
relatively unaffected. In some circumstances, in fact, we can expect that M&As 
could potentially improve internal advancement opportunities by offering previously 
unavailable internal hierarchical steps. In the post M&A period, employees of the 
target may have higher chances to join the ranks of the acquirer than before, opening 
up a series of advancement opportunities that did not previously exist. Overall, 
seeing entrepreneurial entry as a mobility process does not provide a clear direction 
for the effect of unrelated M&As on entrepreneurial entry. 
One particular aspect of unrelated M&As is that as the difference in industries 
between target and acquirer increases, the room for cultural differences to arise also 
increases (Stahl and Voigt, 2008). Social conflict and camp-building are more likely 
to arise as the target and acquirer become more culturally distant, potentially leading 
to misunderstanding and conflicts regarding routines and practices, from decision-
making to compensation. Such conflicts give rise to the type of disagreements 
described by Klepper and Thomson (2010). Management coming from outside the 
industry has more limited knowledge about the value of alternative technologies; 
thus, disagreements with the new management over the value of an idea or project 
are likely. As this type of ownership change introduces the highest uncertainty over 
the optimal strategy, from this perspective, Unrelated M&As are most likely to 
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increase entrepreneurial entry. When the acquirer comes from another industry, the 
likelihood is all the greater that they will bring along different management styles 
and place less value on the decision-making capabilities of current managers. By 
increasing uncertainty and reducing the decision-making weight of incumbent 
managers on the overall strategy, Klepper and Thomson’s (2010) strategic 
disagreements model predicts that unrelated acquisitions are a prominent trigger of 
entrepreneurial entry. 
The second dimension along which M&A deals are typified regards the national 
origin of the parties. The rationale for domestic and cross-border M&As generally 
differ, and so do their outcomes. Domestic M&As, on the one hand, provide an 
opportunity for operational synergies in the integration of offices, production 
facilities and distribution networks (Chatterjee, 1992; O’Shaughnessy and Flanagan, 
1998). The extensive structural integration of the target organization given the high 
resource redundancy (Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999; Paruchuri et al., 2006; 
Puranam et al., 2009; Zollo and Singh, 2004) increases employees’ span of control 
and consequently reduces their internal advancement opportunities. As the relative 
lack of advancement opportunities increases the attractiveness of entrepreneurship as 
a career choice (Sørensen and Sharkey, 2014), I expect domestic M&As to increase 
entrepreneurial entry. Thus, I propose the following:  
Proposition 3: Domestic M&As increase the probability of employees 
entering entrepreneurship. 
While the majority of M&A deals still involve only domestic organizations, cross-
border M&As are extensively and increasingly used as an internationalization 
strategy (Shimizu et al., 2004). Cross-border M&As represent a widespread mode of 
entry into new foreign markets, and they are an alternative to greenfield investments 
and other nonequity-based modes of market entry (Harzing, 2002). Cross-border 
M&As enable acquirers to gain access to foreign markets and to tap into the 
resources, knowledge, human capital and technologies of the target organization 
(Shimizu et al., 2004). As these deals are often a means to enter new markets in 
geographically distant locations, structural integration of the target organization in 
these deals is typically limited (Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999). Cross-border M&As 
offer relatively few opportunities for operational synergies, resulting in less 
extensive intervention by the acquirer. Thus, cross-border M&As have little impact 
on opportunity structures through employees’ span of control. Moreover, it is 
possible that cross-border M&As may actually increase employees’ advancement 
opportunities. Organizations that operate globally may offer advancement 
opportunities that may have been unattainable before the M&A, thereby increasing 
the internal opportunity ceiling. This can potentially decrease the relative 
attractiveness of entering entrepreneurship for employees. Considering 
entrepreneurial entry as a mobility process, it is thus likely that cross-border deals 
have either no effect or a negative effect on the probability that employees of the 
target organization leave to found their own ventures. 
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At the same time, cross-border M&As add a supplementary level of acculturation 
for target employees (Very et al., 1996). National cultures define deeply ingrained 
systems of beliefs, values and norms. Cultural differences often offer potential 
unique complementarities (Morosini et al., 1998); however, they also give way to 
potential disagreements. In fact, these differences have often been associated with 
organizations’ inability to reap the benefits of cross-border M&A deals (Buono et 
al., 1985; Chatterjee et al., 1992; Stahl and Voigt, 2008) as they increase 
misunderstandings, conflict, and camp-building (Cartwright and Cooper, 1993). 
Although the model of strategic disagreements (Klepper and Thomson, 2010) does 
not specifically consider national cultural differences, its underlying logic indicates 
that such differences increase conflict and shift the decision-making power away 
from the target’s management. However, the conception of national cultural 
differences as a source of conflict in cross-border M&As has been disputed. Vaara et 
al. (2012), for example, found a negative association between national cultural 
differences on social conflict in cross-border deals by Finnish companies. As Weber 
et al. (1996) note, cultural distance does not necessarily translate into incongruence 
because congruence can also be achieved by complementarity rather than similarity. 
Stahl and Voigt (2008) argue that the higher attention paid to national cultural 
difference in cross-border deals decreases the negative integration outcomes with 
respect to organizational culture differences. Weber et al. (1996) also found that, 
unlike organization cultural differences, national culture differences in cross-border 
deals have a positive effect on integration and cooperation. Thus, given the limited 
post-M&A integration in cross border deals, and the mixed evidence of 
disagreements and conflict from national cultural differences, it is unclear what the 
strategic disagreements model predicts regarding the effect cross-border M&As on 
entrepreneurial entry. 
3.4. WHO ENTERS ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
Following the discussion up to this point, a natural question is as follows: who 
enters entrepreneurship in greater numbers following M&As? The economic models 
(Anton and Yao, 1995; Cassiman and Ueda, 2006; Hellmann’s 2007) are all 
centered on the inventor-entrepreneur paradigm. Those models are based on the 
serendipity of invention discovery at work, and therefore potential entrepreneurial 
activity comes from the lab. In practice, this means that entrepreneurial entry of the 
type defined in the economic model comes from engineers and scientists. It follows 
that any impact of M&As on entrepreneurship must be through an effect on this 
group of employees. 
Entrepreneurial entry in the strategic disagreements model, however, comes from 
disgruntled members of top management and chief engineers. Executives start their 
own venture when disagreements arise either due to their being downgraded and 
losing influence in the organizations’ decision-making or due to the refusal of the 
organization to pursue a specific strategy. Engineers leave out of frustration for the 
INDIVIDUAL CONSEQUENCES OF ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE 
118
 
lack of support for a specific technology that they champion. M&As provide an 
arena for the disagreement for both executives and engineers as changes in 
management and strategic changes affect the influence of executives and the 
refinement of R&D portfolios and product pipelines truncates the progress of a 
number of projects. 
Transition to entrepreneurship from a sociological perspective is largely agnostic 
about the characteristics of departing employees entering entrepreneurship: In 
principle, all employees may seek entrepreneurship as an alternative for potential 
advancement. Nevertheless, differences can arise both from the position of 
individuals in the opportunity structure and from how well-matched they are to their 
jobs. According to Sorensen and Sharkey (2014), blue-collar employees can in 
principle advance to white collar positions, whereas white collar employees run out 
of advancement opportunities as they progress in the hierarchy. Those in white 
collar positions are closest to the opportunity ceiling and have fewer opportunities 
for internal advancement, and they will be most likely to leave as a result of changes 
on the opportunity structure following M&As. This aspect should be particularly 
acute for managers who are already closest to the opportunity ceiling. Another 
important prediction of Sorensen and Sharkey’s (2014) model is that the better 
matched employees are to their employers, the more likely they will be to enter 
entrepreneurship if they decide to leave. Better-matched employees stay in the 
organization for a longer time period, during which they develop organization-
specific skills or combinations of skills that are most valuable to that specific 
organization. They are more likely to be stuck in their current organization as their 
skills are less valued by other organizations. Thus, advancement opportunities in 
other established employers are relatively more limited, and entrepreneurship 
becomes a more attractive option to advance their careers. Therefore, those who 
have remained in the organization the longest (tenure) are more likely to transition 
to entrepreneurship as in response to changes in the opportunity structure due to 
M&As.  
The above discussion leads to alternative propositions based on employees’ 
organizational rank as the economic model predicts that engineers/scientists will 
enter entrepreneurship, the disagreement model predicts that both top 
engineers/scientists and managers will enter entrepreneurship, and the opportunity 
structure model predicts that managers will do so. With regard to employee tenure in 
the organization, the only prediction comes from the opportunity structure model. 
Proposition 4a: M&As increase the probability of scientists entering 
entrepreneurship. 
Proposition 4b: M&As increase the probability of managers entering 
entrepreneurship. 
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Proposition 5: M&As increase the probability of long-tenured employees 
entering entrepreneurship. 
3.5. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY AND DATA 
The proposed links between M&As and entrepreneurship pose some analytical 
challenges. On one hand, they require a large dataset that is capable of tracking 
individual mobility patterns in and out of organizations. In addition, observing the 
relative value of alternative employment and entrepreneurial opportunities available 
to individuals requires an in-depth study of individuals and organizations. On the 
other hand, these analyses require individuals to be matched to organizations that 
undergo M&As and organizations that do not to compare how M&As affect 
entrepreneurial entry. Analyzing the process by which M&As shape entrepreneurial 
opportunities and their desirability requires in-depth studies of those organizations, 
which would result in small idiosyncratic samples or even single-organization 
studies. I am not aware of any dataset that would provide both the in-depth study of 
the link between M&As and entrepreneurial entry and the breadth to track individual 
mobility patterns across time and across organizations. Given the unavoidable trade-
off between depth and breadth, in this article I have favored breadth over depth to 
avoid results that may be idiosyncratic to a small set of organizations. Therefore, 
while I provide direct evidence of entrepreneurial entry and its link to M&As, it 
cannot unambiguously show the exact mechanism by which employees decide to 
enter entrepreneurship. 
A challenge of studying entrepreneurship as a result of organizational phenomena in 
general and M&A in particular relates to the linking of entrepreneurs to their source 
organizations. Large-scale datasets that consistently track individuals’ employment 
are hardly available, particularly those that map the transition from employment at 
established organizations to entrepreneurship. To overcome this challenge, I make 
use of the Danish entrepreneurship database to track the founding of new 
organizations in the period from 2000 to 2010. This dataset includes all newly 
founded businesses registered in Denmark including both personal and incorporated 
companies. These data are maintained by Statistics Denmark, which links new 
businesses to their founders via their respective social security numbers. I then 
matched this dataset to the Danish Integrated Database for Labor Market Research, 
known as IDA for its acronym in Danish. The IDA is a large dataset collected for 
research purposes from several governmental bodies and anonymized by Denmark 
Statistics. It contains information on virtually all organizations registered in 
Denmark and all residents since 1980, and it is annually updated at the end of 
November, except for education (October) (see Timmermans (2010) for more details 
on the IDA). Some of the most influential articles that have utilized IDA include 
Dahl (2011), Nanda and Sørensen (2010), and Sørensen and Sorenson (2007). The 
second challenge is to link entrepreneurial entry to employees of organizations that 
undergo M&As (treated group) and that do not (control group). To this end, I 
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combined the resulting dataset to the Bureau van Dijk’s Zephyr database on M&A 
deals. The Zephyr database is based on analyst reports, and it contains information 
on M&A deals and the parties involved. It has been used for several articles 
including Arora and Nandkumar (2011) and Useche (2014).  
The link between the Zephyr database and the IDA is performed by Denmark 
Statistics and restricts the use of several variables to preserve the anonymity of 
organizations and individuals. The final dataset is composed of 15,597 organization-
year and 69,671 individual-year observations. To capture individual’s heterogeneity, 
a set of demographic and job-related variables is used as controls. Job-related 
variables include wage, job tenure and 7 dummies for organizational rank. 
Demographic variables include age, sex, education, marital status and number of 
children.  
In addition to individual heterogeneity, we must also control for differences across 
organizations. To this end, I first control for possible confounding variables. It is 
important to control for organizational size as it is well documented that employees 
of smaller organizations are more likely to enter entrepreneurship (Sørensen, 2007). 
Additionally, the opportunity costs for an employee entering entrepreneurship can 
be higher for those in successful organizations with strong performance records 
(Sørensen and Fassiotto, 2011). Nevertheless, it has also been reported that better-
performing organizations have a higher rate of entrepreneurial transition (Klepper, 
2009). Thus, size, profit and sales in the 2 time periods before the M&A are also 
included to control the effect of previous organizational performance on 
entrepreneurial entry. Finally, to further isolate the effect of organizational 
heterogeneity, all models include organization fixed effects. In all models, I use a 
difference-in-difference technique, which estimates the effect of M&As on the 
entrepreneurial transition by comparing the before-and-after for the treated and 
control groups and computing the differences in means due to the M&A. This 
enables us to mimic an experimental design, allowing for the treatment and control 
groups to be heterogeneous. The descriptive statistics of the used sample show that 
organizations that undergo M&As have some difference in terms of size and profits 
with respect to the control organizations. Employees of those organizations, 
however, are remarkably similar in observables.  
All the models in this article are linear probability models with standard errors 
clustered at the organizational level. The choice of model is marked by the necessary 
inclusion of organization fixed effects to control for organizational heterogeneity. 
Stata is not able to handle logistic regression models with organization fixed effects 
due to the numerical overflow problem; therefore, it is computationally unfeasible to 
run such a model (Dahl and Pierce, 2018). Standard errors are clustered (robust) at 
the organizational level to correct for intra-organization correlation in error terms 
across employees of the same organization. For robustness, standard errors are also 
block-bootstrapped (500 repetitions) with the same results.  
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Consistent with the literature on the topic, particularly from labor economics (e.g., 
Stevens, 2003), we use tenure as a proxy for organization-specific knowledge. This 
measure, although imperfect, is widely used in the literature as it is recognized that 
organization-specific knowledge increases through on-the-job formal and informal 
training. In addition, the inverse relationship between employee turnover rate and 
tenure indicates that the quality of the match increases with job tenure; thus, better 
matched employees stay at the same organization longer. Overall, we should expect 
that, net other confounding variables, tenure is a proxy for organization-specific 
knowledge. Also consistent with the labor economics literature, wage is used as a 
measure of the value an employee holds for the organization due to either better 
matching quality or human capital accumulation, whether that is general, 
organization, occupation or industry-specific human capital (Altonji and Williams, 
2005; Becker, 1964; Stevens, 2003).  
One of the interesting features of the Danish labor market is that entrepreneurship is 
most often voluntary given the generous system of unemployment benefits. This 
reduces the proportion of necessity-driven entrepreneurs since the opportunity costs 
of entering entrepreneurship are higher than in other countries. As Sørensen and 
Sharkey (2014) show, this means that workers choose to be unemployed rather than 
matched poorly to an organization. It also means that entrepreneurial entry is not 
more predominant among workers at the lowest end of the income distribution. As 
found by Carriquiry (2018), M&As increase employee turnover for employees with 
relatively low human capital. If it holds true that transition to entrepreneurship is 
mostly voluntary and not necessity-driven, then we will also expect to find no 
significant increase in entrepreneurial entry at the lowest end of the income 
distribution. 
3.5.1. VARIABLES 
Treatments 
M&A: The main treatment (M&A) is defined as a binary variable that takes a unitary 
value if the organization is acquired and zero otherwise. Deals are considered to 
happen on the date of execution. An individual is treated when working for an 
organization the year in which that organization is the subject of an M&A. 
Individuals who join an organization that is the target of an M&A after the 
acquisition are not considered to be treated.  
Domestic and cross-border M&As: The country of origin of the acquiring 
organization determines whether the deal is considered domestic or cross-border. 
Domestic M&A deals are those in which both the acquiring and target organizations 
are based in Denmark. Cross-border M&As are those in which the target is based in 
Denmark whereas the acquiring organization is based abroad. 
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Related, closely related, broadly related and unrelated M&As: Relatedness is 
defined in terms of NACE industry classification. It is defined as a spectrum from 
related to unrelated based on the overlap between industries in which the 
organizations operate. Since Statistics Denmark differentiates between ‘primary’ 
(core) and ‘secondary’ (noncore) industries of operation, this enables the 
construction of 4 categories as follows: ‘Closely related’ M&As are those in which 
the primary industry of both organizations is the same, based on the 4-digit industry 
classification (NACE codes). ‘Related’ M&As are those in which any of the 
industries in which the target operates overlaps with the industry of the acquirer 
based on a 2-digit NACE code as the precision of secondary industries is often 
reduced in the dataset. M&As are considered ‘broadly related’ if the overlap is 
exclusively on only noncore industries (2 –digit NACE codes). Unrelated M&As, on 
the other hand, are those for which no overlap exists between target and acquirer 
operating industries. It should be noted that the full list of industries is restricted by 
Statistics Denmark following the calculation of these variables to preserve the 
anonymity of the organizations and the individuals in the sample.  
In all models, the control group is composed of individuals and their respective 
organizations that do not undergo an M&A. In other words, individuals who 
undergo a domestic M&A are compared to individuals who do not undergo any type 
of M&A. The same applies for all other treatments: those treated by a related M&A 
are compared to those who do not undergo an M&A at all. The same holds when the 
regressions are split, e.g., by organizational rank: managers who work for an M&A 
target are compared to managers who do not undergo an M&A. 
Dependent variables  
The dependent variable for the analysis of M&As on new venture formation is a 
binary variable with an outcome equal to 1 if an employee becomes an entrepreneur 
in the following year. The employee must have registered the business as either a 
personal or incorporated business. All individuals in the sample started a business 
between 2000 and 2010. If the outcome is 1 at time t0, the employee is registered as 
an entrepreneur in the database to have transitioned into entrepreneurship between t-1 
and t0. Here, it is important to note that to qualify as self-employed or as an 
entrepreneur for Statistics Denmark, an individual may not work exclusively for one 
employer. This means that the practice of transitioning to self-employment to rejoin 
the organization as an individual contractor is typically not allowed by tax 
authorities –individuals who work exclusively for an organization are required to be 
on that organization’s payroll. 
Independent variables and controls 
At the individual level, demographic control variables include age (years); sex 
(dummy: 1 female, 0 male); marital status (dummy: 1 married, 0 unmarried); and 
number of children (2 variables, based on the children’s age) as well as 5 dummies 
for the highest educational attainment (primary school, high-school/gymnasium, 
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vocational training, college, university). Job-related individual-level variables 
include wage (DKK, ten-thousand); job tenure (years) and 7 dummies for 
organizational rank based on the ISCO classification (managers, professionals, 
technicians, clerks and administrative employees, blue-collar employees, service and 
sales employees, and unknown).  
At the organization level, the control variables include organizational size (number 
of employees, FTE); profit (DKK, million); sales (DKK, million); location 
(categorical, 22 labor market regions); industry (categorical, 10-group based on 
NACE Rev.2); and sector (dummies, 2 for services and 4 for manufacturing based 
on the Eurostat High-tech aggregation by NACE Rev.2).  
Sample 
The final sample is described in Table XVI through Table XVIII. The main 
treatment group includes 6,200 unique organization-year observations whereas the 
control group includes 9,397. The treated organizations are relatively larger in size 
(FTEs and sales) and more profitable (in total terms) at all time periods. Treated 
organizations are slightly more likely to operate in knowledge-intensive services and 
low-tech manufacturing than the control organizations. The organizations that are 
targets of domestic M&As are relatively smaller and less profitable than those 
subject to cross-border M&As, although they are both larger than the control 
organizations. Cross-border M&A targets are slightly more represented in the 
knowledge-intensive services and high-tech manufacturing industries than domestic 
M&A targets. 
Considering industry relatedness, unrelated M&A targets are slightly smaller (130 
FTE) and more profitable (11.9 DKK million) than closely related M&A targets 
(137 FTE, 11.7 DKK million) whereas organizations that are subject to broadly 
related M&As are larger and substantially more profitable (173 FTE, 31.1 DKK 
million). Unrelated targets have the smallest probability of happening in high-tech 
manufacturing and knowledge-intensive sectors. M&As in low-tech manufacturing 
have the highest probability of being closely related or related M&As whereas the 
highest proportion of deals in high-tech manufacturing are by broadly related 
M&As.  
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Table XVI: Descriptive Statistics - Organizations 
 
All 
M&A 
(Treated) 
No-M&A 
(Control) 
Domestic 
Cross-
border 
Size (FTE) 113.521 132.442 101.037 122.037 144.817 
(284.661) (370.585) (208.574) (422.808) (296.348) 
Size (FTE), t-1 112.800 131.887 100.144 121.867 143.724 
(286.835) (373.105) (210.079) (427.928) (295.151) 
Size (FTE), t-2 112.800 131.887 100.144 121.867 143.724 
(286.835) (373.105) (210.079) (427.928) (295.151) 
Profits, gross (DKK, mln) 9.586 12.683 7.555 10.155 15.670 
(116.591) (153.998) (83.356) (153.934) (154.046) 
Profits, gross (DKK, mln) t-1 9.810 13.455 7.413 10.183 17.298 
(115.813) (153.433) (82.073) (150.295) (156.979) 
Profits, gross (DKK, mln) t-2 10.356 14.403 7.700 11.141 18.190 
(116.212) (155.975) (79.921) (149.880) (162.709) 
Sales, gross (DKK, mln) 240.043 285.380 210.317 274.925 297.706 
(780.803) (953.049) (641.622) (1056.543) (814.320) 
Sales, gross (DKK, mln) t-1 229.541 269.044 203.526 260.495 279.061 
(736.388) (886.040) (617.043) (991.570) (743.642) 
Sales, gross (DKK, mln) t-2 216.288 251.839 192.919 246.079 258.503 
(678.723) (807.038) (577.953) (903.836) (678.119) 
Knowledge-intensive 
services 
0.242 0.257 0.232 0.243 0.273 
(0.428) (0.437) (0.422) (0.429) (0.446) 
Not knowledge-intensive 
services 
0.369 0.357 0.377 0.361 0.352 
(0.483) (0.479) (0.485) (0.480) (0.478) 
High-tech industry 0.026 0.025 0.026 0.023 0.028 
(0.158) (0.157) (0.158) (0.150) (0.165) 
Medium high-tech 
industry 
0.123 0.125 0.121 0.112 0.141 
(0.328) (0.331) (0.327) (0.315) (0.348) 
Medium low-tech industry 0.088 0.082 0.092 0.085 0.078 
(0.283) (0.274) (0.289) (0.279) (0.268) 
Low-tech industry 0.088 0.094 0.085 0.096 0.092 
(0.284) (0.292) (0.278) (0.294) (0.289) 
Region 5.768 5.742 5.786 6.179 5.222 
(3.547) (3.553) (3.543) (3.538) (3.502) 
Primary industry, 10-
Std.grp. 
4.037 4.077 4.011 4.106 4.043 
(2.021) (2.055) (1.998) (2.091) (2.011) 
Number of Organization-
year Observations 
15,597 6,200 9,397 3,368 2,832 
Means; SD in parenthesis. 
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Table XVII: Descriptive Statistics - Organizations - M&A Type by Industry Relatedness 
 
Closely Related Related 
Broadly 
Related 
Unrelated 
Size (FTE) 136.830 134.666 173.325 130.171 
(261.357) (261.067) (330.588) (465.387) 
Size (FTE), t-1 136.816 133.767 169.826 130.007 
(264.963) (261.333) (325.604) (469.450) 
Size (FTE), t-2 136.816 133.767 169.826 130.007 
(264.963) (261.333) (325.604) (469.450) 
Profits, gross (DKK, mln) 11.691 13.384 31.116 11.915 
(197.387) (161.576) (114.356) (145.169) 
Profits, gross (DKK, mln) t-1 11.784 13.628 30.754 13.287 
(192.841) (159.014) (113.871) (147.109) 
Profits, gross (DKK, mln) t-2 13.406 14.212 29.662 14.652 
(192.681) (158.331) (109.624) (153.521) 
Sales, gross (DKK, mln) 320.882 320.141 392.004 246.426 
(1,122.718) (1,023.696) (1,019.914) (865.628) 
Sales, gross (DKK, mln) t-1 305.509 302.115 364.011 232.067 
(1,046.345) (954.901) (956.164) (800.659) 
Sales, gross (DKK, mln) t-2 286.760 282.584 340.910 217.646 
(962.659) (874.243) (886.893) (723.609) 
Knowledge-intensive services 0.255 0.285 0.226 0.225 
(0.436) (0.452) (0.419) (0.418) 
Not knowledge-intensive services 0.347 0.342 0.412 0.373 
(0.476) (0.475) (0.493) (0.484) 
High-tech industry 0.026 0.027 0.060 0.023 
(0.160) (0.163) (0.238) (0.150) 
Medium high-tech industry 0.122 0.117 0.168 0.134 
(0.327) (0.321) (0.374) (0.341) 
Medium low-tech industry 0.055 0.058 0.054 0.108 
(0.228) (0.235) (0.226) (0.311) 
Low-tech industry 0.128 0.111 0.039 0.074 
(0.334) (0.314) (0.193) (0.261) 
Region 5.931 5.624 4.897 5.873 
(3.659) (3.606) (3.456) (3.492) 
Primary industry, 10-Std.grp. 4.317 4.194 3.944 3.946 
(2.321) (2.114) (1.785) (1.978) 
Number of Organization-year 
Observations 
1,982 3,300 464 2,893 
Means; SD in parenthesis.  
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Table XVIII: Descriptive Statistics - Employees 
 
All M&A (Treated) No-M&A (Control) 
Entrepreneurial entry 0.056 0.055 0.057 
(0.230) (0.228) (0.232) 
Wage (DKK; 0,000) 37.273 37.738 36.873 
(31.916) (34.244) (29.754) 
Job tenure (years) 3.064 2.852 3.247 
(4.817) (4.573) (5.010) 
Age (years) 37.457 37.406 37.500 
(9.054) (8.945) (9.146) 
Primary school 0.199 0.203 0.195 
(0.399) (0.402) (0.396) 
High-school/gymnasium 0.101 0.107 0.096 
(0.302) (0.309) (0.295) 
Vocational training 0.360 0.348 0.369 
(0.480) (0.476) (0.483) 
College 0.210 0.211 0.209 
(0.407) (0.408) (0.407) 
University 0.131 0.131 0.131 
(0.337) (0.337) (0.337) 
Marital status 0.733 0.739 0.729 
(0.628) (0.630) (0.626) 
Sex 0.202 0.203 0.202 
(0.402) (0.402) (0.401) 
Number of children, age 0-6 0.451 0.452 0.450 
(0.730) (0.728) (0.732) 
Number of children, age 7-12 0.336 0.338 0.334 
(0.630) (0.631) (0.630) 
Number of children, age 13-18 0.206 0.199 0.212 
(0.499) (0.489) (0.507) 
Unknown rank 0.147 0.144 0.150 
(0.354) (0.351) (0.357) 
Manager 0.103 0.103 0.103 
(0.304) (0.304) (0.303) 
Professional 0.149 0.140 0.156 
(0.356) (0.347) (0.363) 
Technicians 0.207 0.222 0.194 
(0.405) (0.416) (0.396) 
Clerks and admin employees 0.055 0.056 0.055 
(0.229) (0.229) (0.229) 
Service and sales employees 0.049 0.049 0.049 
(0.217) (0.217) (0.217) 
Blue-Collar employees 0.209 0.203 0.214 
(0.406) (0.402) (0.410) 
Observations 69,671 32,283 37,388 
Means; SD in parenthesis. 
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3.1. RESULTS 
3.1.1. MAIN RESULTS 
In Table XIX, we observe the main results of the difference-in-differences 
regression. The models presented in the table are identical in all respects except the 
length of the time window after the event. All models include controls for 
demographic variables, employee rank, and organizational performance, as well as 
industry, year, location and organization fixed effects. At t0, we can observe that the 
M&A has occurred, meaning that it happened at a point in time between t-1 and t0. 
Column (1) displays the difference-in-differences estimate for the time window 
between t-5 and t+5, which thus includes 6 time points (years) after the event. As we 
can see, this model shows that there is no significant effect of M&As on 
entrepreneurship when we consider an extended post time period. This means that, 
whatever the effect of M&As on entrepreneurial entry, it does not show over an 
extended time period. The model in column (2) of Table XIX shows the results for 
the time window t-5 and t+3, meaning 4 time points following the M&A. Here, it is 
again shown that there is no significant effect of M&As on entrepreneurship for this 
time window. This means that there is no effect of M&A on entrepreneurship that 
sustains over several years after the deal closure. The model in column (3) displays 
the results for the time window t-5 and t0. Here, things look quite different: there is a 
significant effect of M&As on entrepreneurial entry, if we limit the time window to 
the period immediately after the closure of the deal (t0). There is a 2.0% increase in 
the entrepreneurship rate overall, which for the baseline rate means there is a 36.4% 
increase in the probability that employees will transition to entrepreneurship as a 
result of the M&A. In all cases, the period post M&A is not significant, meaning 
that differences in the entrepreneurship rates in the post period are not significantly 
different when the interaction with the treatment is considered. From this analysis, 
we can conclude that M&As do increase entrepreneurial entry but that this happens 
in the period immediately after the deal is closed. If we consider further time 
periods, the effect disappears, meaning that the effect is both significant and short-
lived. We can thus confirm Proposition 1: M&As increase employees’ probability of 
entering entrepreneurship, with the caveat that the effect does not sustain over time. 
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Table XIX: Entrepreneurial Entry, Linear Probability Models, Difference-in-Differences 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Period post M&A 0.002 0.004 -0.006 
[0.006] [0.007] [0.007] 
M&A x Post  0.004 0.006 0.020** 
[0.006] [0.007] [0.009] 
Demographic variables  Yes Yes Yes 
Employee rank  Yes Yes Yes 
Organizational Performance  Yes Yes Yes 
Organization fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes 
Location fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.00 0.01 0.01 
Log-likelihood 3,652 2,504 1,312 
Number of Organizations 2,621 2,436 1,803 
Observations 50,255 35,086 21,681 
(1) Window: -5>=t<=5; (2) Window: -5>=t<=3; (3) Window: -5>=t<=0. 
Standard errors are clustered at the level of the organization and reported in brackets.  
Significance levels: *(p<0.10), **(p<0.05), ***(p<0.01). Full regression results available on request. 
 
3.1.2. M&A TYPES 
In Table XX, we turn to the acquirer’s country of origin analysis and industry 
relatedness. In columns (1) through (4), we find the results of the difference-in-
differences linear probability models according to industry relatedness, from closely 
related to unrelated. Column 1 shows that closely related M&As do not have a 
significant effect on entrepreneurial entry. Thus, M&As between organizations 
whose core industry is the same do not increase employees’ probability of 
transitioning into entrepreneurship. Conversely, column (2) shows that related 
M&As (but not closely related) increase the entrepreneurial entry rate by 2.0%. This 
means that when there a certain degree of overlap in industries but not specifically 
on the core industries of both organizations, M&As increase entrepreneurial 
transition by approximately 36.4% with respect to the baseline rate. The results for 
broadly related M&As (i.e., deals where only secondary industries overlap), is 
displayed in column (3). The effect of M&As on entrepreneurial entry (61.8%) is 
even stronger, but at a lower significance level (p<0.10). However, unrelated M&As 
do not significantly increase entrepreneurial transition –as shown in column (4). 
Overall, these results indicate that neither “extreme” of the industry-relatedness 
spectrum increases entrepreneurial entry; however, those deals in between do. This 
could potentially describe some form of curvilinear relationship between industry 
relatedness and entrepreneurship. At any rate, proposition 2 is only partially 
confirmed, as related M&As increase the probability of employees entering 
entrepreneurship; however, closely related M&As do not. 
  
CHAPTER 3. M&AS AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
129 
Table XX: Entrepreneurial Entry by M&A Type, Linear Probability Models, Difference-in-Differences 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Post M&A -0.009 -0.007 -0.004 -0.005 -0.009 -0.005 
 [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] 
Closely related M&A x Post  0.012      
 [0.011]      
Related M&A x Post   0.020**     
  [0.009]     
Broadly related M&A x Post    0.034*    
   [0.018]    
Unrelated M&A x Post    0.011   
    [0.010]   
Domestic M&A X Post      0.022**  
     [0.011]  
Cross Border M&A X Post       0.015* 
      [0.009] 
Demographic variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Employee rank  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Organizational Performance  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Organization fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Log-likelihood 1,195 1,293 1,167 1,211 1,190 1,285 
Number of Organizations 1,573 1,658 1,483 1,647 1,668 1,632 
Observations 16,546 18,609 15,160 17,553 17,383 18,839 
Window: -5>=t<=0. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the organization and reported in brackets. 
Significance levels: *(p<0.10), **(p<0.05), ***(p<0.01). Full regression results available on request. 
 
In the remaining columns, we turn to the analysis of the acquirer’s country of origin 
(i.e., domestic acquisition or cross-border acquisition). The results in column (5) 
indicate that domestic M&As have a positive and significant effect of 2.2% on 
entrepreneurial transition. This translates into an increase of 40.0% in the baseline 
for the treated (5.5%). This result supports Proposition 3: Domestic M&As increase 
the probability of employees entering entrepreneurship. Similarly, cross-border 
M&As (column (6)) are also shown to increase transition to entrepreneurship by 
1.5%, which translates into a 27.3% increase on the baseline. Although we must be 
cautious about the latter as it is only significant at the 10% significance level 
(p<0.10), this finding indicates that cross-border M&As are also not totally exempt 
from the forces that drive the employees of M&A targets into entrepreneurship.  
3.1.3. WHO ENTERS ENTREPRENEURSHIP? 
In Table XXI, we turn to the analysis of who transitions to entrepreneurship as a 
result of M&As. The first aspect that we consider is the rank of individuals within 
the organization, split according to the categories previously outlined: managers, 
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professional, technicians, clerks and administrative employees, service and sales 
employees, and blue-collar employees (group “unknown” omitted). The results from 
this table are clear cut: with regard to which group of employees transitions to 
entrepreneurship as a result of M&As, the answer is managers. Whereas the change 
is not significant for other groups of employees (on average), managers are 
significantly more likely to transition to entrepreneurship following M&As. This 
result is consistent with the proposition that those closest to the internal opportunity 
ceiling are more likely to transition to entrepreneurship to advance their career. 
Managers, who have few opportunities to grow internally, as the number of higher 
positions in the organizational ladder is limited and their span of control is suddenly 
enlarged, transition to entrepreneurship to advance their careers.  
Table XXI: Entrepreneurial Entry by Employee Rank, Linear Probability Models, Difference-in-Differences 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Post M&A -0.030 -0.009 0.007 -0.016 -0.010 0.016 
 [0.020] [0.021] [0.014] [0.027] [0.033] [0.018] 
M&A x Post 0.087*** -0.007 0.009 0.005 0.035 -0.007 
 [0.028] [0.027] [0.017] [0.030] [0.036] [0.023] 
Demographic variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Organizational Performance  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Organization fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.02 
Log-likelihood 379 235 879 547 344 434 
Number of Organizations 715 593 889 400 227 725 
Observations 2,492 3,501 4,599 1,128 1,033 4,529 
 (1) Managers (2) Professionals (3) Technicians (4) Clerks (5) Service/Sales (6) Blue-Collar.  
Window: -5>=t<=0. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the organization and reported in brackets. 
Significance levels: *(p<0.10), **(p<0.05), ***(p<0.01). Full regression results available on request. 
 
In Table XXII, the regressions are split according the tenure quintiles, with the 
lowest 20% displayed in column (1) and the highest 20% displayed in column (3). 
Tenure is used as a proxy for matching quality, and the view of entrepreneurship as 
a mobility process poses that better-matched employees (i.e., with prolonged tenure) 
are the most likely to go solo as a result of changes to the internal opportunity 
structure. Tenure quintiles are based on industry-year-organizational rank groups; 
thus, each employee is considered to be in a certain quintile with respect to others in 
the same industry, the same year and at the same organizational level. The results 
show that the increase in entrepreneurial entry is not highly significant for any 
specific group in terms of tenure, with those in the lowest quintile showing the most 
significant effect. This result is not in line with the prediction that those who have 
spent the most time in the organization (i.e., who are better matched and have 
developed substantial organization-specific skills) will be particularly more likely to 
transition to entrepreneurship in the event of an M&A. The results furthermore 
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indicate that, on average, only those who have joined the organization recently are in 
fact more likely to enter entrepreneurship than before joining the organization. 
Table XXII: Entrepreneurial Entry, by Employee Tenure Quintile, Linear Probability Model  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Post M&A -0.004 0.000 -0.029 
 [0.012] [0.015] [0.022] 
M&A x Post 0.031* 0.023 0.004 
 [0.018] [0.022] [0.030] 
Demographic variables  Yes Yes Yes 
Organizational Performance  Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes 
Organization fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Location fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.01 0.02 0.01 
Log-likelihood 1,262 950 279 
Number of Organizations 1,290 1,007 641 
Observations 6,892 4,061 2,480 
(1) Lowest quintile - (2) Middle quintile - (3) Highest quintile. 
Window: -5>=t<=0. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the organization and reported in brackets. 
Significance levels: *(p<0.10), **(p<0.05), ***(p<0.01). Full regression results available on request. 
 
displays the regression results according to wage quintiles. Like the tenure quintiles, 
the wage quintiles are based on the industry-year-organizational rank groups; thus, 
each employee is considered to be in one of the quintiles with respect to others in the 
same industry, the same year and at the same organizational rank. Column (1) shows 
that those in the lowest end of the wage distribution are not particularly more likely 
to enter entrepreneurship as a result of an M&A. Similarly, column (3) shows that 
the same applies for those in the highest quintile of the wage distribution. However, 
for those in the middle, there is evidence of a positive effect of M&As on 
entrepreneurial transition, albeit at the 10% confidence level only (p<0.10). This 
result is not in line with the prediction that those with the highest wages (presumably 
the best matched employees) are more likely to enter entrepreneurship following an 
M&A. 
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Table XXIII: Entrepreneurial Entry by Wage Quintile, Linear Probability Models, Difference-in-Difference 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Post M&A -0.013 -0.011 -0.006 
 [0.027] [0.016] [0.012] 
M&A x Post 0.029 0.047* 0.016 
 [0.037] [0.025] [0.015] 
Demographic variables  Yes Yes Yes 
Organizational Performance  Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes 
Organization fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Location fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.03 0.02 0.01 
Log-likelihood -1 810 1,584 
Number of organizations 990 946 1,151 
Observations 3,376 3,436 7,349 
(1) Lowest quintile - (2) Middle quintile - (3) Highest quintile. 
Window: -5>=t<=0. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the organization and reported in brackets. 
Significance levels: *(p<0.10), **(p<0.05), ***(p<0.01), Full regression results available on request. 
3.2. DISCUSSION 
This article set out to study the impact of M&As on entrepreneurial entry. The main 
proposition was that M&As affect opportunity structures and thus trigger 
entrepreneurial entry by those employees working for M&A targets. To that end, 
this article provides concrete evidence that M&As indeed increase transition to 
entrepreneurship for employees of M&A targets. In doing so, the article supports 
and extends the previous studies on entrepreneurial entry in high-tech industries that 
have considered M&As to be a relevant factor (Brittain and Freeman, 1986; 
Buenstorf, 2007; Klepper, 2009; Klepper and Thomson, 2010). It also shows that 
this transition is particularly marked for employees in management positions who 
are arguably closest to the ceiling in the internal opportunity structure (Sørensen and 
Sharkey, 2014). For managers, M&As increase the attractiveness of 
entrepreneurship as a career choice, triggering the transition to entrepreneurship. 
The sudden increase in the span of control due to an M&A means that managers’ 
advancement opportunities are curtailed, translating into higher entrepreneurial entry 
rates. 
This is not the only potential explanation for the observed phenomenon, however. In 
particular, the model of strategic disagreements proposed by Klepper and Thomson 
(2010) arrives at similar predictions. Nevertheless, although managers may 
transition to entrepreneurship after disagreements on the strategies and technologies 
to be pursued by an organization, I find no evidence that this is the case for 
engineers/scientists, as expected by Klepper and Thomson (2010) and other entry 
models (Anton and Yao, 1995; Cassiman and Ueda, 2006; Hellmann, 2007). 
Overall, I believe the evidence of this cross-industry analysis is more supportive of 
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entrepreneurship as a mobility process as depicted by Sørensen and Sharkey (2014). 
That said, an important prediction of Sørensen and Sharkey (2014) is that well-
matched employees are more likely to transition to entrepreneurship as a result of 
shifts to internal opportunity structures. I found no evidence that this is the case, and 
in fact it appears those who have been with the organization for the shortest time 
period (relative to their industry peers that year) are most likely to make the 
transition to entrepreneurship as a result of the M&A. 
One key finding of this article is that the impact of M&As on entrepreneurial 
transition is short-lived. The increase in entry following M&As disappears over 
time; thus, it becomes insignificant in the longer run. Once managers leave the 
organization to found their own ventures, the remaining managers are no longer 
more likely to transition to entrepreneurship, on average. This also means that the 
reaction from those managers entering entrepreneurship is swift, and they do not 
remain with the organization long after the deal is closed. The implications of this 
finding are mostly practical: managers whose career trajectories are truncated by the 
M&A will seek to transition to entrepreneurship quickly, and the organization will 
not continue to bleed out managers in the medium term. This is important as the loss 
of managerial talent has often been reported as a consequence of M&As (Cannella 
and Hambrick, 1993; Walsh and Ellwood, 1991; Younge et al. 2014) and as a 
potential cause behind their lack of success (Cartwright and Schoenberg, 2006; 
Marks and Mirvis, 2001). 
Another key finding is that M&As are not a homogeneous phenomenon, nor is their 
impact on entrepreneurial transition. In this case, of particular interest is the degree 
of industry relatedness between target and acquirer. The M&A literature (Larsson 
and Finkelstein, 1999; Paruchuri et al., 2006; Puranam et al., 2009; Zollo and Singh, 
2004) would have suggested that the closer the degree of relatedness, the higher the 
levels of integration will be needed to fully unlock the value of the deal. Higher 
levels of resource redundancy and a greater span of management control would 
suggest that the higher the integration, the stronger the effect on entrepreneurial 
entry will be. The results, however, indicate that this holds only to a certain degree: 
unrelated deals do not have a significant effect, broadly related deals have a 
marginally significant effect, and related deals have a more significant effect. 
However, it is somewhat puzzling that closely related deals, which were expected to 
have the strongest effect, are not significant. This could mean that an identified 
countervailing force might be at play, generating a boundary condition or even a U-
shaped relationship between industry relatedness in M&As and entrepreneurial 
entry. Potential candidates in this case include noncompete contractual clauses or 
economic incentives (e.g., vested stock) to discourage employees’ transition to 
entrepreneurship. Wezel et al. (2006) in fact show that noncompete clauses indeed 
limit entry to entrepreneurship by employees departing established organizations. It 
is also possible that closely related deals are put off when the risk of entrepreneurial 
transition is high, thus precluding the effect of closely related deals on 
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entrepreneurship, which is in line with the Younge et al.’s (2014) findings on overall 
employee mobility.  
In general, I find that the country of origin of the acquirer is not a decisive factor on 
the impact of M&As on entrepreneurship. Both domestic and cross-border M&As 
have a positive effect on entrepreneurial entry, although the effect of domestic 
M&As is stronger and more significant. This finding is in line with the prediction 
that domestic M&As, which typically involve more extensive consolidation and 
integration, increase employees’ span of control and decrease the relative number of 
internal advancement opportunities. These outcomes lead employees of the target 
organization to seek opportunities elsewhere; the higher up the organizational ladder 
they are, the more likely it is that they will choose entrepreneurship as a career 
option. This finding also indicates that for cross-border deals, less extensive 
consolidation is typically expected, and the effect is therefore less pronounced. The 
results also indicate the possibility that, for cross-border M&As, there could indeed 
be a countervailing effect of new advancement opportunities that is not present in 
domestic deals. At any rate, the results can be taken as evidence that national culture 
differences between the parties are unlikely to be a major driver of entrepreneurial 
transition in M&As. This finding is in line with the growing evidence that the 
heightened attention to culture in cross-border deals prevents conflict and enhances 
cooperation (Stahl and Voigt, 2008; Vaara et al., 2012; Weber et al., 1996). 
This article is the first one to consider the effect of M&As on entrepreneurship 
beyond specific industries and to analyze quantitative phenomena including a 
comparable control group. The previous studies have considered M&As to be one of 
a number of relevant events in industry evolution (Brittain and Freeman, 1986; 
Buenstorf, 2007; Klepper, 2009; Klepper and Thompson 2010); however, this is the 
first to study M&As in depth and to link them to the phenomenon of entrepreneurial 
transition in its broadest conception. This is a key distinction, as the previous studies 
have more narrowly focused on a type entrepreneurship in high-tech industries that 
captures the public imagination but fails to account for the common phenomenon of 
entrepreneurial entry. Although there are good reasons for researchers to focus on 
the Intels and AMDs, a more general investigation of entrepreneurial transition is 
warranted as all types of entrepreneurship in conjunction carry a major weight in the 
economy (Sørensen and Fassiotto, 2011).  
Despite the merit of using objective data on a large sample of deals, organizations, 
and individuals, the limitations of the empirical strategy are clear. This article is 
limited by the inability to show conclusively the exact mechanisms and dynamics 
behind M&As and employees’ transition to entrepreneurship –the explanation of the 
evidence can only be speculative in nature. Additionally, the Danish labor market is 
considered to be particularly flexible; thus, extrapolating the findings from this study 
to other contexts should be done with caution. Nevertheless, as outlined by Dahl and 
Sorensen (2010), the mobility rates of Denmark are comparable to that of the US. 
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Replication of the findings presented here in other contexts will ultimately 
determine their wider applicability. It is my hope that this article will trigger further 
research in the field of the consequences of M&As, particularly regarding employee 
mobility. In this endeavor, perhaps further light can also be shed on the exact 
mechanisms that this article was not able to show. 
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Chapter 4. External CEO-TMT replacement 
and employee stress and turnover 
with Michael S. Dahl, Aarhus University 
Abstract: Organizations frequently replace the CEO and top 
management team members (TMT-members) through external 
recruitment. Studies have found that external succession in 
particular has effects on strategy and organization that change 
as the new members bring new cognitive frameworks and put 
their stamp on the organization. Empirically, this phenomenon 
has been found to affect the organizational performance; 
however, less is known about the impact on employees. This 
paper takes a point of departure in this literature and studies 
the effect of external CEO and TMT replacement on 
employees’ mental health and turnover using a unique panel of 
data from Denmark that links the CEO/TMT-member 
recruitment of organizations with the drug prescription and 
career histories of their employees. Following the argument 
that new external top managers alter the organization, we 
study if the recruitment of new CEO/TMT-members externally 
leads to disruptions for employees and causes employees to 
leave the organization or suffer from mental health problems 
such as insomnia, anxiety and depression. We find that 
external TMT recruitment increases both the probability of 
employees leaving the organization (especially following TMT 
recruitment in the period before) and their risk of receiving 
stress-related prescription drugs for insomnia, anxiety and 
depression. We also find that internally replacing the CEO 
coupled with the replacement of other TMT-members increases 
the probability of employee turnover, whereas joint 
replacement events involving external CEO replacement 
decrease it. This finding suggests a complex relationship 
between internal and external top management team 
replacement and its impact on employees.  
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4.1. INTRODUCTION 
Based on the premise that organizations are a reflection of their leaders (Hambrick 
and Mason, 1984), top management team (TMT) replacement has been a major topic 
in the management research for decades. Meanwhile, the direct performance 
outcome of TMT changes has been a fruitful area of research (i.e., Barron et al., 
2011; Haveman, 1993; Tushman and Rosenkopf, 1996; Williams et al., 2017), with 
a general focus on the CEO figure (i.e., Beatty and Zajac, 1987; Georgakakis and 
Ruigrok, 2017; Karaevli, 2007; Karaevli and Zajac, 2013; Khurana and Nohria, 
2000; Leker and Salomo, 2000; Shen and Cannella, Jr., 2002). A considerably less 
studied aspect of TMT replacement is its potential impact on employees’ 
psychological wellbeing and turnover. Employees’ mental wellbeing is clearly a 
relevant topic in itself; it is also relevant for organizations given the potential 
negative impact of impoverished mental health on employee productivity (Adler et 
al., 2006; Brenninkmeijer et al., 2008; Harter et al., 2002; Stewart et al., 2003; 
Wang et al., 2004). Moreover, employee turnover has been systematically associated 
with lower organizational performance through the erosion of human and social 
capital (e.g., Hancock et al., 2013; Kacmar et al., 2006; Park and Shaw, 2013; Shaw 
et al., 2005). Motivated by this literature, we investigate how external CEO/TMT 
replacement influences employees’ mental health and turnover. 
Replacement events represent inflection points in an organization’s life because 
newcomers often come with a mandate for change and are given substantial 
managerial discretion to carry change through (Barron et al., 2011; Karaevli, 2007; 
Quigley and Hambrick, 2012; Shen and Cannella, Jr., 2002). Since top managers’ 
decision-making is shaped by their ability to search for information, identify issues, 
specify alternatives and choose the most appropriate courses of action (Hambrick 
and Fukutomi 1991), altering the composition of the TMT potentially leads to 
changes in decision-making and strategy, consequently affecting the entire 
organization. Replacement by managers from outside the organization potentially 
introduces relatively more heterogeneity to the cognitive basis of the TMT than 
internal succession, and it consequently alters decision-making to a larger extent. In 
addition, external successors arguably have both stronger ability and motivation to 
push for change than do internal successors (Barron et al., 2011; Karaevli, 2007; 
Miller, 1993; Quigley and Hambrick 2012; Shen and Cannella, Jr., 2002; Virany et 
al., 1992; Wiersema, 1992; Weisbach, 1995).  
This article draws on the conversation of the effect of top leadership replacement 
events towards the individual-level psychological reactions. We study the extent to 
which external CEO/TMT replacement causes changes in employee stress and 
turnover, two key indicators of employees’ emotional and psychological wellbeing. 
We make use of an extensive panel dataset containing information on Danish 
organizations and individuals’ employment and medical histories. Through 
differences-in-differences and fixed effects regressions, we examine the increase in 
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employee negative stress and turnover due to external CEO/TMT replacement 
events. We operationalize stress as receiving prescriptions for insomnia 
(benzodiazepine-related medication and benzodiazepine derivatives) and anxiety and 
depression (selective serotonin re-uptake inhibitors) medications. This method has 
several advantages over other studies. First, it enables us to objectively measure the 
highly sensitive issue of serious mental health problems, overcoming the limitations 
of other studies that are based on self-reported surveys. Second, it measures severe 
negative stress-related mental health conditions. Although a certain level of stress is 
often considered positive for employees’ performance, when conditions such 
anxiety, insomnia and depression arise, stress becomes a serious mental health issue. 
Third, it allows us to track the outcome before and after treatment and therefore to 
measure the degree to which changes in stress levels are associated with changes in 
top management. 
Since the link between TMT replacement and employee reactions is virtually 
unexplored, we have adopted an inductive empirical approach (Helfat, 2007; Oxley 
et al., 2010). First, we provide a theoretical motivation for the study and its 
relevance. It is important to keep in mind that the presented theories are not meant to 
be a full list of all potential mechanisms linking TMT replacement with stress. These 
are not tested empirically in this study, and we present a selection of these 
mechanisms based on a review of the literature. Second, we provide robust empirical 
evidence of the phenomenon across a large number of organizations. Third, we 
provide an informal theoretical discussion of what the evidence reveals (Helfat, 
2007). As such, we provide context and theoretically plausible explanations to the 
link between top management replacement and employee reactions; however, we do 
not claim that this is the only hypothesis that could have been proposed a priori.  
4.1.1. EXTERNAL CEO/TMT REPLACEMENT AND 
ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE 
According to the upper echelons theory, strategic decisions are shaped by the entire 
management team, not only by the CEO (Hambrick and Fukutomi, 1991; Hambrick 
and Mason, 1984; Shen and Cannella, Jr., 2002). Organizational outcomes –strategy 
and effectiveness- are reflections of the values and cognitive bases of their top 
managers (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). Thus, the events of TMT-members’ 
replacement, and not just that of the CEO, may have a widespread impact both for 
the organization and for its employees (Barron et al., 2011). Studies have generally 
found that changes in top management have profound consequences on the strategy, 
structure, competencies, and processes of the organization (Karaevli, 2007; Miller, 
1993; Virany et al., 1992; Wiersema, 1995). New managers often have little 
incentive to keep the status quo at the company, and they are therefore more likely 
to promote change than their predecessors (Miller, 1993; Tushman and Rosenkopf, 
1996). The redistribution of power, the redesign of control systems, revision of 
practices, and new information systems are likely to be introduced following 
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succession (Miller, 1993). Executive replacement events can in fact have such a 
profound impact on organizations that they are often considered an inflection point 
in an organization’s trajectory (Quigley and Hambrick, 2012; Tushman and 
Rosenkpf, 1996). 
The organizational origin of incoming CEO/TMT-members is the most salient 
characteristic of top managers identified by the literature. The outcome of internal 
versus external replacement has been the subject of much controversy (Georgakakis 
and Ruigrok, 2017). In general, external replacement events are considered to bring 
about more fundamental change than internal succession for a number of reasons. 
First, new executive members increase cognitive diversity, bringing along new 
information and frameworks that help organizations adapt and evolve. The cognitive 
bases on which top executives operate are largely based on their previous experience 
(Hambrick and Mason, 1984), and therefore altering the composition of the top 
management through external replacement affects the cognitive basis on which the 
TMT operates to a greater extent than internally promoted members. Thus, new 
external CEO/TMT-members more markedly reshape the ability of top management 
to identify issues, search for information, specify alternatives and select appropriate 
courses of action (Hambrick and Fukutomi, 1991; Wiersema, 1992). Strategic 
decisions based on new cognitive schemas are less likely to perpetuate previous 
strategies and policies, and thus new external CEO/TMT-members are more inclined 
to introduce change than their predecessors. External CEO/TMT succession 
increases the relative heterogeneity of the top management, which increases the 
probability of diversion from past courses of action (Wiersema, 1992; 1995). New 
executives who were not part of the organization in the past are most likely to bring 
significant diversity as they do not share a set of common experiences with the rest 
of the TMT-members. 
Second, external successors are less committed to preserving the status quo, and 
they have an interest in overcoming opposition and building a loyal front (Hambrick 
and Mason, 1984). In general, successors who come from outside the organization 
therefore have a stronger motivation to push for changes in strategy and organization 
than executives who rose through the organization’s ranks (Miller, 1993; Hambrick 
and Mason, 1984). Executives who have climbed their way up the hierarchical 
structure have likely learned to manage the power structures of the organization; 
thus, they might be less keen on challenging the status quo (Barron et al., 2011). 
Moreover, managers often show a tendency to escalate investment and reinforce 
commitment to their past decisions to the point that they might get locked-into 
trajectories (Brockner, 1992). New external executives do not feel such commitment 
to past decisions as they were not part of the decision-making; thus, external 
replacement may provide the opportunity to break away from such investment 
trajectories.  
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Lastly, external successors are often expected to exert change and are thus given 
larger managerial discretion for defining and implementing such change (Shen and 
Cannella, Jr., 2002). This is a crucial aspect of replacement as organizations tend to 
develop a set of values and norms over time that is increasingly difficult to change 
(Hannan et al., 2003). Executives often become embedded in this organizational 
inertia, which serves to legitimize and institutionalize current practices, hardly 
carrying out significant organizational changes (Wiersema, 1992). External 
replacement may provide the opportunity to overcome such inertial forces and 
redirect the organization (Tushman and Romanelli, 1985; Tushman and Rosenkopf, 
1996). New executives with no exposure to the organization may have more 
discretionary power to alter current practices and challenge the existing power basis, 
to which they have no ties. 
4.1.2. ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE, EMPLOYEE STRESS AND 
TURNOVER 
The widespread change that follows succession can represent a source of disruption 
for the organization, particularly when it affects core organizational features: the 
organizational mission, the form of authority, the basic technologies, and the 
marketing strategy (Hannan and Freeman, 1984). When changes affect these 
features, they can be potentially disruptive for organizations since organizations are 
inherently resistant to change (Hannan et al., 2003). Altering well established 
routines and behavioral patterns is a destabilizing process that has uncertain 
(stochastic) outcomes, and decision-makers have a tendency to underestimate the 
true costs of change and the time needed to complete it (Hannan et al., 2003). Since 
the feedback effects of change are largely unpredictable, further (unexpected) 
changes are often needed to correct the deficiencies of prior changes, thus setting a 
stage of instability and uncertainty within the organization (Hannan et al., 2003).  
Employees often struggle to cope with the uncertainty caused by change, and they 
can respond emotionally to it (Vakola and Nikolaou, 2005). Employee responses to 
organizational change often manifest in increased levels of stress and depression 
(Bordia et al., 2004; Dahl, 2011; Ferrie et al., 1998; Hellgren and Sverke, 2003). 
Challenging “the way things are done in here” can increase employees’ fear and 
uncertainty in terms of their ability to cope with new methods and situations (Vakola 
and Nikolaou, 2005). Uncertainty (i.e., the lack of knowledge about current and 
future events) caused by organizational change leads to negative employee stress 
(Bordia et al., 2004). Uncertainty about the future direction of the company is likely 
to cause uncertainty at the structural level, which will ultimately translate into job-
related uncertainty. The latter is the most damaging for the psychological wellbeing 
of employees (Bordia et al., 2004). In sum, uncertainty about the new role of 
employees can generate frustration, stress, depression, and burn-out on the 
individuals during and following changes in the organization.  
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Another way in which change can elicit emotional responses is by breaching the 
implicit psychological contract between employees and employers. Psychological 
contracts are a set of expectations that are gradually formed regarding the mutual 
obligations between employees and their employers (Morrison and Robinson, 1997; 
Rousseau, 1989). Such expectations are often not written down, not even vocalized; 
however, they are still part of the culture and values of the workplace. These 
contracts can often be breached in the process of organizational change (Shield et 
al., 2002). If changes to the organization are crafted at the top management level 
with perhaps limited input from or regard for other organizational members, they 
have the potential to alienate employees and fail to fulfill the set of implicit mutual 
obligations (Montes and Zweig, 2009). Violation can then lead to reduced effort, 
uncivil behavior, or the exiting of the organization; it can also manifest in more 
emotional terms such as expressions of anger and distress, or even physical 
disturbances such as increased blood pressure and stress (Morrison and Robinson, 
1997). 
Dahl (2011) and Ferrie et al. (1998) provide large-scale empirical evidence on the 
effects of organizational change on employee wellbeing. Ferrie et al. (1998) found 
through a self-reported survey that individuals in organizations that undergo major 
changes are more likely to experience an increase in longstanding illness, adverse 
sleep patterns, and minor psychiatric morbidity. Similarly, Dahl (2011) found that 
organizational change has significant effects on employees’ levels of stress and 
depression, especially if they work in organizations that undergo broad change 
simultaneously in several dimensions.  
In addition to the evident importance of employee wellbeing in itself, employee 
reactions to change also have the potential to affect organizational performance. 
Severe psychological problems such as depression decrease employees’ productivity 
and ability to focus while also increasing absenteeism (Stewart et al., 2003; Wang et 
al., 2004). Studies have also shown that impoverished employee psychological 
wellbeing and working environment increases workplace conflicts and unrest, 
decreasing labor productivity and translating into significant financial losses 
(Krueger and Mas, 2004; Mas, 2008). Similarly, employee turnover leads to lower 
levels of organizational performance (Hancock et al., 2013; Hatch and Dyer, 2004; 
Kacmar et al., 2006; Park and Shaw, 2013; Shaw et al., 2005; Waldman et al., 2004) 
through the erosion of both human and social capital and increased overhead.  
External executive replacement and the ensuing uncertainty surrounding the 
organization may trigger different reactions among employees. While some workers 
may develop stress-related symptoms, external succession is also likely to translate 
into higher levels of employee turnover. The reason for this phenomenon is two-
fold: on the one hand, the uncertainty that follows organizational change erodes 
organizational commitment and increases levels of dissatisfaction, conflict and 
burnout. Although there is a multitude of factors that might affect employees’ 
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decision to leave an organization (for a review, see Cotton and Tuttle, 1986; Griffeth 
et al., 2000), we expect that external executive replacement will lead to a significant 
increase in the number of employees seeking to leave the organization.  
Other theoretical approaches to employee turnover, such as that of Holtom et al. 
(2005) and Lee et al. (1996), propose that voluntary turnover is usually caused by 
shocks to the individual’s identification with the organization. Shocks are events that 
are sufficiently relevant to individuals to cause them to question whether they should 
leave the organization, regardless of their previous level of job satisfaction (Holtom 
et al., 2005). Organizational changes resulting from external executive replacement 
that affect the organization’s core features can represent a shock to individuals, 
triggering a process of re-evaluation of their attachment to the organization. If 
external executive replacement results in widespread organizational change, we thus 
expect that employees who are exposed to external CEO/TMT replacement will 
have a higher probability of becoming stressed or leaving than employees who are 
not exposed to replacement. 
4.1.3. MULTIPLE AND JOINT REPLACEMENTS 
While CEO and TMT-member replacement events can be inflection points in 
organizations’ trajectories, some factors can either enhance or limit the potential for 
change of these events. One such factor is whether the CEO and TMT-members are 
jointly replaced or whether multiple TMT-members are replaced in a short period. 
Barron et al. (2011) argue that for substantial change to occur, the CEO replacement 
must be coupled with the replacement of other TMT-members to mark a change of 
guard. A substantive departure from the status quo requires a revamp of the entire 
TMT, and the establishment of a camp that is loyal to the new CEO. The joint 
replacement of the CEO and other TMT-members is necessary for new CEOs to 
have an impact on strategic change. In the same vein, Shen and Cannella, Jr. (2002) 
argue that new CEOs who come from outside the organization often do not have ties 
to other members of the TMT, which results in the hostile reception of newly 
appointed external CEOs. This, in turn, may result in both the voluntary and 
involuntary departures of senior TMT-members as external replacements seek to 
carry changes through. If only the CEO is replaced, other senior TMT-members may 
block or slow down attempts to implement substantial change.  
Karaevli (2007) similarly argues that the intent for change signaled by the board of 
directors when they hire an external CEO may not always match the newcomer’s 
ability to achieve change. TMT-members appointed by the outgoing CEO are likely 
to show hostility towards a new external CEO and to oppose change. This resistance 
limits the CEOs ability to initiate and carry change through, and therefore the joint 
replacement of the CEO and other TMT-members might be necessary for change. 
We thus expect the joint external replacement of the CEO and other TMT-members 
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in particular to enable more substantial organizational change and to thus lead to 
higher levels of employee stress and turnover.  
While we argue that externally replacing senior TMT-members generally leads to 
organizational change, it is possible that more substantial change is achieved when 
several members of the TMT are replaced simultaneously. Multiple TMT-member 
replacement should both further increase the cognitive diversity of the TMT 
(Hambrick and Fukutomi, 1991) and weaken the resistance to change from top 
management (Shen and Cannella, Jr., 2002). In the first follow-on analysis, 
therefore, we explore the role of the specific effect of joint CEO-TMT-member 
replacement and multiple-TMT-member replacement on employee stress and 
turnover.  
4.1.4. ORGANIZATIONAL STABILITY AND PREVIOUS 
PERFORMANCE 
In general, external successors are understood to have both greater motivation and a 
stronger mandate to implement substantial change than internal successors. 
However, even when external successors are brought in with the task of changing 
the organization, they are often unable to actually achieve such change (Karaevli, 
2007). Two key determinants of the ability of newcomers to carry change through 
identified by the CEO/TMT-member replacement literature relate to the context in 
which succession occurs. On the one hand, Boeker (1997) and Zhang and 
Rajagopalan (2010) emphasize the role of previous organizational performance in 
enabling change. Periods of poor performance help new executives overcome 
resistance to change (Boeker, 1997; Zhang and Rajagopalan, 2010). Arguing that 
performance indicates the suitability of the current organizational strategy, in their 
view, poor performance indicates the need for a directional change. Stakeholders 
will tend to support change more strongly when they perceive that change is 
required such as following a period of poor performance. If this is the case, we 
would expect that CEO/TMT-member replacement in a context of poor 
organizational performance would lead to more organizational change than in 
periods of solid performance. In our framework, this would translate into increased 
employee turnover and stress.  
Karaevli and Zajac (2013), on the other hand, emphasize the role of organizational 
stability more broadly in limiting or facilitating change. They argue that corporate 
stability (defined as ordinary succession, a long-tenured predecessor CEO, and good 
organizational performance) is required for external CEOs to be able to set and 
implement changes. Periods of poor organizational performance result in more 
limited financial resources, increased monitoring by the board and limited 
willingness to support uncertain or risky projects. Periods of stability and solid 
performance thus provide a platform for change whereas periods of poor 
performance and turmoil make harnessing the resources and support for change 
CHAPTER 4. EXTERNAL CEO-TMT REPLACEMENT AND EMPLOYEE STRESS AND TURNOVER 
149 
more difficult. Shen and Cannella, Jr. (2002) similarly argue that previous CEO 
tenure is a key determinant of the level of change following replacement, with 
succession following longer tenures being more prone to disruption and change. If 
this is the case, then we expect that external replacement in a context of positive 
organizational performance and without succession events in the previous years 
would provide the necessary platform for change, leading to higher levels of 
employee turnover and stress. In the second follow-on analysis, therefore, we focus 
on how previous performance and previous succession events influence the effect of 
CEO/TMT-member succession on employee turnover and stress. 
4.2. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY AND DATA 
Measuring the mental health effects of organizational events is a challenging 
endeavor. Widely used techniques, such as surveys and interviews, can suffer from 
severe limitations in the study of such sensitive matter since individuals may avoid 
revealing information regarding their mental health condition. Moreover, publicly 
available, objective data on the mental health of individuals is hardly available. 
This paper overcomes these limitations by means of a unique matched dataset that 
provides information on employee mobility patterns, on the one hand, and 
prescriptions of stress-related medication on the other. This dataset has been 
previously used in Dahl (2011) and Pierce et al. (2013). It is the product of the 
merger between the Danish Integrated Database for Labor Market Research (IDA) 
and a Danish database on medical prescriptions for all individuals in Denmark. In 
this way, we are able to observe a) employee mobility patterns to measure employee 
turnover, and b) the number of prescriptions for medicines related to stress and 
depression, for measuring negative employee stress. The individual data on mobility 
and medical prescriptions is additionally matched with organizational-level datasets, 
to identify CEO/TMT-member recruitment.  
As highlighted by Barron et al. (2011) and Quigley and Hambrick (2012), the 
continued presence of departed executives in the organization, for example, as chair 
of the board, is not uncommon. This might limit the ability of newcomers to 
implement substantive change (Quigley and Hambrick 2012), and we therefore 
empirically focus on cases where the former CEO/TMT-member departs the 
organization. 
Descriptive statistics of the sample can be found on Table XXIV and Table XXV. 
The tables are split between organizational-level variables (Table XXIV) and 
individual-level variables (Table XXV). As we can see, the mean stress level at 
organizations that experience external TMT or CEO replacement is slightly higher, 
and employee turnover slightly lower, than at organizations that do not experience 
external succession. Control organizations are also slightly smaller, younger, and 
less profitable than organizations that undergo external CEO or TMT-member 
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succession. Similarly, individual-level descriptive statistics reflect the same pattern, 
with employees in the control group being less likely female, more likely to be blue-
collar workers, and marginally younger and less experienced.  
Table XXIV: Descriptive Statistics - Organizations 
 
New Ext TMT 5 New Ext CEO No change 
 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Stress 0.052 0.046 0.052 0.046 0.047 0.042 
Turnover 0.130 0.120 0.136 0.122 0.176 0.131 
New External TMT 0.347 0.476 0.402 0.490 0 0 
New External CEO 0.132 0.338 0.223 0.416 0 0 
New Internal TMT 0.280 0.449 0.281 0.450 0.210 0.407 
New Internal CEO 0.064 0.244 0.065 0.246 0.094 0.292 
Average TMT age  47.068 6.469 46.631 6.787 49.749 7.048 
Average TMT tenure  7.374 5.282 6.379 5.185 11.134 6.230 
TMT size  7.712 20.558 7.647 18.438 5.118 50.944 
Organization age  15.115 7.700 14.916 7.703 13.071 8.150 
Founded <1980  0.398 0.489 0.380 0.485 0.339 0.473 
Organization size (Ln)  4.490 0.994 4.548 1.007 3.906 0.751 
Organization size (Ln), t-1  4.474 0.985 4.533 1.001 3.897 0.738 
Sales per employee  1.802 1.768 1.804 1.775 1.534 1.445 
Sales per employee, t-1 1.705 1.685 1.710 1.698 1.444 1.367 
Profit per employee 0.070 0.118 0.068 0.119 0.062 0.109 
Profit per employee, t-1  0.066 0.111 0.064 0.112 0.058 0.103 
Number of organization-year  
Observations 23,574 13,944 6,950 
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Table XXV: Descriptive Statistics - Employees 
 
New Ext TMT 5 New Ext CEO No change 
 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Stress 0.057 0.232 0.056 0.230 0.051 0.219 
Turnover 0.130 0.336 0.135 0.341 0.165 0.371 
Female 0.357 0.479 0.349 0.477 0.311 0.463 
Age  41.761 10.861 41.580 10.843 40.085 11.402 
Labor market experience (Ln) 15.355 6.621 15.274 6.606 14.069 6.817 
Tenure (Ln) 7.079 6.365 7.126 6.373 5.649 6.002 
Full time 0.910 0.286 0.912 0.284 0.880 0.325 
Blue collar 0.675 0.468 0.682 0.466 0.739 0.439 
1st gen immigrant 0.041 0.199 0.043 0.202 0.039 0.194 
2nd gen immigrant 0.003 0.058 0.003 0.058 0.004 0.059 
Kids (0-5 yrs) 0.252 0.561 0.257 0.565 0.255 0.565 
Kids (6-12 yrs) 0.300 0.615 0.304 0.618 0.283 0.600 
Kids (13-17 yrs) 0.183 0.457 0.184 0.458 0.174 0.447 
Number of person-year  
observations 2,724,994 1,560,491 509,447 
 
4.2.1. VARIABLES 
TREATMENTS 
The first treatment is defined as working for an organization that experiences the 
external replacement of a top-5 non-CEO TMT-member in terms of pay (New 
External TMT). This identification of core TMT-members is largely in line with the 
approach used by most of the TMT-replacement literature. Barron et al. (2011), for 
example, uses that approach and focuses on the top-3 non-CEO TMT-members. 
The second treatment (New External CEO) is defined as working for an organization 
that experiences the external CEO replacement in particular. The CEO is taken as 
the highest paid executive. Both treatments take the value 1 if the individual is 
treated, and zero otherwise.  
To contrast the proposition that external replacement has a particular impact on the 
organization, we also test whether internal succession has a similar effect. For that 
purpose, we additionally create a treatment for the internal replacement of a top 5 
non-CEO member of the TMT (New Internal TMT) and a treatment for internal 
CEO replacement (New Internal CEO). 
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For the follow-on analysis, we develop a series of treatments for multiple and joint 
TMT-CEO replacement events. To test the effect of the simultaneous replacement of 
multiple top-5 TMT-members on employees, we created two treatments: multiple 
external top-5 TMT-member replacement (New Multi-External TMT) and multiple 
internal top-5 TMT-member replacement (New Multi-Internal TMT). The next 
treatment of the follow-on analysis (Joint) refers to employees working for an 
organization that experiences the joint replacement of the CEO and other top 5 
members of the TMT. Next, a treatment was created for each combination of joint 
internal-external CEO-top 5 TMT-member replacements: joint external CEO and 
external top 5 TMT-member replacement (External CEO-External TMT), joint 
external CEO and internal top 5 TMT-member replacement (External CEO-Internal 
TMT), joint Internal CEO and external top 5 TMT-member replacement (Internal 
CEO-External TMT), and joint internal CEO and internal top 5 TMT-member 
replacement (Internal CEO-Internal TMT). 
For the follow-on analysis of the role of stable and unstable organizational contexts, 
we created treatments for external top 5 TMT-member replacement and external 
CEO replacements in the context of stability and instability. Stability was defined as 
no previous TMT replacements in the previous period. By comparison, instability 
was defined as TMT replacement with other top 5 TMT-members replaced in the 
previous period. Four conditions were created: external CEO replacement in a stable 
organizational context (New External CEO, Stability), external top-5 TMT-member 
replacement in a stable context (New External TMT, Stability), external CEO 
replacement in an unstable context (New External CEO, Unstable), and external top-
5 TMT-member replacement in an unstable context (New External TMT, Unstable). 
Finally, to further test the proposition that change through succession is only 
enabled by stable organizational contexts, we construct a series of 1-1 matched 
samples of organizations. The first sample (338 organizations) is composed of 
organizations that experienced a decline in sales from the previous year and either 
external top-5 TMT-member replacement (treated) or no replacement (control). The 
second sample (488 organizations) is composed of organizations that also 
experienced declining sales from the previous year and that experienced either 
external CEO replacement (treated) or no replacement (control). The last two 
samples, of 968 and 1672 organizations, respectively, are analogous but in a context 
of sales increase.  
DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
The first dependent variable in this study is a measure of negative employee stress. 
The data on stress come from the Danish Medical Database, which is maintained by 
Statistics Denmark. The prescriptions of medicines typically used to treat stress-
related symptoms (insomnia, anxiety, and depression) were traced before and after 
the treatment. These drugs are selected according to their codes provided by the 
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Anatomic Therapeutic Chemical (ATC) classification system, produced by the 
World Health Organization Collaborating Center for Drug Statistics Methodology. 
In particular, we identify drugs related to shorter-term insomnia (benzodiazepine-
related medication, ATC: N05CF) and longer-term insomnia (benzodiazepine 
derivatives, ATC: N05BA), on one hand, and anxiety and depression (selective 
serotonin re-uptake inhibitors, ATC: N06AB) on the other. The variable Stress is a 
dummy variable, taking the value 1 if the individual was prescribed with stress-
related medication that year, and zero otherwise. 
The second dependent variable in this study is employee turnover. The data in this 
case come from Danish Integrated Database for Labor Market Research (IDA), also 
maintained by Statistics Denmark. Employee turnover is a dummy variable, taking 
the value 1 if the employee leaves the organization, and zero otherwise. 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Organizational and environmental conditions are key elements that can affect the 
relationship between CEO/TMT-member replacement and strategy change 
(Georgakakis and Ruigrok, 2017; Karaevli, 2007; Karaevli and Zajac, 2013). For 
that reason, it is essential to control for both past organizational performance and 
industry. Organizational performance is measured by sales (at t0 and t-1) and profit 
(at t0 and t-1) per employee. Industry is a categorical variable based on 2-digit NACE 
codes. Organizational size (ln) is measured as the number of FTE and reported at t0 
and t-1 whereas organizational age is measured in the years since it was founded. In 
addition, a dummy for organizations founded before 1980 (the year the records start) 
is also included.  
Also at the organizational level, we control for the average size of the TMT (number 
of top executives based on ISCO classification), the average age of the TMT, and 
the average tenure of the TMT in the organization. 
At the individual level, a number of demographic variables are controlled for. These 
include years of age, gender (1 female, 0 male), number of kids (age 0-5, age 6-12, 
and age 13-17), and two dummy variables indicating whether the individual is a 
first- or second generation immigrant (1 yes, 0 no). Job-related individual-level 
years of tenure in the organization, and labor market experience (number of years in 
labor market). All models in this paper control for the variables mentioned in this 
section and standard errors are always clustered at organizational level. 
4.2.2. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
In an ideal experiment, we would randomly assign CEO and TMT changes with 
internal and external replacements to organizations and follow the prescriptions of 
employees. This is obviously not a feasible research design. We rely on two other 
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strategies for the identification of effects. First, we study the effects in a differences-
in-differences design, where we compare changes over time to a set of control 
organizations that have not experienced the changes at the CEO/TMT-level. We 
control for the financial performance and other observable characteristics to 
minimize potential selection bias. Second, we estimate the within-organization 
effects in linear probability models with organization fixed effects. This allows us to 
control for unobservable differences between organizations. 
These strategies at least partly account for the following concerns: Omitted variable 
bias, which happens when a variable (unaccounted for) is both correlated with the 
outcome (stress and turnover) and the treatment (external CEO/TMT-member 
replacement). The most obvious candidate in this case is the performance of the 
organization prior to the recruitment of a new CEO/TMT-member. Employees may 
be under stress or leaving the organization due to poor organizational performance, 
which also causes the replacement of top executives. To address the potential noise, 
we first and foremost control for organizational performance (sales, sales per 
employee and profit per employee) for the last two years prior to the replacement 
event. In addition, in the second follow up analysis, we create a matched sample of 
comparable organizations with comparable performance prior to succession (treated) 
and no succession (control).  
4.3. RESULTS 
4.3.1. MAIN ANALYSIS 
Table XXVI displays the results of the main analysis on employee turnover. All 
models in this table are logistics regressions and include controls for employee 
demographics and rank, TMT characteristics (as well as organizational age and 
size), current and past size and performance, industry fixed effects and year fixed 
effects. Standard errors in all models are clustered at the organizational level. In 
column (1), we regress the probability of an employee leaving the organization on 
the hiring of a new internal CEO (New Internal CEO), a new external CEO (New 
External CEO), a new internal TMT-member (New Internal TMT) or a new external 
TMT-member (New External TMT). The results in column (1) show a positive and 
significant (p<0.01) correlation between employee turnover and the hiring of new 
internal and external TMT-members. We find no correlation between external CEO 
replacement and employee turnover, and a very marginally significant (p<0.10) 
negative correlation between internal CEO replacement and employee turnover. 
In columns (2) to (4), we turn to the differences-in-differences (DID) analysis. Here, 
the variables of interest are the interaction of the treatment and the post period –i.e., 
the period after the treatment. In column (2) we find that despite the initial 
appearance of a lack of correlation between external CEO replacement and 
employee turnover, this process masked a positive and significant (p<0.01) effect in 
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the post period for the treated with respect to the control. That is, the DID analysis 
shows that external CEO replacement has a positive effect on the probability of 
employee turnover, an increase of approximately 24%. Similarly, external TMT-
member replacement (column (3)) also results in a significant probability increase of 
approximately 70% in employee turnover. Column (4) shows that internal TMT-
member replacement also has a positive effect, although it is smaller and less 
significant than that of external replacement. 
Table XXVI: Employee Turnover, Logistic Regressions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
New Internal CEO -0.089*    
 [0.050]    
New External CEO 0.028    
 [0.058]    
New Internal TMT 0.093***    
 [0.032]    
New External TMT 0.169***    
 [0.043]    
New External CEO (all years)  -0.075**   
  [0.034]   
New External CEO x Post  0.216***   
  [0.037]   
New External TMT (all years)   -0.511***  
   [0.058]  
New External TMT x Post   0.535***  
   [0.044]  
New Internal TMT (all years)    -0.200*** 
    [0.039] 
New Internal TMT x Post    0.087** 
    [0.035] 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.05 
Log-likelihood -839,991 -840,074 -836,737 -840,452 
Number of Organizations 4,537 4,537 4,537 4,537 
Number of person-year observations 2,223,106 2,223,106 2,223,106 2,223,106 
Standard errors are clustered at the level of the organization and reported in brackets. 
Significance levels: *(p<0.10), **(p<0.05), ***(p<0.01). 
 
In Table XXVII, we repeat the model of Table XXVI, and we include organization 
fixed effect to account for unobserved organizational heterogeneity. The models 
displayed are all linear probability models. Overall, the direction of the results in 
column (1) is the same as those displayed in Table XXVI. When we turn to the DID 
analysis, however, we obtain quite a different perspective. The DID estimator for 
external CEO replacement is not significant when unobserved organizational 
heterogeneity is controlled for in column (2). The same applies to internal TMT-
member replacement, which no longer has an effect on employee turnover. 
However, external TMT-member replacement shows robustness to organization 
INDIVIDUAL CONSEQUENCES OF ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE 
156
 
fixed effects as displayed in column (3) of Table XXVII. Employees working for an 
organization that undergoes external TMT-member replacement are more likely to 
leave than before, compared to the control, and this likelihood is robust to 
unobserved organizational heterogeneity. This assessment is consistent with the 
proposition that replacement of the whole top management team has an impact on 
the organization, and not just that of the CEO. It is also consistent with the 
proposition that more change would come from external TMT-member replacement 
than from internal replacement. The finding that, overall, external CEO replacement 
does not have a significant effect is more surprising. One potential explanation is 
that external CEO replacement alone might not be enough to enable change. It could 
be that additional TMT changes are required to enable substantive change in the 
organization following CEO replacement, as argued by Baron et al. (2011), among 
others. We address this scenario in the next section. 
Table XXVII: Employee Turnover, Organization Fixed Effects Model, Linear Probability 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
New internal CEO -0.017***    
 [0.004]    
New External CEO -0.004    
 [0.009]    
New internal TMT 0.008**    
 [0.003]    
New External TMT  0.012***    
 [0.004]    
New External CEO x Post  0.003   
  [0.007]   
New External TMT x Post   0.048***  
   [0.005]  
New Internal TMT x Post    0.002 
    [0.005] 
Organization fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Log-likelihood -689,065 -689,357 -688,230 -689,359 
Number of Organizations 4,537 4,537 4,537 4,537 
Number of person-year observations 2,223,106 2,223,106 2,223,106 2,223,106 
Standard errors are clustered at the level of the organization and reported in brackets. 
Significance levels: *(p<0.10), **(p<0.05), ***(p<0.01). 
 
In Table XXVIII, we turn to the analysis of employee stress. Analogous to Table 
XXVI, in column (1), we regress the probability of receiving stress-related 
medication on CEO and TMT-member replacement. In this case, we find no 
correlation between employee stress and internal or external CEO succession, a 
weakly significant correlation (p<0.10) with internal TMT-member replacement, 
and a more significant correlation with external TMT-member replacement. In 
columns (2) to (4) we turn to the DID analysis. Here, we see that there is no effect of 
either external CEO succession (column (2)) or internal TMT-member replacement 
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on employee stress. We find, however, a nearly 4% positive effect of external TMT-
member replacement on employee stress (p<0.05). 
Table XXVIII: Employee Stress, Logistic Regressions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
New internal CEO 0.008    
 [0.015]    
New External CEO -0.014    
 [0.014]    
New internal TMT 0.016*    
 [0.009]    
New External TMT  0.025**    
 [0.010]    
New External CEO (all years)  -0.016   
  [0.016]   
New External CEO x Post  0.015   
  [0.016]   
New External TMT (all years)   -0.019  
   [0.021]  
New External TMT x Post   0.036**  
   [0.017]  
New Internal TMT (all years)    0.021 
    [0.020] 
New Internal TMT x Post    0.011 
    [0.014] 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
Log-likelihood -451,748 -451,754 -451,749 -451,752 
Number of Organizations 4,537 4,537 4,537 4,537 
Number of person-year observations 2,223,106 2,223,106 2,223,106 2,223,106 
Standard errors are clustered at the level of the organization and reported in brackets. 
Significance levels: *(p<0.10), **(p<0.05), ***(p<0.01). 
 
In Table XXIX, we repeat the models of Table XXVIII and include organization 
fixed effects. All models in this table are linear probability models. Column (1) 
shows that when accounting for unobserved organizational heterogeneity, there is no 
correlation between employee stress and either internal CEO or internal TMT-
member replacement. The positive correlation between stress and external TMT-
member replacement is also weak (p<0.10), as is the negative correlation with 
external CEO replacement. Columns (2) to (4) display the DID estimation results. 
Here, we see that the results from Table XXVIII are robust throughout to 
unobserved organizational heterogeneity. Only external TMT succession has a 
positive and significant effect on employee stress. This is in line with the findings 
for employee turnover, and we also take it as evidence that the external replacement 
of members of the whole TMT -and not specifically of the CEO- has a significant 
impact on employees’ mental wellbeing throughout the organization. 
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Table XXIX: Estimated Probability of Stress, Organization Fixed Effects Models, Linear Probability 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
New internal CEO 0.000    
 [0.001]    
New External CEO -0.001*    
 [0.001]    
New internal TMT 0.000 0.000   
 [0.000] [0.000]   
New External TMT  0.001* 0.000   
 [0.000] [0.000]   
New External CEO x Post  -0.000   
  [0.001]   
New External TMT x Post   0.002***  
   [0.001]  
New Internal TMT x Post    -0.001 
    [0.001] 
Organization fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Log-likelihood 165,629 165,627 165,631 165,627 
Number of Organizations 4,537 4,537 4,537 4,537 
Number of person-year observations 2,223,106 2,223,106 2,223,106 2,223,106 
Standard errors are clustered at the level of the organization and reported in brackets. 
Significance levels: *(p<0.10), **(p<0.05), ***(p<0.01). 
 
4.3.2. FOLLOW-ON ANALYSIS: MULTIPLE AND JOINT 
REPLACEMENTS 
The finding that external CEO replacement does not have a significant effect on 
either employee turnover or stress seems to go against the initial proposition of this 
study. As discussed above, however, a stream of literature has recently indicated that 
CEO succession may not be enough to enable substantial organizational change. In 
particular, the recent findings suggest that the joint replacement of the CEO and 
other TMT-members is required to achieve change (Barron et al., 2011; Karaevli, 
2007; Shen and Cannella, Jr., 2002). Thus, we next turn to the analysis of multiple 
TMT-member replacements and joint CEO-TMT-member replacements. First, we 
consider the effect of the replacement of multiple internal and external TMT-
members on employee stress and turnover. The results are displayed in Table XXX. 
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Table XXX: Employee Turnover and Stress, Logistic Regressions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
New Multi-External TMT (all years) -0.105*  0.039*  
 [0.055]  [0.022]  
New Multi-External TMT X Post 0.061  -0.021  
 [0.053]  [0.018]  
New Multi-Internal TMT (all years)  -0.212***  0.014 
  [0.055]  [0.022] 
New Multi-Internal TMT X Post  0.026  0.007 
  [0.044]  [0.016] 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.04 
Log-likelihood -491,113 -580,059 -260,332 -315,584 
Number of Organizations 2,417 2,698 2,417 2,698 
Number of person-year observations 1,265,224 1,534,221 1,265,224 1,534,221 
Employee Turnover: Columns 1 & 2; Stress: Columns 3 & 4.  
Standard errors are clustered at the level of the organization and reported in brackets. 
Significance levels: *(p<0.10), **(p<0.05), ***(p<0.01). 
 
As above, all models include controls for employee demographics and rank and 
TMT characteristics as well as organizational age, current and past size and 
performance, industry fixed effects and year fixed effects. Standard errors in all 
models are clustered at the organizational level. Columns (1) and (2) in Table XXX 
shows the effect of multiple external and internal TMT-member replacements on 
employee turnover, respectively: neither event has an effect on employee turnover. 
Columns (3) and (4) display the effect of multiple external and internal TMT-
member replacements on employee stress: similarly, there is no effect of either event 
on employee stress. These results are robust to unobserved organizational 
heterogeneity, as shown in unreported linear probability models with organization 
fixed effects (available on request).  
These results suggest that the effect of external TMT-member replacement observed 
in the previous section is not related to multiple replacement events. Employees’ 
probability of exiting the organization or becoming stressed is not particularly 
increased by multiple TMT replacements. This finding can seem slightly puzzling as 
we would have expected that multiple replacements would bring about more change 
and thus have a more disruptive effect on employees. A possible explanation is that 
external top management replacement has a marginally decreasing effect on stress 
and turnover. If that is the case, it would suggest that the heterogeneity brought by a 
single new external TMT-member would be more disruptive for the organization 
than the simultaneous replacement of several top-team members. Another possible 
explanation is that the replacement of a single TMT-member is qualitatively 
different than the replacement of multiple TMT-members as they are simply 
different phenomena, perhaps with diverging causes.  
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Next, we turn our attention to the analysis of joint CEO-TMT-member replacement 
events. In this case, we identified five possible scenarios. In the first scenario, all 
possible joint replacements involving the CEO and another member of the TMT are 
considered to be a single treatment (Joint), as displayed in column (1) in Table 
XXXI through XXXIII. In the second scenario, organizations undergo joint external 
CEO replacement and external TMT-member replacement during the same period 
(column (2) in Table XXXI through XXXIII). In the third scenario, organizations 
undergo joint external CEO and internal TMT-member replacement in the same 
period (column (3) in Table XXXI through XXXIII). In the last two scenarios, 
organizations undergo joint internal CEO replacement and either external TMT-
member replacement (column (4) in Table XXXI through XXXIII) or internal TMT-
member replacement (column (5) in Table XXXI through XXXIII) displays the DID 
estimation results of logistic regressions for employee turnover. The main variables 
of interest here are also the interactions between the treatments and the post period 
variable. Column (1) shows that the overall effect of joint replacement events is 
positive but only marginally significant (p<0.10). That translates into a weakly 
significant link if we lump together all types of joint replacement. Column (2) shows 
that joint external CEO-external TMT-member replacement has no effect on 
employee turnover. The same can be said about joint external CEO-internal TMT-
member replacement in column (3) and joint internal CEO-internal TMT-member 
replacement (column (5)). In contrast, the joint internal replacement of the CEO and 
external replacement of a TMT-member does have a positive and significant effect 
of approximately 31% on the probability of employee turnover.  
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Table XXXI: Employee Turnover, Logistic Regressions - Joint Replacements 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Joint -0.217***     
 [0.048]     
Joint x Post 0.084*     
 [0.044]     
External CEO-External TMT  -0.176***    
  [0.049]    
External CEO-External TMT x 
Post 
 0.064    
  [0.047]    
External CEO-Internal TMT   -0.084   
   [0.064]   
External CEO-Internal TMT x 
Post 
  0.040   
   [0.061]   
Internal CEO-External TMT    -0.088  
    [0.066]  
Internal CEO-External TMT x 
Post 
   0.268***  
    [0.069]  
Internal CEO-Internal TMT     -0.140** 
     [0.058] 
Internal CEO-Internal TMT x 
Post 
    0.004 
     [0.059] 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06 
Log-likelihood -657,004 -580,442 -311,331 -261,211 -407,820 
Number of Organizations 3,699 3,250 1,733 1,629 2,443 
Number of person-year 
observations 
1,709,845 1,495,844 795,821 657,694 1,046,746 
Standard errors are clustered at the level of the organization and reported in brackets. 
Significance levels: *(p<0.10), **(p<0.05), ***(p<0.01). 
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Table XXXII displays the results of the DID analysis of joint replacement events, 
with the addition of organization fixed effects to control for unobserved 
organizational heterogeneity. All models are linear probability models with standard 
errors clustered at the organizational level. The results show that by adding 
organization fixed effects, the overall effect of joint replacement (column (1)) 
becomes insignificant. However, this finding masks the fact that different types of 
joint replacement are actually significant but in opposite directions. Both joint 
replacement events involving external CEO replacement (columns (2) and (3)) have 
a negative effect on employee turnover. Both joint replacement events involving 
internal CEO replacement (columns (4) and (5)) have a positive and significant 
effect on employee turnover. By controlling for unobserved organizational 
heterogeneity, we thus confirm that joint replacement events involving internal CEO 
replacement have a positive impact on employee turnover whereas joint replacement 
events involving external CEO replacement have a negative impact on turnover.  
These findings appear to be slightly paradoxical and to contradict the previous 
theories (e.g., Shen and Cannella, Jr., 2002) that predict that external CEO 
successors will embark on swift change. It is possible that two mechanisms are at 
play: On one hand, since employees may have limited knowledge of the new 
external CEOs and TMT-members, they might delay their decision to depart the 
organization until they have gathered enough information on the potential impact of 
the replacement. On the other hand, this finding would be consistent with Karaevli’s 
(2007) narrative of Louis V. Gerstner, Jr.’s tenure as CEO of IBM: external CEOs 
may take their time to increase their knowledge of the organization before initiating 
change. If that were generally the case, then we would not observe a discrete 
increase in employee turnover immediately following joint external CEO/TMT-
member events. Internal CEO replacements –of the type described by Shen and 
Cannella, Jr. (2002) as “contender successors”- with their more in-depth knowledge 
of the organization, would be in a position to initiate change swiftly after their 
appointment, bringing in new external TMT-members to that end. As opposed to 
ordinary internal CEO replacement, in which the CEO retires, contender succession 
is the result of a power struggle that ends in the ousting of the CEO and often other 
TMT-members. While internal CEO replacement per se may not have a significant 
effect on employee turnover, the combination of internal CEO replacement and 
external TMT-member replacement can precisely describe the “contender 
succession” event. 
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Table XXXII: Employee Turnover, Organization Fixed Effects Models, Linear Probability - Joint Replacements 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Joint x Post 0.002     
 [0.004]     
External CEO-External TMT x 
Post 
 -0.012**    
  [0.005]    
External CEO-Internal TMT x 
Post 
  -0.015**   
   [0.007]   
Internal CEO-External TMT x 
Post 
   0.022***  
    [0.007]  
Internal CEO-Internal TMT x 
Post 
    0.014** 
     [0.006] 
Organization fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Log-likelihood -547,295 -488,569 -265,443 -227,989 -345,813 
Number of Organizations 3,699 3,250 1,733 1,629 2,443 
Number of person-year 
observations 
1,709,845 1,495,844 795,821 657,694 1,046,746 
Standard errors are clustered at the level of the organization and reported in brackets. 
Significance levels: *(p<0.10), **(p<0.05), ***(p<0.01). 
 
In Table XXXIII, we turn to the analysis of joint replacement in terms of employee 
stress. As above, the variables of interest are the interactions between the treatment 
and the post variable. The models in Table XXXIII are all logistic regressions on the 
probability of receiving stress-related medication prescription and include the same 
set of controls as in the previous models. Standard errors are clustered at the 
organizational level. The results show that there is no significant effect of any type 
of joint replacement on employee stress. These results are further confirmed by 
unreported linear probability models with organization fixed effects (available on 
request). These findings indicate that joint replacement events are not generally 
sufficiently relevant in terms of their impact on employees’ mental health. 
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Table XXXIII: Employee Stress, Logistic Regression - Joint Replacements 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Joint -0.004     
 [0.021]     
Joint x Post 0.016     
 [0.016]     
External CEO-External TMT  0.003    
  [0.021]    
External CEO-External TMT x 
Post 
 -0.011    
  [0.017]    
External CEO-Internal TMT   0.050**   
   [0.025]   
External CEO-Internal TMT x 
Post 
  -0.022   
   [0.024]   
Internal CEO-External TMT    0.030  
    [0.032]  
Internal CEO-External TMT x 
Post 
   -0.017  
    [0.030]  
Internal CEO-Internal TMT     0.012 
     [0.025] 
Internal CEO-Internal TMT x 
Post 
    0.023 
     [0.021] 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 
Log-likelihood -349,325 -304,237 -164,367 -135,498 -215,352 
Number of Organizations 3,699 3,250 1,733 1,629 2,443 
Number of person-year 
observations 
1,709,845 1,495,844 795,821 657,694 1,046,746 
Standard errors are clustered at the level of the organization and reported in brackets. 
Significance levels: *(p<0.10), **(p<0.05), ***(p<0.01). 
 
4.3.3. FOLLOW-ON ANALYSIS: ORGANIZATIONAL STABILITY AND 
PREVIOUS PERFORMANCE 
One of the latest debates regarding the effect of CEO/TMT-member replacement on 
the organization concerns the role of organizational stability and performance in 
enabling change (Karaevli and Zajac, 2013; Shen and Cannella, Jr., 2002). Stability 
is thus defined in terms of positive organizational performance and the lack of recent 
leadership changes. These arguments are partly contested by scholars (Boeker, 1997; 
Zhang and Rajagopalan, 2010) who claim to the contrary that change is only 
possible following periods of poor performance, as performance is a clear indicator 
of the suitability of current systems and strategies for the environment. Therefore, it 
is quite possible that CEO/TMT-member replacement has a markedly different 
effect on employee turnover and stress depending on whether it follows a period of 
poor organizational performance and/or other leadership changes.  
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To analyze the combination of organizational stability (in terms of leadership 
replacement) and organizational performance, we created two matched samples in 
which we observed CEO/TMT-member replacement (treated) or no replacement 
(control) in a context of either negative organizational performance or positive 
performance. Performance was measured as sales growth (positive/negative), 
although additional samples used sales-per-employee growth and profit-per-
employee growth for robustness, with essentially the same results. The main results 
are presented on Table XXXIV through Table XXXVII.  
Table XXXIV shows the DID estimation results for the external CEO replacement 
in a context of falling sales. These are linear probability models with organization 
fixed effects and include all the control variables from the previous models. In this 
context, external CEO replacement that was not preceded by CEO replacement in 
the previous period (New External CEO Stability x Post) has a negative effect on 
employee turnover. The probability of employee turnover therefore decreases when 
the CEO is externally replaced and sales are declining, if the CEO has not been 
replaced in the previous year. Conversely, when the CEO has been replaced in the 
previous year (New External CEO Instability x Post), externally replacing the CEO 
has no effect on employee turnover. Neither treatment has a significant effect on 
employee stress. In sum, in a context of poor organizational performance, external 
CEO replacement has a negative effect on employee turnover if the CEO had not 
also been replaced in the previous year and no effect if the CEO had been replaced 
in the previous year. This finding suggests that stability and performance combine to 
determine the effect of external CEO replacement on employee turnover and that 
employees may react positively to a leadership change when performance is 
negative and the CEO has not been recently replaced. 
Table XXXIV: Employee Turnover and Stress, Organization Fixed Effects Models, Linear Probability - Sales drop 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
New External CEO Stability x Post -0.033**  -0.004  
 [0.015]  [0.005]  
New External CEO Instability x Post  0.006  0.002 
  [0.013]  [0.002] 
Organization fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.02 
Log-likelihood -52,865 -85,655 15,060 19,604 
Number of Organizations 292 488 292 488 
Number of person-year observations 150,214 320,990 150,214 320,990 
1-Stable, 2-Unstable; 3-Stable, 4-Unstable. 
Standard errors are clustered at the level of the organization and reported in brackets. 
Significance levels: *(p<0.10), **(p<0.05), ***(p<0.01). 
 
The results of external TMT-member replacement in a context of declining sales 
with and without replacement in the previous period are displayed in Table XXXV. 
The external replacement of a TMT-member when sales are in decline has no effect 
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on employee turnover if TMT-members had not been replaced the year before (New 
External TMT Stability x Post). Similarly, the action also does not have a significant 
effect on employee stress. Conversely, the external replacement of TMT-members 
when replacement also occurred the previous year (New External TMT Instability x 
Post) and sales are in decline has a positive and significant effect on employee 
turnover. The effect of such replacement on employee stress is negative, although it 
is only marginally significant (p<0.10). Overall, this indicates that in a context of 
poor organizational performance, the effect of external TMT-member replacement 
on employee turnover depends on whether changes to the TMT also occurred during 
the previous period. 
Table XXXV: Employee Turnover and Stress, Organization Fixed Effects Models, Linear Probability - Sales drop 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
New External TMT Stability x Post -0.007  0.001  
 [0.011]  [0.004]  
New External TMT Instability x Post  0.053***  -0.004* 
  [0.008]  [0.002] 
Organization fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.01 
Log-likelihood -37,167 -50,109 9,813 14,912 
Number of Organizations 216 336 216 336 
Number of person-year observations 98,742 139,322 98,742 139,322 
Columns: 1-Stable, 2-Unstable; 3-Stable, 4-Unstable. 
Standard errors are clustered at the level of the organization and reported in brackets. 
Significance levels:*(p<0.10), **(p<0.05), ***(p<0.01). 
 
To compare the scenario of poor organizational performance described above, Table 
XXXVI displays the results of DID models for external CEO replacement in the 
context of increasing sales. All models are linear probability models with 
organization fixed effects, and we control for the same set of variables as in all 
previous models. External CEO replacement, whether it follows replacement in the 
previous year (New External CEO Instability x Post) or not (New External CEO 
Stability x Post), has no effect on either employee turnover or employee stress in a 
context of increasing sales. Taken together, this is evidence that when performance 
is positive, external CEO replacement does not have a significant impact on 
employee turnover or stress, irrespective of CEO replacement in previous years. 
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Table XXXVI: Employee Turnover and Stress, Organization Fixed Effects Models, Linear Probability - Sales Increase 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
New External CEO Stability x Post 0.013  -0.002  
 [0.013]  [0.003]  
New External CEO Instability x Post  0.017  -0.001 
  [0.014]  [0.002] 
Organization fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.01 
Log-likelihood -100,923 -134,324 27,263 37,557 
Number of Organizations 785 928 785 928 
Number of person-year observations 269,802 360,572 269,802 360,572 
Columns: 1 and 2, employee turnover, 3 and 4, employee stress. 
Standard errors are clustered at the level of the organization and reported in brackets. 
Significance levels: *(p<0.10), **(p<0.05), ***(p<0.01). 
 
Finally, Table XXXVII shows the results of the models for external TMT-member 
replacement in a context of positive organizational performance. As in the rest of the 
models in this section, these are linear probability models with organization fixed 
effects and include the same controls as the rest of the models. We find that, in this 
context, external TMT-member replacement has a negative effect on employee 
turnover when there has not been replacement in the previous year (New External 
TMT Stability x Post) and a positive effect if there has been replacement the year 
before (New External TMT Instability x Post). External TMT-member replacement 
does not have an impact on employee stress in a context of sales increase, 
irrespective of TMT replacement the year before. In sum, organizational 
performance does not make a difference on the effect of external TMT-member 
replacement on employee turnover and stress; however, stability does. Replacement 
after a period of replacement has a positive effect on employee turnover, regardless 
of the performance of the organization. These results are further confirmed in 
(unreported) robustness checks for different measures of organizational performance 
(sales per employee, profit per employee) and by reviewing replacement in the 
previous two years. 
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Table XXXVII: Employee Turnover and Stress, Organization Fixed Effects Model, Linear Probability - Sales Increase 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
New External TMT Stability x Post -0.025**  -0.002  
 [0.012]  [0.003]  
New External TMT Instability x Post  0.046***  0.000 
  [0.007]  [0.002] 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.01 
Log-likelihood -78,224 -89,954 23,470 29,574 
Number of Organizations 502 603 502 603 
Number of person-year observations 225,928 275,674 225,928 275,674 
Columns: 1 and 2, employee turnover, 3 and 4, employee stress. 
Standard errors are clustered at the level of the organization and reported in brackets. 
Significance levels: *(p<0.10), **(p<0.05), ***(p<0.01). 
 
4.4. DISCUSSION 
Motivated by the debate on the outcomes of top management succession, we studied 
the effect of external CEO/TMT-member replacement on employee stress and 
turnover as well as the roles of multiple replacements and organizational stability 
and performance in such outcomes. To this end, we used a large panel dataset of 
Danish organizations and employees that contains information on employees’ 
mobility and medical prescriptions. We consistently found that external TMT-
member replacement increases employee turnover and stress and that external TMT-
member replacement in unstable contexts increases employee turnover irrespective 
of the organizational performance in the period leading up to the replacement. These 
findings are in line with the upper-echelon view of the firm, by which the whole 
TMT shapes the organization and its strategy; the findings do not support views that 
either positive or negative organizational performance is a prerequirement for 
change (Boeker, 1997; Karaevli and Zajac, 2013; Zhang and Rajagopalan, 2010). 
Performance is relevant, however, with regard to external CEO replacement. In a 
context of positive performance, external CEO replacement does not have a 
significant impact on employee turnover or stress, irrespective of CEO replacement 
in the previous years. When performance is negative, externally replacing the CEO 
actually reduces employee turnover if no replacement happened the year before. 
Taken together, this is evidence that CEO succession is least disruptive for 
employees when the organization is performing strongly, and it is even positive in 
periods of poor performance without recent replacement. 
Another major finding is that joint replacement events involving internal CEO 
replacement increase employee turnover whereas joint replacement events involving 
external CEO replacement decrease turnover. We believe that two mechanisms 
could be at play in this case: first, it may be a timing issue, which occurs as 
employees wait to obtain more information on the new external CEO’s and the 
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remodeled TMT’s potential impact on the organization and as the new executives in 
turn learn more about the organization before embarking on major changes. This 
would be consistent with cases such as Louis V. Gerstner, Jr.’s tenure as CEO of 
IBM (Karaevli, 2007). Second, it is possible that internal “contender succession” –
whereby the CEO is forced to step down as a result of power struggles and is 
replaced internally– can be more disruptive for employees than external CEO 
replacements when coupled with a new TMT. With their more in-depth knowledge 
of the organization, internal “contenders” would be in a position to initiate change 
swiftly after their appointments, bringing in new TMT-members to overcome 
opposition to change. This is in line with Shen and Cannella, Jr. (2002), who note 
that internal contender succession will have the most immediate impact on 
organizational performance as contenders initially have a better understanding than 
external candidates of the required changes and how to harness internal support. 
This second possible mechanism raises some questions regarding the extent to 
which executive “outsiderness” is a meaningful trait in cognitive terms, as initially 
theorized. If external CEOs bring in fresh perspectives and cognitive schemas that 
have a substantial impact on the organization, then why does the joint external 
replacement of the CEO and other TMT-members not have an impact on employee 
turnover and stress whereas internal replacement does have an impact? Further, the 
argument of internal political resistance to new external CEOs is not sound because, 
in this scenario, members of the TMT are also replaced, paving the way for the new 
CEO to establish his or her agenda. Overall, on one hand, the evidence supports the 
notion of “contender” succession as the most disruptive type for employees, and, on 
the other, it calls for a re-examination of the factors of outsiderness that may 
determine the impact of external successors on employee turnover and stress. 
The replacement of multiple members of the TMT does not show an effect on either 
stress or turnover. This is in some ways surprising as one would logically expect that 
more TMT replacement would lead to more change and thus more stress and 
turnover. A possible explanation is that top management replacement may have a 
negative marginal effect on stress and turnover whereby, after the first replacement, 
replacing additional members gradually decreases the effect of replacement on 
employee stress and turnover. We believe that this could be an indication that a 
“change of guard” in the TMT decreases internal conflict. If this were the case, it 
opens up the possibility that internal power struggles are the driving force of 
employee stress and turnover down the line, rather than organizational change, as 
initially theorized in the current study. Further investigation should shed light on this 
specific question. 
This article informs two contemporary discussions. First, it contributes to the debate 
on the impact of organizational changes on employee turnover and mental wellbeing 
(Dahl, 2011; Ferrie et al., 1998). Second, it expands the discussion on the outcomes 
of CEO/TMT-member recruitment (i.e., Barron et al., 2011; Georgakakis and 
Ruigrok, 2017; Karaevli, 2007; Karaevli and Zajac, 2013; Quigley and Hambrick, 
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2012; Shen and Cannella, Jr., 2002; Williams et al., 2017) by considering its impact 
on individual employees throughout the organization. We show that external 
CEO/TMT-member recruitment has significant implications for employee turnover 
and, to a lesser extent, employee stress. Given the well-established link between 
employee turnover and organizational performance (Kacmar et al., 2006; Park and 
Shaw, 2013; Shaw et al., 2005), the effect of external recruitment on turnover is 
indeed an important finding. Organizations’ decisions to hire new CEO/TMT-
members should account for increased levels of employee turnover as a consequence 
of external recruitment, and the potential associated costs should also be considered 
in the executive hiring decision. 
Our panel dataset enables us to overcome common methodological limitations by 
allowing us to consistently and objectively track individual mobility patterns and the 
prescription of medicines related to stress for the entire Danish population. Access 
to linked data on medicine prescriptions on this scale provides an exceptional 
opportunity for analyzing the mental health outcomes of organizational phenomena. 
There are some limitations to the current study that should be considered. It is 
possible that CEO/TMT-member replacement and employee turnover/stress are 
jointly caused by a third (omitted) variable. The obvious candidate in this case is 
organizational performance. Thus, we controlled for past organizational 
performance and several organizational characteristics to limit the potential effect of 
poor performance on stress and turnover. However, we do not know why the 
CEO/TMT-member was replaced, which could have been unrelated to 
organizational performance and not captured by other observable variables. Another 
limitation of the empirical setting is that while we empirically demonstrate the 
phenomenon, we are unable to disentangle the exact mechanisms behind it. We 
propose a series of plausible mechanisms behind the effect of external CEO/TMT-
member succession on employee turnover and stress; however, we are not able to 
dismiss all other potential alternative mechanisms. In particular, based on the extant 
literature, we propose that CEO/TMT-member replacement leads to organizational 
change and that organization change leads to employee stress and turnover. 
However, it is possible that CEO/TMT-member replacement leads to stress and 
turnover through other mechanisms such as internal struggles for power and political 
disputes. 
Another limitation of this study is that we cannot observe potential coping 
mechanisms other than stress and turnover. It is possible that individuals used other 
means for coping with change besides turnover such as negative organizational 
citizenship behaviors, absenteeism, the lack of organizational commitment, or the 
abuse of alcohol and other substances. We are only able to measure a reduced –
albeit significant- number of outcomes of organizational change on wellbeing. 
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Finally, this study is also limited in terms of the population it studies as the Danish 
labor market is considered to be particularly flexible. There are relatively low 
barriers to switching employers since, for example, holidays and pension schemes 
are transferable from one employer to another. It is possible that employees in other 
labor markets with higher costs of switching employers will be less prone to 
changing and, instead, cope with change in different ways. In such cases, it is also 
possible that employees are more likely to become stressed as a consequence of not 
being able to depart from the organization. With respect to populations with higher 
switching costs, we infer that the results of this study may provide a higher 
estimation of the effect on turnover and an underestimation of the effect on stress.  
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Organizations increasingly engage in M&As and executive board shakeups 
–but how do these impact employees’ behavior? Do employees suffer from 
anxiety and depression when top managers are ousted and replaced by out-
siders? Do the “best and brightest” leave in droves following M&As? Or do 
employees transition to entrepreneurship instead? Employees’ mental well-
being is clearly a relevant topic in itself, and it is also crucial for organiza-
tions given the potential negative impact of impoverished mental health on 
employee productivity. Employee turnover, on the other hand, undermines 
performance by eroding the social and human capital base of the organization 
and affecting organizational performance, survival and competitive advan-
tage. Similar to turnover, entrepreneurial entry has been associated with sig-
nificant performance damage for the source organization. This thesis brings 
us a step closer to understanding the impact of these predominant business 
practices on the organizations’ micro-foundations –their employees.
